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The strategic management literature emphasizes the firm’s speed in the time-to-build 
its plant as a source of its competitive advantage. The extant research literature has achieved 
substantial progress by recognizing the firm’s speed in its time-to-build its plant as a strategic 
decision involving a cost-benefit tradeoff, and by distinguishing the firm’s faster speed in its 
time-to-build its plant from its superior speed capability of building its plant faster at the same 
cost. This distinction leads to the question of how the firm might achieve competitive advantage 
through its superior speed capability of building its plant faster at the same cost, which shifts 
the focus away from simply examining how the firm can achieve faster speed in its time-to-
build its plant.  
However, the previous literature has mostly focused on pre-entry speed capability, 
which is a focal firm’s speed capability for its recent previous plant construction in the related 
markets prior to its entry into the focal market. I examine instead post-entry speed capability, 
which is the focal firm’s speed capability for its current plant construction after it enters the 
focal market. I revisit the same empirical context of extant research, focusing on the post-
demand shock market in the Liquefied Natural Gas industry caused by energy market 
liberalization in 2000. This previous research found that firms with superior pre-entry speed 
capability are more likely to enter the post-shock market. In my research, I find that firms in 
the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities compared to firms in the pre-
shock period. My empirical finding is surprising because firms with superior pre-entry speed 
capability are more likely to enter the market later. Furthermore, firms in the post-shock period 
have more opportunities to learn from their own experiences (i.e., experiential learning) or 
others’ experiences (i.e., vicarious learning). However, my further analysis provides two 
explanations on why firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities 
relative to firms in the pre-shock period: namely, new entry of lower speed-capable firms in 
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the post-shock period and increasing opportunity costs arising from not applying non-scale-
free resources into more new projects in the post-shock period. Empirical results from my 
further analysis corroborate these explanations.  
I also find that the industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., the outer boundary of speed) in 
the post-shock period expands relative to that in the pre-shock period, whereas firms in the 
post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities as compared to firms in the pre-
shock period. In particular, I find that the industry-wide speed frontier does not follow a             
U-shaped relationship between time-to-build and cost-build, but fitted value becomes less 
negative (and even can be positive) when more firms make investments far within the speed 
frontier.  
In addition to looking at pre-entry and post-entry speed capabilities, I consider another 
key issue in the literature: distinguishing the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant 
(i.e., the time lag between the firm’s plant construction initiation and its completion) from its 
superior speed capability of building its plant faster at the same cost. This dissertation 
contributes to the extant literature both theoretically and empirically by providing boundary 
conditions, which distinguish the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant from its 
superior speed capability of building a plant faster at the same cost. To address the lack of 
distinction between the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant and its superior speed 
capability of building its plant faster at the same cost, I first develop a model and derive a 
theoretical framework of the firm’s time-to-build, cost-to-build, and marginal cost-to-build its 
plant when the firm’s speed capability and/or product-market demand change. My theoretical 
framework shows that a firm with inferior speed capability can have faster speed if product-
market demand increases substantially (additionally, it shows that the firm with superior speed 
capability can have slower speed if product-market demand decreases substantially). Next, I 
empirically examine firms’ time-to-build their plants and their speed capabilities in the LNG 
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industry by using a demand shock caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. I find that, 
despite inferior speed capability, firms in the post-shock period have a shorter time-to-build 
their plants (i.e., faster speed) relative to firms in the pre-shock period.  
In conclusion, this dissertation makes four major findings, all of which have significant 
repercussions for the strategic management literature. First, this dissertation finds that a firm’s 
pre-entry and post-entry speed capabilities can diverge, and particularly that firms with superior 
pre-entry speed capabilities do not necessarily achieve post-entry speed capabilities. This 
empirical finding suggests a further avenue for investigation: researchers should examine the 
antecedents and outcomes of post-entry speed capability to see how they differ from those of 
pre-entry speed capability. Second, I find that a demand shock in LNG market can lead to a 
firm’s loss of capability even if the shock is positive in a homogenous product market. This 
finding suggests that, in examining the development of firm capabilities and the nature of firm 
competition, rapid change in a homogenous product market should be considered a context as 
important as a rapidly changing technological environment or heterogeneous demand. Third, I 
find that industry-wide speed frontier does not follow a U-shaped relationship between time-
to-build and cost-build, but heterogeneity in firms’ speed capability can contribute to less 
negative (and even positive) fitted value of time-to-build and cost-to-build. This empirical 
finding complements recent research on time compression (dis)economies, which found time 
compression economies, not diseconomies, and provided two potential explanations to explain 
time compression economies: (1) heterogeneity in firms’ speed capability or (2) a U-shaped 
relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build with the majority of firms not realizing 
their economies of time compression. My data show a pattern consistent with heterogeneity in 
firms’ speed capability. This empirical result suggests that time compression diseconomies and 
their changes can be better understood by focusing on the industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., 
the outer boundary of speed), while firm-specific speed capability can be better understood by 
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identifying changes in firms’ distances from the speed frontier. Fourth, my dissertation shows 
that firms with inferior speed capability can have faster speed when product-market demand 
increases substantially. This finding suggests that practitioners and academic researchers 
should distinguish the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant from its superior speed 
capability of building its plant faster at the same cost. This distinction suggests that researchers 
should examine the antecedents and outcomes of the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its 
plant from its superior speed capability of building its plant faster at the same cost in tandem.  
In coming to these conclusions, this dissertation fills research gaps in the extant literature and 
offers new insights on the relationships among a firm’s post-entry speed capability, speed, and 
product-market demand. By combining theoretical rigor and practical relevance in this way, I 
seek to provide a contribution to the strategic management field. I also hope to offer guidance 
for future research to go beyond the LNG industry to test empirically the warranted 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction 
The strategic management literature has emphasized speed as a potential source of a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Helfat, et al. 2007; Stalk & Hout, 1990; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997). The extant literature has achieved substantial progress by recognizing that a firm’s speed 
is a strategic decision involving a cost-benefit tradeoff (Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1966; Teece, 
1977), and by distinguishing faster speed from superior speed capability (Hawk, Pacheco-de-
Almeida, & Yeung, 2013, Pacheco-de-Almeida, Hawk, & Yeung, 2015). “Faster speed’ refers 
to a shorter time lag between initiation and completion of an event of interest (e.g., investment 
or R&D), whereas ‘superior speed capability’ means faster speed at the same cost. The 
distinction between faster speed and superior speed capability enables us to recognize that a 
firm with faster speed need not have superior speed capability, because faster speed can incur 
substantially higher cost and thereby diminish speed capability. This distinction leads to the 
question of how the firm might achieve competitive advantage through its superior speed 
capability of building its plant faster at the same cost, which shifts the focus away from simply 
examining how the firm can achieve faster speed in its time-to-build its plant.  
However, the extant literature has mostly focused on pre-entry speed capability, which 
is a focal firm’s speed capability for its recent previous plant construction in the related markets 
prior to its entry into the focal market. For example, research has examined the relationship of 
the firm’s pre-entry speed capability and market-entry timing, the effect of superior pre-entry 
speed capability on financial performance at entry timing, and what moderates the relationship 
of superior pre-entry speed capability and firm performance (Hawk et al. 2013; Pacheco-de-
Almeida et al. 2015). Even though it is important to understand pre-entry speed capability, the 
extant literature assumed that a firm with superior pre-entry speed capability would have 
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superior post-entry speed capability, and thus has overlooked understanding the firm’s post-
entry speed capability.  
Chapter 2 fills this research gap in the extant literature by examining the firm’s post-
entry speed capability, which is the focal firm’s speed capability for its current plant 
construction after it enters the focal market. I revisit the same empirical context of extant 
research, focusing on the post-demand shock market in the Liquefied Natural Gas industry 
caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. This previous research found that firms with 
superior pre-entry speed capability are more likely to enter the post-shock market. In Chapter 
2, I focus on the specific constructs of the firm’s time-to-build its plant (i.e., the time lag 
between the firm’s plant construction initiation and its completion) and its speed capability (i.e., 
the time-to-build its plant at the same cost) after its market entry. I find that firms in the post-
shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities compared to firms in the pre-shock 
period. This finding is surprising because firms with superior pre-entry speed capabilities are 
more likely to enter the market later (Hawk et al. 2013). Furthermore, firms in the post-shock 
period have additional opportunities to learn from their own experiences or others’ experiences 
(Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 1990; Dixit, 1992; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Kim & Miner, 2007; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1994; Pindyck, 1991; 
Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997; Zimmerman, 1982). In my further analysis, I address this 
surprising outcome by examining why firms in the post-shock period (i.e., firms facing rapidly 
increasing product-market demand) have inferior post-entry speed capabilities. My further 
analysis provides two explanations on why firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-
entry speed capabilities relative to firms in the pre-shock period: namely, new entry of lower 
speed-capable firms in the post-shock period and increasing opportunity costs arising from not 
applying non-scale-free resources into more new projects in the post-shock period. Empirical 
results from my further analysis corroborate these explanations.  
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I also find that the industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., the outer boundary of speed) in 
the post-shock period expands relative to that in the pre-shock period, whereas firms in the 
post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities as compared to firms in the pre-
shock period. In particular, the industry-wide speed frontier does not follow a U-shaped 
relationship between time-to-build and cost-build, but fitted value becomes less negative (and 
even can be positive) when more firms make investments far within the speed frontier.  
In addition to pre-entry and post-entry speed capabilities, this dissertation considers 
another key issue in the literature, namely, distinguishing faster speed from superior speed 
capability. The conceptual distinction this dissertation emphasizes between the firm’s faster 
speed in its time-to-build its plant from its superior speed capability of building its plant faster 
at the same cost, challenges the extant literature’s implicit assumption that firms with superior 
speed capability will demonstrate faster speed (e.g., Hawk & Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2018). The 
lack of distinction between the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant from its superior 
speed capability of building its plant faster at the same cost can be highly impactful. The 
continuing lack of distinction between faster speed and superior speed capability arises from 
two gaps in the literature. First, the absence of empirical research examining the divergence of 
the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant from its superior speed capability of building 
its plant faster at the same cost in tandem, and, second, the lack of a theoretical understanding 
of the boundary condition of when faster speed and superior speed capability can diverge. 
Chapters 3 and 4 fill the gap in the extant literature by providing theoretically the boundary 
condition for when the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant can diverge from its 
superior speed capability of building its plant faster at the same cost. The developed theory is 
then tested in the context of the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry by using the demand 
shock caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. 
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Specifically, Chapter 3 provides a new formal analytical model examining a firm’s 
time-to-build, cost-to-build, and marginal cost-to-build its plant when product-market demand 
and/or a firm’s speed capability change. This model views the firm’s time-to-build its plant as 
both a strategic choice based on product-market demand (which shifts revenue curve) and an 
outcome of its speed capability (which shifts cost curve). This chapter provides exhaustive 
scenarios of product-market demand and/or speed capability changes that this developed 
decision-theoretic model explains. Each scenario involves theoretically distinct predictions for 
a firm’s time-to-build, cost-build, and marginal cost-to-build a plant: together, these 
distinctions enable us to discern whether and in what direction the product-market effect and/or 
speed capability effect are substantially at play. Table 1.1 summarizes these scenarios and their 
corresponding theoretical predictions. Based on the results of applying my developed decision-
theoretic model, I submit that a firm with inferior speed capability can have faster speed when 
product-market demand increases substantially (and that a firm with superior speed capability 
can have slower speed when product-market demand decreases substantially). Chapter 3 thus 
fills the literature gap by providing an analytical model to determine the boundary condition 
when the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant can diverge from its superior speed 
capability of building its plant faster at the same cost. 
Chapter 4 addresses the literature’s empirical shortcoming in distinguishing between 
the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant from its superior speed capability of building 
its plant faster at the same cost. It provides an empirical examination of firms’ time-to-build, 
cost-to-build, and marginal cost-to-build their plants when product-market demand increases 
and speed capability decreases by exploiting a demand shock in the Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) industry caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. Consistent with my developed 
model, I find that firms in the post-shock period have shorter times-to-build their plants (i.e., 
faster speed), despite their inferior speed capabilities relative to firms in the pre-shock period. 
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To account for a potential endogeneity bias from self-selection, I adopt Wooldridge’s (2010) 
three-step instrumental variable (IV) approach and use monthly price volatility as the 
instrumental variable. The result of my theoretical and empirical work in Chapters 3 and 4 
demonstrates that the firm’s faster speed in its time-to-build its plant and it superior speed 
capability of building its plant faster at the same cost are distinct constructs and can diverge.   
In conclusion, this dissertation fills the research gaps in the extant literature by offering 
several new insights into the relationships among a firm’s post-entry speed capability, speed, 
and product-market change. Specifically, this dissertation makes four major contributions to 
the strategic management literature. First, this dissertation finds that a firm’s pre-entry and 
post-entry speed capabilities can diverge, and particularly that firms with superior pre-entry 
speed capabilities do not necessarily achieve post-entry speed capabilities. This finding 
suggests a further avenue for investigation: researchers should examine the antecedents and 
outcomes of post-entry speed capability to see how they differ from those of pre-entry speed 
capability. Second, I find that a demand shock in LNG market can lead to a firm’s loss of speed 
capability, even if the shock is positive in a homogenous product market. This finding suggests 
that, in examining the development of firm capabilities and the nature of firm competition, 
rapid change in a homogenous product market should be considered a context as important as 
a rapidly changing technological environment (Teece, et al. 1997) or heterogeneous demand 
(Adner, 2002). Third, my dissertation complements recent research on time compression 
(dis)economies (Hawk & Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2018), which found time compression 
economies, not diseconomies. By distinguishing industry-wide speed frontier and firm-specific 
speed capability, I find that the industry-wide speed frontier does not follow a U-shaped 
relationship between time-to-build and cost-build, but fitted value becomes less negative when 
more firms make investments far within the speed frontier. This empirical finding complements 
recent research on time compression (dis)economies, which found time compression 
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economies, not diseconomies, and provided two potential explanations to explain time 
compression economies: (1) heterogeneity in firms’ speed capability or (2) a U-shaped 
relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build with the majority of firms not realizing 
their economies of time compression. My data show a pattern consistent with heterogeneity in 
firms’ speed capability.  This empirical result suggests that time compression diseconomies 
and their changes can be better understood by focusing on the industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., 
the outer boundary of speed), while firm-specific speed capability can be better understood by 
identifying changes in firms’ distances from the speed frontier. Fourth, this dissertation finds 
that firms with inferior speed capability can have faster speed when product-market demand 
increases substantially. This finding suggests that practitioners and academic researchers 
should consider the antecedents and consequences of the divergence of the firm’s faster speed 
in its time-to-build its plant from its superior speed capability of building its plant faster in 
tandem. 
In coming to these conclusions, this contribution to the strategic management field not 
only adds a nuanced theoretical richness to explain and predict firm behavior empirically in the 
LNG industry, but also offers guidance for other researchers to go beyond the LNG industry to 




Table 1.1. Theoretical predictions on comparative statics when a firm’s capability and/or product-market demand change 
 (a) Time =                                    𝜶𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜶𝟑𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 
      T𝐢𝐦𝐞 = 𝜶𝟏𝑰𝑽 × 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕  +  𝜶𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜶𝟑𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 
(b) 𝐂𝒐𝒔𝒕 =                                   𝜷𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜷𝟑Time 
       𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝑽 × T𝐢𝐦𝐞 +   𝜷𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜷𝟑Time 
Product-Market Changes (captured by revenue curve) 
1. No change in demand 
    (i.e., no shift) 
2. Increase in demand 
    (i.e., upward shift) 
3. Decrease in demand 
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Why Does Positive Demand Shock in a Homogeneous Product Market                          
Diminish a Firm’s Post-entry Speed Capability? 
 
ABSTRACT 
The extant literature on speed capability has mostly focused on the firm’s pre-entry speed 
capability of building its plant prior to a firm’s market entry, despite the importance of post-
entry speed capability that a firm only realizes after its market entry. I therefore examine a 
firm’s post-entry speed capability after its market entry. I revisit the same empirical context of 
scholars’ previous research, which found that firms with superior pre-entry speed capability 
are more likely to enter the post-shock market. That context was the post-demand shock market 
in the Liquefied Natural Gas industry caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. I find 
that firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities as compared to 
firms in the pre-shock period. This finding is surprising, because firms with superior pre-entry 
speed capability are more likely enter the market later, and because firms in the post-shock 
period have additional opportunities to learn from their own experiences or observing others. 
Further analysis shows that new entry of lower speed-capable firms in the post-shock period 
and increasing opportunity costs of not applying non-scale-free resources into more new 
projects in the post-shock period lead to inferior post-entry speed capability of the firms in the 
post-shock period. I discuss potential contributions to the literatures of speed capability, 








The strategic management literature has emphasized speed as a potential source of a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Helfat, et al. 2007; Stalk & Hout, 1990; Teece, et al. 1997). 1 
The literature has achieved substantial progress by recognizing a firm’s speed as a strategic 
decision involving a cost-benefit tradeoff (Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1966; Teece, 1977),2 and 
by distinguishing faster speed from superior speed capability (Hawk, Pacheco-de-Almeida, & 
Yeung, 2013, Pacheco-de-Almeida, et al. 2015). ‘Faster speed’ refers to the shorter time lag 
between initiation and completion of an event of interest (e.g., investment or R&D), whereas 
‘superior speed capability’ means faster speed at the same cost. This distinction between speed 
and speed capability challenges the notion that a firm with faster speed has superior speed 
capability, because it makes clear that faster speed can incur substantially higher cost, and 
substantially higher cost can diminish speed capability. This distinction leads to the question 
of how the firm might achieve competitive advantage through its superior speed capability of 
                                                        
1 A firm’s “time-to-build” its plant is a strategic choice because it involves irreversible investments and 
a cost-benefit tradeoff (Ghemawat, 1991; Porter, 1996). In the current study, for example, the LNG 
plants built involved substantial investments that were not fully redeployable. 
2 A firm’s speed is a strategic choice for an event with irreversible investment because it involves an 
economic tradeoff in terms of costs and revenues. On the one hand, decreasing a firm’s speed is 
beneficial because a firm that is slow to execute investment projects (e.g., slow to build plants) often 
incurs substantial revenue losses (D'Aveni, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Smith & Reinertsen, 1998; Stalk & 
Hout, 1990). For example, the PC industry saw an approximately $1.1 million per day revenue loss with 
the late introduction of the HP 930 computer (Waldman, 1986). Similarly, Clark (1989) estimates that 
each day of delay in introducing a new model represents a $1 million loss in profits for a $10,000 car. 
This revenue loss resulting from slower speed in the execution of investment projects also has a direct 
impact on a firm’s market value: delay announcements in new product introduction decrease firm 
market value by 5.25% (or -$119.3 million in 1991 dollars), on average (Hendricks & Singhal, 1997). 
On the other hand, a firm may significantly raise its costs when it compresses its speed (Boehm, 1981; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Graves, 1989; Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1967, 1984). For example, early 
estimates of this time-cost tradeoff indicate that, on average, a 1% acceleration in project development 
time increases investment costs by 1.75% (Mansfield, 1971). Mansfield’s (1988) elasticity estimate of 
time-cost tradeoff in the electrical and instruments industry of 4.3% implies that a two-week schedule 
compression of Intel’s 386 microprocessor development would have resulted in an $8.6 million increase 
in costs (see Graves (1989) for a review of empirical estimates of the acceleration-cost tradeoff). In 
addition, Hawk and Pacheco-de-Almeida (2018) explain why empirical estimates of firms’ time-cost 





building its plant faster at the same cost, which shifts the focus away from simply examining 
how the firm can achieve faster speed in its time-to-build its plant.  
The previous literature has mostly focused on pre-entry speed capability, which is a 
focal firm’s speed capability for its recent previous plant construction in the related markets 
prior to its entry into the focal market. For example, scholars have examined the relationship 
of superior pre-entry speed capability and market-entry timing; the effect of pre-entry speed 
capability on financial perform at its entry timing; and what moderates the relationship of pre-
entry speed capability and firm performance (Hawk et al. 2013; Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. 
2015). It is indeed important to understand pre-entry speed capability, especially when we can 
expect a firm with superior pre-entry speed capability to have superior post-entry speed 
capability. However, what matters in the end is whether the firm realizes post-entry speed 
capability, which is the focal firm’s speed capability for its current plant construction after it 
enters the focal market. The conceptual distinction this dissertation emphasizes between the 
firm’s pre-entry speed capability of building its plant from post-entry speed capability, 
challenges the extant literature’s implicit assumption that firms with superior pre-entry speed 
capability will demonstrate superior post-entry speed capability.  
In the current research, I seek to fill this research gap by examining a firm’s post-entry 
speed capability after its market entry. I revisit the empirical context of the Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) industry from 1996 to 2007. This is the same empirical context of previous 
scholarly research (Hawk et al. 2013), which finds that firms with superior pre-entry speed 
capability are more likely to enter the post-shock market. That context is the post-demand 
shock market in the LNG industry caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. However, I 
focus on the specific constructs of a firm’s time-to-build its plant (i.e., the time lag between a 
firm’s plant construction initiation and completion) and its speed capability (i.e., the time-to-





shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities as compared to firms in the pre-shock 
period. This result is surprising for two reasons. First, because firms with superior pre-entry 
speed capabilities are more likely to enter the market later (Hawk et al. 2013). Second, because 
firms in the post-shock period have additional opportunities to learn from their own experiences 
or others experiences (Argote, et al. 1990; Dixit, 1992; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Kim & Miner, 
2007; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Mitchell, et al. 1994; Pindyck, 1991; Shaver, et 
al. 1997; Zimmerman, 1982). In my further analysis, I find that new entry of lower speed-
capable firms in the post-shock period and increasing opportunity costs of not applying non-
scale-free resources into more new projects in the post-shock period lead to inferior post-entry 
speed capability of the firms in the post-shock period. 
My research contributes to the extant literature in four ways. Current literature on speed 
capability has mostly focused on pre-entry speed capability prior to a firm’s market entry and 
has neglected post-entry speed capability. My first contribution, therefore, is to examine the 
firm’s post-entry speed capability of building its plants in the pre- and post-shock period (i.e., 
before and after 2000). I do so by revisiting the same empirical context where previous research 
finds that firms with superior pre-entry speed capability are more likely to enter the post-shock 
market. I, however, find that firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed 
capability relative to firms in the pre-shock period. This result suggests that firms’ pre-entry 
speed capability could be distinct from their post-entry speed capability. The empirical 
context makes clear that the antecedents and outcomes of post-entry speed capability can 
differ from those of the firm’s pre-entry speed capability of building its plant. 
Second, I contribute to the dynamic capability literature. Traditionally, a dynamic 
capability is considered critical in the rapidly changing technological environment (Teece et al. 
1997) or the heterogeneous demand environment (Adner, 2002). The finding that the positive 





suggests that, in examining the development of firm capabilities, rapid changes in a 
homogenous product market should be considered as another important context. The addition 
of another important context will improve our understanding on how firms can improve the 
dynamic capability. 
Third, I contribute to the literature of time compression (dis)economies. I find that the 
speed frontier itself expands over time (as shown in Figure 2.6), even though the firms in the 
post-shock period have, on average, inferior post-entry speed capability. This result suggests 
that the firm’s speed capability in building its plant can be understood in terms of both an 
industry-wide speed frontier and firm-specific distances from the frontier, which might diverge. 
Specifically, my data provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationships among time 
compression diseconomies, speed frontier, and speed capability, by complementing the recent 
research on time compression (dis)economies (Hawk & Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2018). Hawk & 
Pacheco-de-Almeida (2018), for example, finds that only 12 percent of projects are subject to 
time compression diseconomies. It provides two potential explanations to explain time com-
pression economies: (1) heterogeneity in firms’ speed capability or (2) a U-shaped relationship 
between time-to-build and cost-to-build with the majority of firms not realizing their 
economies of time compression. Figure 2.6 makes clear how my dissertation complements 
recent research: my data show that the industry-wide speed frontier is clearly not U-shaped. I 
find, instead, that the fitted value becomes less negative (and even can be positive) when more 
firms make investments far within the speed frontier. This finding means that it would be 
possible to observe empirically a positive fitted value if the sample data had more firms far 
within the speed frontier. As a result, I submit that time compression diseconomies and their 
changes can be better understood by focusing on the industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., the outer 





identifying changes in firms’ distances from the speed frontier. In this way, I contribute to the 
literature on time compression (dis)economies. 
Fourth, I contribute to the market-entry timing literature. The finding that firms in the 
post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities as compared to firms in the pre-
shock period is counterintuitive when we solely rely on the market-entry timing literature. At 
the same time, however, the expansion of speed frontier over time is consistent with the 
prediction from the entry-timing literature. Considering both effects of entry timing and 
product-market conditions would complement our understanding and help foster better 
predictions of the phenomenon involving timing issues in the literature. 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I hypothesize a 
relationship between post-entry speed capabilities of firms in the pre-shock period and firms in 
the post-shock period, based on the market-entry timing literature. In Section 3, I explain the 
empirical context and my research design to test my developed hypothesis, based on the 
market-entry timing literature. In short, I examine the post-entry speed capabilities of firms in 
the pre-shock period and those of firms in the post-shock period in the context of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) industry from 1996 and 2007. This is the context where previous research 
(Hawk et al. 2013) has found that firms with superior pre-entry speed capabilities are more 
likely to enter the post-shock period (i.e., post-2000). In Section 4, I find a statistically 
significant empirical result opposite to the hypothesis in Section 2. In Section 5, I conduct 
further empirical analysis to address why firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-
entry speed capability. In Section 6, I conclude by providing a discussion of the implications 
of this chapter. 
2.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
A firm’s entry timing decision is a key strategic variable, which involves a tradeoff 





entrants (i.e., new entrants at t=0) or late entrants (i.e., new entrants at t=1), perform better in 
the end (i.e., performance since t=2) (Fosfuri, Lanzolla, & Suarez, 2013; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). However, the market-entry timing literature offers a solid ground for 
understanding post-entry speed capability of firms in the post-shock period relative to those of 
firms in the pre-shock period. Specifically, the market-entry timing literature provides two 
coherent explanations, which enable us to compare post-entry speed capabilities of firms in the 
pre-shock period (i.e., all firms at t=0) and firms in the post-shock period (i.e., all firms at t=1). 
The first explanations is that, firms in the post-shock period (i.e., at t=1) consist of both 
existing firms that already entered in the pre-shock period (i.e., at t=0) and enter again in the 
post-shock period (i.e., at t=1), and new firms that enter only in the post-shock period (i.e., at 
t=1). The former firms have additional opportunities to learn from their own experiences in the 
pre-shock period (Argote et al. 1990; Dixit, 1992; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Kim & Miner, 2007; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Mitchell et al. 1994; Pindyck, 1991; Shaver et al. 1997; 
Zimmerman, 1982). The latter firms have additional opportunities to learn by observing others 
in the pre-shock period (Huber, 1991). We cannot be sure about which firms have better post-
entry speed capability between existing firms that already entered in the pre-shock period and 
enter again in the post-shock period and new firms that enter only in the post-shock period. 
However, we can expect both the former and the latter firms to have better post-entry speed 
capability in building a plant than firms in the pre-shock period because both had additional 
opportunities to learn. 
The second explanation is that there is a selection effect that makes firms in the post-
shock period (i.e., at t=1) more likely to have better post-entry speed capability than those in 
the pre-shock period (i.e., at t=0). Previous research has found that firms with superior pre-
entry speed capabilities are more likely enter the market later. This outcome occurs because a 





tradeoff of market-entry timing. Specifically, a firm’s superior speed capability in building its 
plant increases the relative benefit of its late-market entry by decreasing its preemption risk, 
which allows it to wait longer until demand uncertainty is mitigated. Research using analytical 
models (Bar-Ilan & Strange, 1996; Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2003) has found that a 
firm delays its entry with increased demand uncertainty when its time-to-build its plant 
decreases, whereas it is less sensitive to demand uncertainty when its time-to-build its plant 
increases. Because the firm’s cost-to-build its plant is assumed to be independent of its 
time-to-build its plant, the time-to-build a plant in the analytic model is the same as speed 
capability. Therefore, the increase in a firm’s time-to-build its plant increases the likelihood of 
its early-market entry. Empirical studies (Hawk et al. 2013; Pacheco-de-Almeida, Henderson, 
& Cool, 2008) also find robust support for the predicted results that are derived from these 
analytical models. The selection effect thus provides another coherent explanation of why firms 
in the post-shock period are more likely to have better post-entry speed capability than those 
in the pre-shock period. 
Therefore, based on this examination of the theory, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms in the post-shock period have superior post-entry speed 
capability in building their plants relative to firms in the pre-shock period. 
2.3. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.3.1 Empirical context 
The current study examines the post-entry speed capability of firms in the pre-shock 
and the post-shock period in the context of the global LNG industry from 1996 to 2007. The 
natural gas industry plays an important role in the energy industry. Natural gas has been 
increasing its shares among other energy sources. This trend is especially true of fossil fuels: 
the share of natural gas has been historically increasing relative to oil and coal. Natural gas 





market share has been consistently falling since the late 1990s and coal’s market share fell to 
its lowest level since 2004 (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2018 June). Moreover, 
based on the Shell Sky Scenario, natural gas is expected to continue to grow, such that it 
replaces coal in the 2020s and stays on its plateau until 2040.  
In addition, the importance of natural gas is critical in some countries’ economies, and 
sometimes even greater than for oil. For example, Qatar’s ratio of natural gas supply to the 
world’s supply of natural gas is greater than its ratio of oil supply to the world’s supply. 
Reserves of natural gas in Qatar were at approximately 892 trillion cubic feet, which are 14% 
of all known natural-gas reserves on earth, whereas the reserves of oil in Qatar were at 
approximately 15.2 billion barrels, which are 1% of all known oil reserves, as the world's 
fourteenth-largest reserves.3 
The empirical context of the current study follows that of Hawk et al. (2013), which 
finds that firms with superior pre-entry speed capabilities in building their plants are more 
likely to enter an uncertain market later. My use of the same context enables a direct 
comparison between the current chapter’s finding on the firm’s post-entry speed capability of 
building its plant and the literature’s previous finding on the firm’s pre-entry speed capability 
of building its plant.  
The empirical context also has additional attractive features. First, it allows me to 
exploit demand shock in the LNG industry in 2000 because of the contemporaneous energy 
market liberalization. This feature is well presented in the qualitative analysis of Hawk et al. 
(2013), which I complement with additional quantitative analysis. I empirically corroborate the 
timing of demand shock based on structural break analysis. Second, a firm’s plant-construction 
investment decision is strategic, and is informed by existing knowledge regarding price level, 
price volatility, and other firm-level characteristics in the LNG industry. The firm also must 
                                                        





make a strategic choice regarding its entry timing and speed. Third, and finally, I can observe 
a time-cost tradeoff in this empirical context, which is consistent with the majority of the 
previous research (Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1966; Teece, 1977). All of these contextual 
factors are appropriate for this study and are discussed next in greater depth. 
First, the empirical context offers the feature that the LNG industry experienced a 
demand shock in 2000, which was caused both by energy market liberalization and the 
electricity industry increasing the number of gas power plants at that time. Market liberalization 
was implemented or considered globally in all IEA member countries to create more efficient 
operation of electricity energy systems through greater market competition (International 
Energy Agency, 2005). The liberalization allowed private electricity entities to participate in 
the previously state-regulated market, or the market price system that replaced state-determined 
price. This deregulation created a wholesale electricity market with time-varying prices. Under 
this market, a firm’s operational flexibility to respond better to demand (e.g., easier start-
up/shut-down) in gas power plants became more advantageous relative to traditional power 
plants. Moreover, the advantages of gas power plant construction (e.g., gas power plant permits 
are granted more easily due to less greenhouse gas emission4 and gas power plants allow a 
faster time and lower cost to build) became more attractive after market liberalization. Figure 
2.1.A (Blumsack, Apt, & Lave, 2006) illustrates the effects of this attractiveness by showing 
that electricity-generating capacity addition through natural gas rapidly increased after 1999 
relative to all other sources. The addition of more gas power plants created a demand shock 
that led to sharp increases in both natural gas prices and LNG plant construction activities in 
the late 1990s. Figure 2.1.B (Hawk et al. 2013) allows us to look at the impact of the shock on 
market entry. In the pre-shock period, entry occurred at a very slow and steady rate; natural gas 
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prices remained low and steady historically. In the post-shock period until the end of my sample, 
however, entry into the LNG industry dramatically increased, with the result that natural gas 
prices rose to more than five times the typical price level.5 Figure 2.1.B makes clear that the 
empirical data correspond with the expected demand shock described here.  
Moreover, I can test the existence and the timing of that empirically observed demand 
shock using a structural break analysis (Chow, 1960; Gregory & Hansen, 1996; Perron, 2006) 
based on LNG price. In this analysis, I perform a test of no structural break to identify the 
specific timing for the market partition in the monthly natural gas price data.6  Table 2.1 
presents the empirical results. In the analysis, the null hypothesis of no structural break is 
rejected and the test provides an estimate for a break point as April 2000. This result is 
consistent with the empirical patterns shown in Figure 2.1.B, corroborating that the demand 
shock did, in fact, occur. 
I partition the LNG market into pre-shock and post-shock periods based on the 
structural break point (i.e., April 2000). This partition is qualitatively validated and statistically 
corroborated. The current study does not consider technological change as a variable because 
the LNG industry relies on a standardized technology. Moreover, entry into the industry was 
not constrained by proprietary technology or technology innovation in my sample period.7 
Second, the empirical context offers the feature that it corresponds with the principle 
that a firm’s plant-construction investment decision is strategic and informed by existing 
knowledge regarding product market, factor market, and other firm characteristics. Column I 
                                                        
5 Hawk et al. (2013) provide detailed explanations about the LNG industry between 1996 and 2007. 
6 I used the estat sbsingle command in Stata. 
7 Technological changes in shale gas affected the LNG market after 2007, so those changes are not 
within the sample data period. Similarly, Floating LNG (FLNG) in the LNG fleet influenced the LNG 
market after 2007 and are thus outside the context here. Floating Storage and Regasification Units 
(FSRU) started in 2001, but because there was little adoption of FSRU until 2007, they are also not 





in Table 2.2 gives the results from a probit regression, based on the variables of market 
characteristics and firm characteristics of a firm’s entry into the LNG industry. The results 
show that a firm’s entry is positively associated with price level; negatively associated with 
construction raw material price; and associated with a firm’s prior experience and possession 
of complementary assets, such as LNG fleet and oil & gas production.  
Third, and finally, I can empirically observe a time-cost tradeoff in my data set based 
on the empirical context. Column II in Table 2.2 present the results of an OLS regression of a 
firm’s cost-to-build (per ton capacity) on a firm’s time-to-build (per ton capacity) its plant and 
other variables from yearly and monthly panel data. The results show that, on average, a 
decrease in a firm’s time-to-build its plant (per ton capacity) is associated with an increase in 
its cost-to-build its plant (per ton capacity). This observed time-cost tradeoff is consistent with 
the majority of previous research (Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1966; Teece, 1977).  
These three attractive features make the 1996-2007 context in the LNG industry 
an excellent one in which to examine firms’ post-entry speed capability of building their 
plants in the pre-shock and post-shock periods in the empirical data. 
2.3.2 Data Sampling 
I now provide my procedure for sampling and analyzing the data given by the 1996-
2007 context. To turn this empirical context into a data set, I first identified the proposed 
contemporary LNG construction projects from the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), Tusiani and 
Shearer’s (2007) LNG: A Non-technical Guide, company Web sites, Web searches, and other 
sources. Through this data collection, I identified 306 LNG construction projects proposed 
from 1996 to 2007. Of the 306 LNG projects, 136 resulted in the actual construction and 
operation of an LNG plant. Of the 136 LNG plants constructed, 96 started construction between 
1996 and 2007. I then hand-collected samples based on other plant-level data, such as plant 





plant-level data led to a final sample size of 72 LNG construction plants. All of the ensuing 
analysis comes from these 72 plants. 
To analyze my data, I define ‘entry’ as the ‘construction of a liquefaction or re-
gasification plant.’ I used actual construction because it incurs the highest sunk-cost 
commitment among a firm’s decisions when executing this project. That such a commitment 
represents the highest sunk-cost is a warranted assertion for two reasons. First, a firm’s plant 
construction does not begin until the board of directors makes its final investment decision and 
entails contractual obligations that are costly to reverse. Second, a firm has little ability to 
change its plant construction plans after construction begins, making it “locked in” to its 
planned course of action (Department of Energy, 2016: 95).8  With ‘entry’ thus defined, this 
dissertation follows Ghemawat (1991) in considering the timing of its commitment (i.e., the 
timing of the irreversible investment) as a key component of what it means for a firm to be 
“strategic.” Analyzing whether a firm is being “strategic” is a key component of the empirical 
analysis of the data set given here. Therefore, the current study focuses on the 72 of the 306 
plants in my sample that resulted in actual construction from 1996 to 2007 because they 
represent the subcategory of substantial irreversible investment. That subcategory is necessary 
to make this empirical context relevant to the current analysis with its starting point that firms 
act strategically in the timing of their market entry.  
To hone further this subcategory into a data set, the plant-level data are next matched 
with the firm-year panel data of the parent company using the ownership information collected 
during my data work. I matched the plant-level data with hand-collected firm-level data such 
                                                        
8 The commitments examined in the current study qualify as strategic in the sense that they involve 
(staged) irreversible investments under uncertainty in cost (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Ghemawat, 1991; 
Trigeorgis, 1996).  For example, after the firm’s early design stage, an estimate of the LNG plant cost 
typically has a substantial uncertainty in its cost estimate of 30-40%. After the design stage, the 
uncertainty in the cost estimate is 15-25%. After the engineering procurement construction contract, the 
cost estimate has an uncertainty of 10-15% as the firm gathers more information and does progressively 





as Oil & Gas Productions and Reserves and financial information.9 After deleting observations 
due to missing data for needed variables, my final panel data set corresponds to 45 firms over 
12 years, from 1996 to 2007, and produces a sample of 500 firm-year records in the yearly 
panel data. Figure 2.2 briefly shows the structure of the panel data in the current study. These 
data comprise a fairly comprehensive panel data set covering most of the entrants into LNG 
industry with available and useable data for covariates, and therefore they provide the best 
empirical context for the current analysis.  
My goal is to examine the post-entry speed capability of firms in the pre-shock and 
post-periods. I have accordingly defined speed capability as “firms’ ability to execute 
investment projects faster than competitors at the same cost” (Hawk et al. 2013: 1531). 
Therefore, it was essential to gather the key data of time-to-build and cost-to-build to 
operationalize post-entry speed capability. My process of gathering these data requires more 
explanation. 
For time-to-build, I hand-collected data to identify the construction beginning date as 
well as the commercial operation date to help determine the nominal time-to-build per ton 
capacity. When the construction beginning date was not available but the construction duration 
and commercial operation date were identified, I used the latter two to calculate the 
construction start date. When the construction start date and/or duration were not clear, I used 
the Engineering-Procurement-Construction (EPC) contract award date as a proxy for the 
construction beginning date. If the EPC contract award date was not available, I used the board 
of directors’ final investment decision (FID) date as the next best proxy for the construction 
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beginning date.10 I then calculated nominal time-to-build. I divided nominal time-to-build by 
ton capacity of a plant to obtain the nominal time-to-build per ton capacity. 
To obtain nominal cost-to-build per ton capacity, I hand-collected the plant construction 
cost estimates in millions of US dollars (USD). The cost estimate is typically available when 
the EPC contract is awarded or when the construction is completed.11  When several cost 
estimates were available over time, I used the most updated publicly available information 
concerning a particular plant. When the currency unit was not USD, I used the yearly-averaged 
exchange rate to convert other currency units into USD. I deflated the cost estimate in USD to 
1996 prices using the yearly-averaged consumer price index (CPI). I divided this deflated cost 
estimate of a plant by ton capacity to obtain the nominal cost-to-build per ton capacity.  
In this way, I was able to provide a compelling sample of data from the selected 
empirical context. The following section provides further details on how I measured pre-shock 
and post-shock firms, post-entry speed capability, and other control variables. 
2.3.3 Measures 
Having selected my data, my goal was to examine firms’ post-entry speed capabilities 
in the pre- and post-shock time-periods. I explain here how I measured the key constructs of 
product-market demand, a firm’s speed capability, its time-to-build and cost-to-build its plant, 





                                                        
10 I calculate the average months between EPC calendar dates and construction calendar dates when 
both calendar dates are observable in the current study’s data set. Months of difference, on average, 
were 1.6 months. I also calculate the average months between FID calendar dates and construction 
calendar dates when both dates are observable in the current study’s data set. Months of difference, on 
average, were 2.5 months. The average of firms’ time-to-build their plants is 41.2 months, with a 
standard deviation of 13.9 months. 
11 58 cost estimates of the 72 cost estimates were available when the EPC contract is awarded. The 





2.3.3.1. Pre-shock and post-shock period in product-market demand: Demand shock and 
the interaction term of yearly price and yearly price volatility 
 
To begin my analysis of the firm panel data, I created two variables to measure product-
market demand. These variables result from the empirical context and the quantitative 
structural break analysis performed above, which showed that the demand for LNG rapidly 
increased after April 2000. For the main variable, I created a dummy variable, demand shock, 
which is equal to ‘1’ for the firms in the post-shock period (since April 2000) and ‘0’ for the 
firms in the pre-shock period (before April 2000). Alternatively, for the second variable, I used 
the interaction term of yearly price and price volatility to measure product-market demand. As 
seen in Figure 2.3, the pre-shock period in my sample corresponds with steady low product-
market demand (i.e., low price and low price volatility), whereas the post-shock period 
corresponds with rapidly increasing product-market demand (i.e., high price and high price 
volatility). Because I compared the group of firms facing low price and low price volatility to 
the group of firms facing high price and high price volatility, I used the interaction term of 
yearly price level and price volatility as an alternative independent variable. In measuring both 
variables, I controlled for yearly price and yearly price volatility. Price is measured by using 
monthly U.S. natural gas wellhead price data from the Energy Information Administration of 
the U.S. Department of Energy. Price volatility is the conditional variance of U.S. natural gas 
price estimated from ARCH process (Episcopos, 1995; Huizinga, 1993). Using these two 
variables, I was able to distinguish firms in the pre-shock and post-shock periods. In the next 
subsection, I explain how I measured the post-entry speed capability. 
2.3.3.2. Post-entry speed capability  
In this subsection, I now show how to generate a measurement of post-entry speed 
capability. First, I make clear that speed capability from here is an post-entry measure because 
I used the actual time-to-build and cost-to-build data for the projects, of which construction 





in building its plant is conceptually defined as faster speed at the same cost. To measure speed 
capability empirically, I adopt frontier methods. As Chen, Delmas, and Lieberman point out, 
“Frontier methods can be used by strategy researchers to test theories of various factors that 
lead to competitive advantage. They are also particularly suited to conceptualize and measure 
firm-specific capabilities” (2015: 20).  I used two different speed capability measures based on 
frontier methods. First, I developed a measure of relative speed frontier on average, which uses 
the distance from the origin and the slope of observation, based on the coordinates of cost-to-
build and time-to-build. Once I obtained measures of a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build 
its plant as described in the next subsections, I was able to measure relative speed capability 
on average. For better explanation, I use Figure 2.4, which illustrates speed capability as points 
in the coordinates of a plane with time-to-build as the X-axis and cost-to-build as the Y-axis. 
In these coordinates, if two points reside on a line with the same slope, the point with shorter 
distance from the origin has superior speed capability relative to the point with longer distance 
from the origin. For example, point  and point  are the two points on the line with the same 
slope and with different distances from the origin. In this case, point  has superior speed 
capability to point  because point  has shorter time-to-build and lower cost-to-build than 
point . Likewise, point  has superior speed capability to point  and point  has superior 
speed capability to point . Therefore, speed capability can be measured based on the point’s 
slope and its distance from the origin, where slope is calculated as  and the distance from 
the origin is calculated as: √time + cost . With these measures of slope and distance from 
the origin, I can identify whether the firms in the post-shock have superior or inferior speed 
capability by testing whether they negatively or positively moderate distance between the 
origin and the points on the line with the same slope. Specifically, in a regression of distance 
on the interaction term of slope and demand shock after controlling for slope and demand shock 





period have inferior speed capability as compared to firms in the pre-shock period. I have now 
shown how to generate a measurement of speed capability for the purposes of testing speed 
capability variance in my empirical context.  
As an alternative measure of speed capability, I also created a measure by using Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Banker, Charnes, & Cooper, 1984; Charnes, Cooper, & Rhodes, 
1978). To apply the DEA approach, I needed to transform my time-to-build and cost-to-build 
(per ton capacity) measures from the cost-function type curve to the production-type curve. In 
the original data, a firm’s speed capability is superior when the frontier of time-to-build and 
cost-to-build is closer to the origin of the coordinates. However, DEA analysis calculates a 
firm’s speed capability for the production functions type frontier. A firm’s speed capability is 
superior when the observation of time-to-build and cost-to-build are closer to the outer frontier. 
Therefore, I symmetrically transposed the observation of time-to-build and cost-to-build on the 
X-axis by multiplying cost-to-build values by negative one. I then shifted the transposed cost-
to-build values by adding minimum value plus one. I calculated an efficiency score, theta, by 
using user command in Stata (Ji & Lee, 2010) with the options of decreasing return to scale. 
Higher efficiency score represents superior speed capability in this approach.  
Using the frontier approach, I was able to create two measures for a firm’s post-entry 
speed capability. The following section provides further details on how I operationalized a 
firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build, which were two main components in creating the speed 
capability construct. 
2.3.3.3. Time-to-build per ton capacity and cost-to-build per ton capacity 
Having provided my approach to calculating speed capability and other measures, I 
now turn to time-to-build and cost-to-build. As explained in the previous section, time-to-build 
and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) are two essential components in operationalizing firm 





lag between the beginning of construction and the commencement of commercial operation 
(per ton capacity). Further, this study defines the construct of “cost-to-build” (per ton capacity) 
as construction cost (per ton capacity). Because the conceptual definition of speed capability 
relies on ceteris paribus assumptions, a firm’s time-to-build its plant and its cost are directly 
comparable between the reference group of firms and the comparison group of firms. This 
approach renders unnecessary any further analytical constructs. 
However, strategic management, especially based on the resource-based view, posits 
that firms are heterogeneous (Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rumelt, 1984). Indeed, 
in my empirical setting, I anticipate that firms will have heterogeneous capabilities in their 
time-to-build their plant (per ton capacity). Therefore, the empirical testing parsed out how 
heterogeneous plants, firms, and markets influence a firm’s strategic choice of its time-to-build 
its plant.  
To obtain comparable time-to-build per ton capacity and cost-to-build per ton capacity, 
and thus both use my mathematical model and determine the heterogeneous capabilities of 
firms, I took the five steps detailed in the next paragraph. These steps are based on the approach 
of Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015), but there are several important 
differences. The first difference results from the purpose of the measure. Hawk et al. (2013) 
and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (215) aimed to measure a firm’s pre-entry speed capability. I, 
on the other hand, seek to measure a firm’s post-entry speed capability. Due to this difference 
in goals, I measure a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build its plant, of which construction was 
initiated and completed, so that I could create a measure for the firm’s post-entry speed 
capability in building its plant. I operationalized the focal year’s measure based on when the 
construction project was initiated, whereas the focal year’s measure was based on when the 
project was completed. For reference, Hawk et al. (2013) measured a firm’s time-to-build its 





pipeline, and sulfur facility construction projects up to the focal year, considering all stages of 
the non-LNG projects. The second difference is whether to discount the time-to-build measure 
by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida 
et al. (2015) discounted time-to-build measure by the weighted average cost of capital to create 
a pre-entry speed capability measure directly out of its time-to-build measure. However, I do 
not discount time-to-build by WACC because I had two separate measures of a firm’s time-to-
build and cost-to-build (per ton capacity). Because of these two separate measures, I could 
measure speed capability using the frontier approach, instead of discounting time-to-build by 
WACC. The third difference is the time-period of moving averaging. Hawk et al. (2013) and 
Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015) used a three-year moving average of their pre-entry speed 
capability. I, however, averaged time-to-build and cost-to-build for the current year in the 
yearly panel data when a firm entered the market more than once in the same year in the yearly 
panel data. The fourth difference arises from whether time-to-build and cost-to-build measures 
were shifted and transformed. I shifted a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build measures by 
their minimum values and then added one, so that all the values of the time-to-build and cost-
to-build were positive, whereas Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015) kept 
the negative values after adjustment. This shift enabled me to measure speed capability using 
the frontier approach on the coordinates of the time-to-build and cost-to-build measures. The 
four differences I state between my measures and those of Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-
Almeida et al. (2015) resulted from our different goals. While these extant studies aimed to 
capture a firm’s pre-entry speed capability up to the moment when the firm enters the market, 
my goal was to create measures for post-entry speed capability, once the firm enters the market. 
Having in mind the differences between my measures of time-to-build and cost-to-build 
and those of the previous research, I now provide a detailed explanation of the five steps to 





the first step, I adjusted the nominal time-to-build for plant-level variables and for market-level 
variables. Because in most cases, more than one firm engaged in each construction project in 
the sample, I did not control for firm-level variables in this step, but rather waited until the final 
regression of market entry in the firm panel data. In the second step, I standardized residuals 
from the first step within each region subgroup for each year. In the third step, I averaged the 
standardized residuals from the second step for the projects that each firm began in the year in 
question from the yearly panel. In the fourth step, I mapped the yearly average to a yearly panel 
of firm observations. I carried forward this measure to any future years when no new 
information was available for a given firm. For years in my panel before any time-to-build 
information was available for a given firm, I assumed neutral time-to-build (i.e., I replaced the 
missing time-to-build per ton capacity observations by zeroes for the years before any time-to-
build per ton capacity information was available for a firm in my panel).12 Finally, in the fifth 
step, I shifted a firm’s time-to-build in the firm panel data by its minimum value and then added 
one, so that all the values of the time-to-build per ton capacity were positive. This shift enabled 
me to create a firm’s post-entry speed capability measure based on the time-to-build and cost-
to-build measures. I discuss the first to fifth steps in further depth below so that I can explain 
how I also used them to generate comparable time-to-build per ton capacity data for my data 
panel.  
I now turn this detailed discussion of the application of the five steps into one of time-
to-build per ton capacity. I start with the first step, as suggested above. In that first step, I 
adjusted nominal time-to-build per ton capacity for plant-level variables (e.g., plant size, usage, 
quality, and type) and market-level variables (e.g., demand growth, geography, and year). In 
                                                        
12 In the robustness check, I do not replace the missing time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity 
observations by zeroes for years before any time-to-build per ton capacity information is available for 
a firm in my panel. Results are robust with respect to the assumption of neutral time-to-build. Empirical 





this approach, I decomposed the time-to-build per ton capacity of each plant into a systematic 
component (i.e., average time-to-build in the sample) and a plant-specific component 
(corresponding to the degree to which a firm has a shorter or a longer time-to-build per ton 
capacity than the average time-to-build in the sample). Specifically, I pulled plant-level data 
from all firms for all facilities (indexed by f), all geographic regions (indexed by l), and all 
years (indexed by t) in my sample by running the following regression: 
ln𝑇 , , =  β ln𝐸 , , + β ln𝐸 , , + β 𝑃 , , + β 𝑄 , , + β 𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀 , , + β ln∆ , +  β LDUM
+  β YDUM + θ      (1) 
where 𝑇 is the nominal time-to-build per ton capacity, E is the ton capacity of a plant, P is plant 
usage dummy, Q is the plant quality dummy, NDUM is the plant type dummies, ∆ is the proxy 
for the local demand growth, and LDUM and YDUM are geographic region dummies and year 
dummies, respectively. First, I included a ton capacity of a plant variable and a squared term 
of it because the ton capacity of a plant could affect time-to-build per ton capacity due to 
economies of scale and diseconomies of scale. The ton capacity of a plant is measured as 
capacity figures in million ton per year. Second, I included a plant usage variable because can 
also influence the time-to-build due to the different usage specificity. Plant usage is measured 
as 1 if a plant is a liquefaction plant and as 0 if a plant is a regasification plant. Third, I included 
a plant quality variable because quality can also influence the time-to-build per ton capacity. 
Specifically, firms can decrease their time-to-build at the expense of the plant quality. On the 
contrary, it is possible that bad plant management leads to poor quality and a longer time-to-
build a plant, meaning that poor quality and a longer time-to-build can be positively correlated. 
Plant quality is measured as 1 if a plant is shut down for maintenance within a year of 
commercial operation. Fourth, I included plant type dummies because plant type such as new, 
expansion, or revamp can influence time-to-build per ton capacity. Fifth, local demand growth 





World Bank Development Indicators database. Finally, I included geographic region dummy 
variables13 and year dummy variables to capture year-specific and geography-specific effects 
(i.e., bureaucratic delays). Using these different variables, I was able to apply the first step to 
adjust nominal time-to-build per ton capacity for plant-level and market-level variables.  
As a result, the estimated residual 𝜃 , ,  associated with a plant for a given firm (denoted 
𝜃𝑓,𝑙,𝑡 for firm j) from my estimation of Equation 1 represents the plant-specific component of 
the time-to-build that is uncorrelated with the systematic determinants of time-to-build 
associated with plant ton capacity, quality, usage, types, demand condition, time fixed effects, 
and geography fixed effects. A positive residual indicates that the plant was finished slower 
than average, whereas a negative residual implies the plant was finished faster than average. 
In the second step, I standardized the measure within each regional subgroup for each 
year for the purposes of comparability. I calculated the mean and standard deviation of 𝜃 , ,  
within each region subgroup for each year, where the mean is calculated as ?̅? , =  
∑ ∑ , ,
,
  
and the standard deviation is calculated as σ , =  
∑ ∑ , , ,
,
. I then standardized each 




In the third step, I built my measure of time-to-build per ton capacity for firm j by 
summing up the standardized plant time-to-build per ton capacity 𝜃 , ,  for all of the plants that 
firm j begin in year t, and then taking the average.  
                                                        
13 I use the following geographic regions: Asia and the Pacific; Eastern Europe; Former USSR; Japan; 
Latin American and the Caribbean; North Africa and the Middle East; North America; Sub-Saharan 
Africa; and Western Europe. 






In the fourth step, I mapped my averaged, standardized, time-to-build per ton capacity 
measure from the fourth step into a panel of firm-year observations. My goal was to have a 
firm time-to-build per ton capacity measure when a firm initiated the construction. Thus, I took 
the following approach: I carried forward my time-to-build per ton capacity measure to future 
years when no new information was available. For years in my panel before any time-to-build 
information is available for a firm, I assumed neutral time-to-build (i.e., I replaced the missing 
time-to-build per ton capacity observations by zeroes for years before any time-to-build per ton 
capacity information was available for a firm in my panel). In the robustness check, I did not 
replace the missing time-to-build per ton capacity observations by zeroes for years before any 
time-to-build per ton capacity information was available for a firm in my panel. The results are 
robust to the assumption of neutral time-to-build. 
In the fifth and final step, I shifted a firm’s time-to-build in the firm panel data by its 
minimum value and then added one, so that all the values of the time-to-build per ton capacity 
were positive. This approach enabled me to capture the real world characteristic that time-to-
build and cost-to-build are both positive, without affecting the coefficients of each regression. 
Additionally, it provided an opportunity to create a measure for a firm’s post-entry speed 
capability. This detailed analysis of steps one through five for time-to-build per ton capacity 
show how my data panel could generate comparable time-to-build data. 
For cost-to-build per ton capacity measure, I replaced time-to-build per ton capacity by 
cost-to-build per ton capacity in equation 1 of the first step and then repeated the rest of the 
steps. This is enough to show how one through five steps for cost-to-build per ton capacity 
panel can generate comparable time-to-build data for my data panel. Figure 2.5 illustrates the 
yearly average of time-to-build and the cost-to-build per ton capacity in the yearly panel data, 
and follows the procedures described here. In this way, I was able to obtain the comparable 





2.3.3.4. Control variables 
As discussed in the section 3.3.1, the effect of demand shock is measured by demand 
shock and the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility. To better capture the 
effect of demand shock, I controlled for yearly price level and price volatility as market 
characteristics. Price is measured by using U.S. natural gas wellhead price data from the Energy 
Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy. Price volatility is the 
conditional variance of U.S. natural gas price estimated from ARCH process (Episcopos, 1995; 
Huizinga, 1993). A demand shock in the product market might influence input prices in the 
factor market, which might influence firms’ post-entry speed capability. For example, the focal 
firm in my context is a buyer in the factor markets, where Engineering-Procurement-
Construction (EPC) contractors are specialized suppliers. In this case, increasing demand (i.e., 
greater number of projects of the focal firms in the post-shock period) could raise input prices 
(i.e., EPC cost) for the same time-to-build a plant, which might lead to post-shock firms’ 
inferior speed capability. To rule out the factor market explanation, I included two measures: 
EPC cost and construction raw material price. EPC cost is measured by averaging EPC 
contract amounts in the current year. EPC Costs for each year were deflated to 1996 prices 
using the CPI. For the years when EPC cost data (i.e., 1997, 1998, and 2001) is not available, 
I extended the value from the previous year. Construction raw material price was measured by 
using monthly Producer Price Index by Commodity for Special Indexes: Construction 
Materials data from the Federal Reserve Bank database. 
I next set my control variables for the differences between firms. Numerous firm 
characteristics (Fuentelsaz, Gomez & Polo, 2002; Mitchell, 1989, 1991) may affect a firm’s 
post-entry speed capability. In this case, I considered firm size, age, experiences, and the 
possession of complementary assets, all of which I now define. Firm size is the natural log of 





were not available for a period, I used a regression imputation procedure (Little & Rubin, 1987) 
to impute missing values and complete the data. Alternatively, I also measured firm size as the 
natural log of the average sales of the firm from 1996 to 2007. Again, sales for each year were 
deflated to 1996 prices using the CPI. Results are robust with respect to the primary 
measurement of firm size.15 Age is the difference between the year of incorporation for the firm 
and the plant construction year. 16  To capture firm experience, Total Project Initiated was 
measured by the number of prior LNG plant construction projects in which a firm had initiated 
over the course of the LNG industry in the current panel data set. To account for the possession 
of complementary assets, I included several measures. I create LNG fleet as the number of LNG 
fleet owned by focal firms in the current year. I measured oil and gas production and oil and 
gas reserves as the natural log of the oil and gas production and reserves of the firm for the 
current year, respectively, measured in millions of barrels of oil equivalent (MMboe). When 
oil and gas production and reserves data were not available for a period, I used a regression 
imputation procedure (Little & Rubin, 1987) to impute missing values and complete the data. 
Alternatively, I created additional measures of oil and gas production and oil and gas reserves 
as the natural log of the average oil and gas production and reserves of the firm from 1996 to 
2007, respectively, measured in millions of barrels of oil equivalent (MMboe). Results are 
robust with respect to the primary measurement of oil and gas production and reserves.17 In 
these various ways, I accounted for firm size, age, prior experiences, and the possession of 
complementary assets to control for firm differences. 
A few other necessary control variables in addition to the numerous firm characteristics 
were discussed in the previous paragraph. To account for any systematic differences in entry 
                                                        
15 Appendix B includes additional analysis results. 
16 Results are robust with respect to the inclusion of age2. To reduce potential multicollinearity between 
the age and age-squared terms. I standardize the age measures.  





incentives across parent industry categorizations (i.e., parent companies’ related diversifica-
tions), I included a set of related industry dummies that might represent how parent companies 
are diversified, including Oil and Gas Extraction (SIC code 13), Petroleum and Coal Products 
(SIC code 29), Electric and Gas Services (SIC code 49), and Other. To better capture the true 
nature of time compression diseconomies, I controlled for a delay event during plant 
construction.18 I create two dummy variables, delay by extreme weather and delay by extreme 
hurricane, when a project experienced a delay event in its schedule. These additional controls 
allowed me to account for differences between firms, and thereby to generate empirical results 
that resemble real life as closely as possible. 
                                                        
18 Let’s suppose event A has realized speed of 40 months and realized cost of $3 billion as planned and 
event B has realized speed of 38 months and realized cost of 3.5 billion as planned. The empirical 
comparison of realized time and cost of the events A and B represents the true nature of time and cost, 
which is time compression diseconomies. Now, let’s suppose event C has planned speed of 38 months 
and planned cost of $ 2.5 billion, but it turns out that event C has realized speed of 42 months because 
the event is rushed beyond its normal schedule without the proportionate increase in cost to support the 
planned decreased speed. Moreover, event C has realized cost of $ 4 billion because the delay increases 
the cost of the event due to the opportunity cost of capital (which can be captured by the weighted 
average cost of capital). The event C, when compared to the event A, is the example of time compression 
diseconomies of strict convexity, but the empirical comparison of realized speed and cost of the events 
A and C leads to a misleading conclusion of time compression economies. Moreover, the empirical 
comparison of realized speed and cost of the events A, B, and C all together leads to another misleading 
conclusion of U-shaped relationship of time and cost. In sum, the empirical comparison of the realized 
time and cost can lead to a misleading conclusion about the relationship of time and cost. The empirical 
comparison of the planned time and cost, rather than realized time and cost, is also problematic. The 
empirical comparison of planned speed and cost of the events A and C leads to a misleading conclusion 
of time compression economies even though event C is penalized. This is because event C is rushed 
beyond its normal schedule and true nature of the time-cost relationship resides under time compression 
diseconomies. Ideally, the solution to this problem is rather simple. It would solve the problem to 
measure both planned and realized speed and cost and to correct time and cost for the difference between 
planned and realized. In principle, as long as the difference of planed and realized speed and the 
difference of planned and realized cost are controlled for, any combination of time and cost (i.e., 
planned time & planned cost, realized time & realized cost, planned time & realized cost, and realized 
time & planned cost) will capture the true nature of time-cost relationship. However, it is challenging 
enough to gather the speed and cost data together regardless of whether they are planned or realized 
data. The second-best solution is to observe the probable events that can be assumed to affect planned 
speed and cost (e.g., the delay events). Even though the [accurate impact on causing] the difference 
between planning and realization of time and cost cannot be estimated in this way, it can sufficiently 
correct the bias in the right direction and mitigate the concerns regarding empirically capturing the true 
nature of speed-cost relationship. In particular, adopting one consistent speed measure (either planned 
or realized) and one consistent cost measure (either planned or realized) will be better in correcting the 






2.3.4. Statistical method 
For better empirical testing, there is a further concern to address. This looks to the 
choice of the estimator. The question is whether to use a within-effect estimator (e.g., fixed-
effects model), a between-effect estimator, or an average estimator of within-effects and 
between-effect (e.g., random-effects model) (Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017). I use a firm 
fixed-effect model for my main estimator, but I present the results using the firm random-effect 
model, too. The results using a firm fixed-effect model and a firm random-effect model are 
consistent in the current study. A consideration of the statistical method did, therefore improve 
the reliability of my empirical analysis, as did consideration of all the variables and controls 
mentioned in this section. 
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Having provided how I generated my data set, and then how I constructed an empirical 
model, I now provide summary statistics and a correlation matrix for the yearly panel data set 
in Table 2.3. From these, I find that demand shock is negatively correlated with efficiency 
score. This analysis omits any control variables to partial out other influences that may affect 
the correlation coefficients. I also observe that most variables demonstrate substantial variation. 
Therefore, the lack of variation is less of a concern in finding statistically significant results. 
I examined potential collinearity in the yearly panel data using variance inflation factors 
(VIFs). I found that mean VIF is 4.69 and VIFs for most variables are less than 10 except for 
Yearly Price Level, Yearly Price Volatility, and Construction Raw Material Price (VIF of 34.10, 
24.10, and 10.76 respectively). It is because of the empirical context that the pre-shock period 
is characterized by low price level coupled with low price volatility, whereas the post-shock 
period by high price level coupled with high price volatility. My regression analysis produces 





Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present results regarding post-entry speed capabilities of firms in the 
post-shock period (i.e., when the product-market demand rapidly increases) relative to those of 
firms in the pre-shock period (i.e., when the product-market demand is steadily low). Table 2.4 
provides the results when I use distances from the origin as my dependent variable. Column I 
and Column III provide the results from a firm fixed-effect model, and Columns II and IV 
provide the results from a firm random-effect model. The coefficients for the interaction term 
of post shock and slope are positive and statistically significant in Columns I and II, which 
means that the average speed frontier of the firms in the post-shock period is more distant from 
the origin than that of pre-shock period firms. The coefficients for the three-way interaction 
term of price level, price volatility, and slope are positive and statistically significant in 
Columns III and IV, which means that the average speed frontier of the firms facing rapidly 
increasing gas prices are more distant from the origin that of the firms facing steady and low 
gas prices. Therefore, these empirical findings corroborate that firms in the post-shock period 
have inferior speed capability compared to those in the pre-shock period. 
Table 2.5 provides the results when I use efficiency scores from DEA analysis as my 
dependent variable. Column I and Column III provide the results from a firm fixed-effect model, 
and Columns II and IV provide the results from a firm random-effect model. The coefficient 
for post shock is negative and statistically significant in Column, which means that the 
efficiency of the firms in the post-shock period is worse than that of pre-shock period firms. 
The coefficients for the interaction term of price level and price volatility are negative and 
statistically significant in Columns III and IV, which mean that the efficiency of the firms 
facing rapidly increasing gas prices are worse than that of the firms facing steady and low gas 
prices. Therefore, these empirical findings corroborate that firms in the post-shock period have 





In sum, I find that firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed 
capabilities compared to firms in the pre-shock period, which is opposite to the prediction of 
H1. This result is surprising for two reasons. First, firms with superior pre-entry speed 
capabilities are more likely to enter the market later (Hawk et al. 2013). Second, firms in the 
post-shock period have additional opportunities to learn from their own experiences or others 
experiences (Argote et al. 1990; Dixit, 1992; Ingram & Baum, 1997; Kim & Miner, 2007; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998; Mitchell et al. 1994; Pindyck, 1991; Shaver et al. 1997; 
Zimmerman, 1982). In the next section, I examine why the firms in the post-shock period (i.e., 
firms facing rapidly increasing product-market demand) have inferior post-entry speed 
capabilities relative to the firms in the pre-shock period (i.e., firms facing steadily low product-
market demand).  
2.5. FURTHER EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To find out why the firms in the post-shock period (i.e., firms facing rapidly increasing 
product-market demand) have inferior post-entry speed capabilities. I primarily relied on the 
entry timing effects in the original hypothesis. From here, I incorporate possible explanations 
generated by a positive demand shock. I provide two possible causes: new entry of lower speed-
capable firms in the post-shock period and firms’ increasing opportunity costs of not applying 
non-scale-free resources into more new projects in the post-shock period. 
First, positive demand shock in the post-shock period might create additional new entry 
opportunities for lower speed-capable firms that could not enter the pre-shock market due to 
negative net present value (NPV), but can enter the post-shock market due to the upward 
revenue curve shift caused by positive demand shock. I created a dummy variable, firm without 
pre-shock market experience, for the firms possessing no entry experience in the pre-shock 





Hypothesis 2 (H2a): In the post-shock period, a firm without pre-shock market experience 
has lower post-entry speed capability relative to that with pre-shock market experience. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2b): Inferior speed capability of a  firm in the post-shock period, relative 
to that in the pre-shock period, is lower for a firm without pre-shock market experience. 
Second, in addition to new entry of lower speed-capable firms, positive demand shock 
might raise opportunity costs of not applying non-scale-free resources in the pre-shock market 
into demand increasing market. When market demand increases, as argued in Levinthal and 
Wu (2010),19 we might observe that firms’ profit-maximizing growth decisions lead to total 
profit growth (e.g., conducting more projects or projects of greater capacity), but lower average 
returns (e.g., inferior firm speed capability). According to Levinthal and Wu (2010), if a 
positive demand shock occurs, non-scale-free resources in the pre-shock market become excess 
because it raises the opportunity cost of not applying some of these non-scale-free resources 
for growth of a firm. The stock of a firm’s resources becomes the binding constraint that limits 
the growth rate of the firm (Penrose, 1959), and due to the spread of non-scale-free resources 
across more projects, we might observe that firms’ profit-maximizing growth actions lead to 
total profit growth but lower average returns (e.g., inferior firm speed capability) when positive 
demand shock happens. In other words, the focal firm will make a growth decision by 
conducting more projects or projects of greater total capacity because the total sum of NPV 
from multiple projects or project of greater capacity with inferior speed capability can outweigh 
the NPV from one project with better speed capability when positive demand shock occurs. In 
the current study’s context, most firm resources in a project (e.g., project management team, 
                                                        
19 Levinthal and Wu (2010) bring the discourse of ‘diversification’ back to Penrose (1959) by making 
a distinction between scale-free capabilities and non-scale-free capabilities, which are subject to oppor-
tunity costs. Penrose (1959) maintained that the stock of a firm’s resources is critical in determining 
diversification decisions, and managerial capability is the binding constraint that limits the growth rate 
of the firm (i.e., Penrose effect). Levinthal and Wu’s (2010) distinction between scale-free capabilities 
and those capabilities subject to opportunity costs provides the critical necessary condition for Penrose’s 
(1959) argument because there will be always ‘excess’ capacity for the scale-free capabilities and thus, 





product development expertise, material resources) are non-scale-free,20 and the opportunity 
costs of not applying some of these non-scale-free resources to pursue firm growth increase 
due to positive demand shock in the market. In sum, profit-maximizing firms in the post-shock 
period will pursue firm growth by conducting greater number of projects or projects of greater 
total capacity; however, these firms will have inferior firm speed capability as a result of trading 
off profit margins for firm growth. To test the idea of inferior speed capability led by firm 
growth, I measured firm growth in two ways: total project capacity as a focal firm’s total LNG 
capacity proposed in the current year divided by market total LNG capacity proposed in the 
current year and total project initiated as the number of focal firm’s total project initiated by 
the current year. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3a): In the post-shock period, the greater total project capacity a firm 
initiates, the lower a firm’s post-entry speed capability. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3b): Inferior post-entry speed capability of a firm in the post-shock 
period, relative to that in the pre-shock period, is lower for a firm initiating greater total 
project capacity. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4a): In the post-shock period, the more projects a firm initiates, the lower 
a firm’s post-entry speed capability. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4b): Inferior speed capability of a firm in the post-shock period, relative 
to that in the pre-shock period, is lower for a firm initiating more projects. 
The empirical results for these three factors shed light on why firms in the post-shock 
period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities relative to firms in the pre-shock period. 
Table 2.6 presents results regarding which firm has inferior post-entry speed capability in the 
post-shock period. Columns I and II provide the results when the dependent variable is the 
distance from the origin, and Columns III and VI provide the results when the dependent 
                                                        
20  In a plant construction project in LNG industry, most firm resources in a project (e.g., project 
management team, product development expertise, material resources) are non-scale-free subject to 
opportunity costs. At any point in time, these resources must be allocated among alternative projects 
and the use of these resources in one activity precludes their use in other settings. For example, the 





variable is the efficiency scores from DEA analysis. Column I and Column III provide the 
results from a firm random-effect model, and Columns II and IV provide the results from a 
between-firm estimator.  In Columns II, III, and IV, I find support for H2a. In Column II, the 
coefficient for the interaction term of firm without pre-shock market experience and slope is 
positive and statistically significant, which means that a firm without pre-shock market 
experience is located farther away from the origin in the post-shock period. In Columns III and 
IV, the coefficients for the firm without pre-shock market experience are negative and 
statistically significant, which means that a firm without pre-shock market experience has 
lower efficiency scores in the post-shock period. In Columns I and III, I find support for H3a. 
In Column I, the coefficient for the interaction term of total project capacity and slope is 
positive and statistically significant, which means that a firm initiating greater total capacity of 
projects is located farther away from the origin in the post-shock period. In Column III, the 
coefficient for the total project capacity is negative and statistically significant, which means 
that a firm initiating greater total capacity of projects has lower efficiency scores in the post-
shock period. In Columns III and IV, I find support for H3a. In Column III and IV, the 
coefficients for the total project initiated are negative and statistically significant, which means 
that a firm initiating greater number of projects has lower efficiency scores in the post-shock 
period. Thus, these findings corroborate that firms in the post-shock period have inferior speed 
capability, due to new entry of lower speed-capable firms in the post-shock period and firms’ 
application of non-scale-free resources into more new projects. 
Table 2.7 presents results regarding why post-entry speed capabilities of firms in the 
post-shock period (i.e., when the product-market demand rapidly increases) are worse relative 
to those of firms in the pre-shock period (i.e., when the product-market demand is steadily low). 
All Columns provide results when the dependent variable is the efficiency scores from DEA 





III and IV. The coefficients for the interaction term of firm without pre-shock market 
experience and post shock is negative and statistically significant, which means that having no 
experience in the pre-shock market negatively moderates the relationship between lower 
efficiency scores and post-shock firms (i.e., the lower efficiency scores of post-shock firms, 
relative to pre-shock firms, are even lower for a firm without pre-shock market experience).  
I find support for H3b in Columns II and IV. The coefficients for the interaction term 
of total project capacity and post shock is negative and statistically significant, which means 
that greater total capacity of projects negatively moderates the relationship between lower 
efficiency scores and post-shock firms (i.e., the lower efficiency scores of post-shock firms, 
relative to pre-shock firms, are even lower for the firms initiating greater total project capacity). 
I find support for H4b in Columns III and IV. The coefficients for the interaction term of total 
project initiated and post shock is negative and statistically significant, which means that the 
more number of projects initiated by a firm negatively moderates the relationship between 
lower efficiency scores and post-shock firms (i.e., the lower efficiency scores of post-shock 
firms, relative to pre-shock firms, are even lower for the firms initiating more number of 
projects). Thus, these findings corroborate that firms in the post-shock period have inferior 
speed capability compared to those in the pre-shock period, due to new entry of lower speed-
capable firms in the post-shock period and firms’ application of non-scale-free resources into 
more new projects. 
Do these results mean that the initial hypothesis is wrong? I initially hypothesized that 
firms in the post-shock period have superior post-entry speed capability relative to firms in the 
pre-shock period. However, I now find the opposite empirical result to my initial hypothesis. 
Figure 2.6 provides a good response to this question. In Figure 2.6, the speed frontier 
for the firms in the post-shock period has expanded toward the origin relative to that for the 





post-shock period, as was predicted by the initial hypothesis based on entry timing literature. 
In other words, firms in the post-shock period have superior speed capability in terms of the 
industry-wide speed frontier, but their post-entry speed capability on average is worse relative 
to the pre-shock firms because the firms in the post-shock period make investments far within 
the speed frontier. The initial hypothesis was not simply wrong, but did provide the correct 
prediction on the industry-wide speed frontier. 
Figure 2.6 also provides more nuanced explanations of the relationships among time 
compression (dis)economies, speed frontier, and speed capability. Recent research on time 
compression (dis)economies (Hawk & Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2018) finds that only 12% of the 
projects are subject to time compression diseconomies, and that over 39% of the project do not 
realize economies of time compression. This finding is not surprising when we see Figure 2.6, 
where a few firms make cost-efficient investments on the speed frontier whereas the majority 
of other firms make cost-inefficient investments within the speed frontier. Regarding their 
finding of time compression economies, not diseconomies, Hawk and Pacheco-de-Almeida 
(2018) provides two possible explanations for why time compression economies, not 
diseconomies, can be observed empirically in the data set: (1) heterogeneity in firms’ speed 
capability, or (2) a U-shaped relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build and majority 
firms not realizing its economies of time compression. Figure 2.6 provides a consistent pattern 
that supports heterogeneity of firms’ speed capability. As seen in Figure 2.6, the speed frontier 
follows the time compression diseconomies for firms in the pre- and post-shock periods. 
However, the negative relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build for the firms in the 
pre-shock period (i.e., slope of the fitted line in black) becomes less negative for the post-shock 
firms (i.e., slope of the fitted line in red) due to the existence of lower speed-capable firms 
farther away from the origin. Indeed, it would be possible to observe the positive slope of the 





in the sample. In sum, Figure 2.6 suggests that understanding speed capability requires a more 
nuanced distinction between changes in speed frontier and changes in distances from the 
frontier. The speed frontier itself improves for the firms in the post-shock period as predicted 
by the entry timing literature whereas the distances from the speed frontier becomes longer 
(i.e., greater un-realization of the frontier) for the firms in the post-shock period. This 
distinction also suggests that the frontier method (Chen et al. 2015) would be more fruitful in 
understanding speed capabilities in terms of both changes in the frontier itself and distances 
from the frontier. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The current research contributes to the literature in four aspects. The extant literature 
on speed capability has mostly focused on pre-entry speed capability prior to the firm’s market 
entry and has neglected post-entry speed capability. First, I examine the post-entry speed 
capability of the firms in the pre- and post-shock period (i.e., before and after 2000) by 
revisiting the same empirical context where previous research finds that firms with superior 
pre-entry speed capability are more likely to enter the post-shock market. I find that firms in 
the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capability relative to firms in the pre-shock 
period. This result suggests that firms’ pre-entry speed capability could be distinct from their 
post-entry speed capability. Therefore, we need to extend our understanding on the firm’s speed 
capability in building its plant into post-entry speed capability because antecedents and 
outcomes of post-entry speed capability can differ from those of pre-entry speed capability.  
Second, I contribute to the dynamic capability literature. Traditionally, a dynamic 
capability is considered critical in a rapidly changing technological environment (Teece et al. 
1997) or a heterogeneous demand environment (Adner, 2002). The finding that the positive 





suggests that, in examining the development of firm capabilities, rapid changes in homogenous 
product market should be considered as another important context.  
Third, I contribute to the literature of time compression (dis)economies. I find that, the 
industry-wide speed frontier expands over time (see Figure 2.6) even though the firms in the 
post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capability, on average. This result suggests 
that speed capability can be understood in terms of both the industry speed frontier and firm-
specific distances from the frontier, which might diverge. Specifically, my data provide more 
nuanced understanding concerning the relationships among time compression diseconomies, 
speed frontier, and speed capability, by complementing recent research on time compression 
(dis-) economies (Hawk & Pacheco-de-Almeida, 2018). Hawk & Pacheco-de-Almeida (2018) 
finds that only 12 percent of the projects are subject to time compression diseconomies and 
provide two potential explanations to explain time compression economies: (1) heterogeneity 
in firms’ speed capability, or (2) U-shape relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build 
and majority firms not realizing its economies of time compression. My data as shown in Figure 
2.6 reveal a consistent pattern supporting heterogeneity in firms’ speed capability. In particular, 
the industry-wide speed frontier is clearly not U-shape. However, I find the fitted value 
becomes less negative when more firms make investment far within the speed frontier. It would 
be possible to observe empirically a positive fitted value if the sample data had more firms 
distant from the speed frontier. In sum, I submit that time compression diseconomies and speed 
capability are different constructs. On the one hand, time compression diseconomies and its 
change are better understood by focusing on the industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., the outer 
boundary of speed). On the other hand, firm-specific speed capability is better understood by 
identifying the changes in the distances from the frontier.  
Fourth, I contribute to the market-entry timing literature. The finding that firms in the 





shock period is counterintuitive when we solely rely on the market-entry timing literature. At 
the same time, the expansion of the speed frontier over time is consistent with the prediction 
from the entry timing literature. Considering both effects of entry timing and product-market 





Figures and Tables 
Figure 2.1. Demand shock in liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry 
 
(Source: Blumsack, Apt, & Lave, 2006) 
A. Generating Capacity Additions in Electric Power Generation, 1991-2003 
 
 
(Source: Hawk et al. 2013) 







Figure 2.2. Brief structure of panel data 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Price level and price volatility in the LNG industry between 1996 to 2007 
       






Figure 2.4. Measuring speed capability using time-to-build and cost-to-build  
                      
(a) relative speed frontier on average                  (b) efficiency score from DEA analysis 
Figure 2.5. Yearly average of time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity 
     
(a) yearly average of time-to-build                (b) yearly average of cost-to-build 








Table 2.1. Test for a structural break: Unknown break date 
 Column I 
Number of observation 156 
Full sample 1995 January to 2007 December 
Trimmed sample 1997 January to 2006 December 




Exogenous variables time_month 
Results reported in Column I are from the test using sbsingle stata command after running the OLS regression 















Time-to-build  -0.098** 
 (0.042) 
Yearly Price Level 0.400*** -0.054 
(0.139) (0.046) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.520 0.119 
(2.180) (0.631) 
Construction Raw Material Price -6.543*** 0.089 
(1.767) (0.381) 
EPC Cost 0.099 0.013 
(0.101) (0.021) 
Firm Size 0.032 -0.018** 
(0.025) (0.009) 
Age -0.088** -0.026 
(0.044) (0.025) 
Firm without pre-shock Market Experience 0.176 0.430*** 
(0.144) (0.050) 
Total Project Capacity 3.368* 0.345 
(1.830) (0.688) 
Total Project Initiated 0.506*** 0.143*** 
(0.075) (0.017) 
LNG Fleet -0.037*** -0.015*** 
(0.012) (0.004) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.198** 0.013 
(0.098) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.102 0.110*** 
(0.085) (0.032) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.165 -0.312*** 
(0.195) (0.083) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.451 -0.300** 
(0.834) (0.150) 
Diversification effect control Y Y 
N 500 500 
R-sq 0.277 0.407 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.10 
 
Results reported in Column I are from estimation of a probit model on entry into LNG market, and results reported 
in Column II are from estimation of an OLS model on cost-to-build. Industry dummies for diversification effects 
and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Pseudo R-square is reported 





Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for yearly panel 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Efficiency Score 
 
0.75 0.14 
1.00                  
2. Distance  
from the origin 
3.26 0.44 




-0.66 -0.00 1.00                
4. Post Shock 
 
0.57 0.50 
-0.03 -0.06 0.18 1.00               
5. Yearly  
Price Level 
4.10 1.81 
-0.02 -0.07 0.19 0.78 1.00              
6. Yearly  
Price Volatility 
0.11 0.13 
-0.03 -0.06 0.18 0.69 0.97 1.00             
7. Construction  
Raw Material Price 
1.53 0.15 
-0.05 -0.03 0.18 0.62 0.88 0.89 1.00            
8. EPC cost 
 
1.69 1.28 
-0.09 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.51 1.00           
9. Firm Size 
 
9.48 2.43 




-0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.29 1.00         
11. Firm without Pre-
shock Market Experience 
0.41 0.49 
-0.23 -0.02 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.33 -0.04 1.00        
12. Total Project 
Initiated 
0.02 0.03 
-0.12 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.23 -0.23 1.00       
13. Total Project 
Capacity 
1.39 1.74 
-0.19 0.15 0.24 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.20 0.31 0.14 -0.43 0.39 1.00      
14. LNG Fleet 
 
2.21 5.31 
-0.10 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.30 0.12 -0.24 0.39 0.52 1.00     
15. Oil Gas  
Production 
6.12 0.82 
0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.35 0.40 -0.28 0.39 0.27 0.29 1.00    
16. Oil Gas  
Reserves 
10.54 0.62 
-0.13 0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.26 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.12 -0.03 1.00   
17. Delay by 
Extreme Weather 
0.08 0.27 
0.26 0.15 -0.32 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.23 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 1.00  
18. Delay by  
Hurricane 
0.02 0.13 






Table 2.4. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.356* 0.285*   
(0.199) (0.158)   
Post Shock -0.297 -0.241   
(0.178) (0.151)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 
  0.139** 0.124** 
  (0.068) (0.057) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
  0.562 0.581 
  (0.434) (0.474) 
Slope -0.318 -0.267 -0.219 -0.207 
(0.236) (0.185) (0.169) (0.141) 
Yearly Price Level -0.056 -0.074** 0.130 0.111 
(0.049) (0.036) (0.098) (0.126) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.385 0.541 -7.226 -7.119 
(0.451) (0.389) (4.495) (5.181) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.114 -0.121 0.181 0.173 
(0.275) (0.256) (0.303) (0.315) 
EPC Cost 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.027 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Firm Size 0.030 0.014 0.031 0.015 
(0.023) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) 
Age -0.040 -0.054 -0.026 -0.051 
(0.541) (0.063) (0.635) (0.062) 
Firm without pre-shock Market Experience  0.265***  0.261*** 
 (0.094)  (0.094) 
Total Project Capacity -0.061 0.529 -0.128 0.497 
(0.729) (0.626) (0.761) (0.631) 
Total Project Initiated 0.038 0.057** 0.031 0.051* 
(0.032) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
(0.025) (0.011) (0.024) (0.011) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.078* 0.055* 0.083* 0.058* 
(0.043) (0.032) (0.042) (0.031) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.104*** -0.050** -0.084*** -0.037 
(0.015) (0.026) (0.016) (0.023) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.287 0.359** 0.246 0.319* 
(0.195) (0.178) (0.197) (0.181) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.097 -0.054 -0.090 -0.051 
(0.194) (0.181) (0.192) (0.178) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.078 0.177 0.088 0.182 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-





Table 2.5. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock (H1) -0.025* -0.012   
(0.015) (0.017)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 
  -0.354** -0.332** 
  (0.151) (0.161) 
Yearly Price Level 0.003 0.019 -0.090*** -0.068* 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.033) (0.039) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.069 -0.065 3.930** 3.562** 
(0.129) (0.139) (1.593) (1.747) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.016 -0.004 -0.121 -0.124 
(0.072) (0.069) (0.098) (0.102) 
EPC Cost -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm Size -0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Age 0.203 0.012 0.111 0.012 
(0.146) (0.013) (0.173) (0.014) 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience  -0.134***  -0.134*** 
 (0.022)  (0.022) 
Total Project Capacity 0.060 -0.034 0.054 -0.029 
(0.259) (0.241) (0.260) (0.243) 
Total Project Initiated -0.032** -0.039*** -0.033** -0.040*** 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009) 
LNG Fleet -0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.003 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.028** -0.012 -0.028** -0.012 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.013 -0.009 0.012 -0.010* 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.113*** 0.089*** 0.120*** 0.094*** 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.082 0.079 0.086 0.083 
(0.060) (0.052) (0.060) (0.053) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.167 0.340 0.175 0.344 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






Table 2.6. Speed capability of the firms in the post-shock period 
 DV: distances from the 
origin 
DV: efficiency scores 
I 
GLS / RE 
II 
GLS / BE 
III 
GLS / RE 
IV 
GLS / BE 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience 






Total Project Capacity 






Total Project Initiated 
























































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 286 286 286 286 
R-square 0.274 0.627 0.448 0.760 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects OLS model. Results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm between-effects OLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm in Columns I and III. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a 
constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for 





Table 2.7. The moderating effect on the inferior speed capability of firms in the post-
shock period 
 DV: efficiency scores 
I 
GLS / RE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
GLS / RE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience 









Total Project Capacity 





Total Project Initiated 
× Post Shock (H4b) 




























































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.350 0.362 0.366 0.373 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in all Columns are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 









When Can a Firm Have Faster Speed Despite Inferior Speed Capability? 
(Formal Analytical Model) 
ABSTRACT 
The continuing lack of distinction in the extant literature between the firm’s faster speed and 
its superior speed capability in building its plant arises from a lack of theoretical understanding 
of the boundary condition dictating when speed and speed capability can diverge. Further, there 
is an absence of empirical research examining the divergence of speed and speed capability in 
tandem. To address the lack of distinction between faster speed and superior speed capability, 
I develop a model and derive a theoretical framework of a firm’s time-to-build, cost-to-build, 
and marginal cost-to-build its plant when the firm’s speed capability and/or product-market 
demand change. My theoretical framework shows that a firm with inferior speed capability can 
have faster speed if product-market demand increases substantially (additionally, it shows that 
a firm with superior speed capability in building its plant can have slower speed if product-







The strategic management literature has emphasized speed as a potential source of a 
firm’s competitive advantage (Helfat, et al.  2007; Stalk, 1988; Stalk & Hout, 1990; Teece, et 
al. 1997). The extant literature has achieved substantial progress by recognizing that a firm’s 
speed is a strategic decision involving a cost-benefit tradeoff (Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1966; 
Teece, 1977), and by distinguishing faster speed from superior speed capability (Hawk, et al. 
2013, Pacheco-de-Almedia, et al. 2015). ‘Faster speed’ refers to the shorter time lag between 
initiation and completion of an event of interest (e.g., investment or R&D), whereas ‘superior 
speed capability’ means faster speed at the same cost. This distinction between speed and speed 
capability challenges the view that a firm with faster speed has superior speed capability in 
building its plant, because it makes clear that faster speed can incur substantially higher cost, 
and substantially higher cost can diminish speed capability. It also leads researchers seeking to 
find the source of a firm’s competitive advantage to pose the question of how a firm can achieve 
superior speed capability, and thereby shifts their focus away from simply examining how 
firms achieve faster speed. The strategic management literature has thus made strides into 
explaining how speed and speed capability are a source of a firm’s competitive advantage. 
However, the extant literature still accepts the proposition that firms with superior 
capability have faster speed.21 The lack of distinction between faster speed and superior speed 
capability is problematic given its importance and potential impact. In particular, academic 
research investigating speed has commonly made arguments by assuming that firms with 
superior capability have faster speed, and that unproven thesis has reverberated in the extant 
literature. For time-to-build a plant example, Hawk and Pacheco-de-Almeida state, “the 
optimal development time for firms with lower time compression diseconomies is also usually 
                                                        
21 This proposition is the converse of the proposition, now disproven, that firms with faster speed have 





faster: specifically, when choosing the development time that maximizes the difference 
between project revenues and costs, firms with lower [time compression diseconomies] not 
only accelerate more but also incur lower costs” (2018: 2501). This explanation posits that 
speed (i.e., optimal development time) for firms with superior speed capability (i.e., lower time 
compression diseconomies) is usually faster. Similar examples are found in research areas such 
as acquisitions (Aktas, de Bodt, & Roll, 2013),22 competitive strategy (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; 
Más-Ruiz, Nicolau-Gonzálbez, & Ruiz-Moreno, 2005),23 corporate governance and design 
(Kownatzki, Walter, Floyd, & Lechner, 2013; Lewis & Bajari, 2011), 24  decision-making 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Forbes, 2005; Judge & Miller, 1991; Wally & Baum, 1994), 25 
entrepreneurship (Beckman & Burton, 2008; Chang, 2004; Honjo & Nagaoka, 2018, Markman, 
                                                        
22 In the acquisition context literature, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2013) maintain that firms with more 
learning from previous acquisition experiences have shorter time between acquisition deals. 
23 In the competitive strategy literature, Chen and Hambrick (1995) argue that smaller firms have faster 
response speed to rivals’ competitive actions than larger firms because smaller firms both have better 
flexibility and need to analyze and coordinate fewer markets. Más-Ruiz, Nicolau-Gonzálbez, and Ruiz-
Moreno (2005) maintain that larger firms have faster response speed to rivals’ competitive actions than 
smaller firms, because large firms have more resources and are less threatened by rivals’ retaliation. 
24 In the corporate governance and design literature, previous research finds that firms with an incentive 
system for faster speed consequently have faster speed. Lewis and Bajari (2011) show that where the 
scoring design was used, contracts were completed 30–40% faster and welfare gains to commuters 
exceeded the increase in procurement costs. Kownatzki, Walter, Floyd, and Lechner (2013) find that 
three types of corporate control systems (e.g., goal setting, extrinsic incentives, and decision process 
control) enhance decision speed. 
25 In the decision-making literature, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) maintain that effective firms make 
strategic decisions quickly in high velocity environments. Eisenhardt (1989) conducts case studies of 
eight microcomputer firms and develops a set of propositions linking decision speed with certain 
management team processes, including the use of real-time information, the consideration of multiple 
simultaneous alternatives, and the use of experienced counselors. Judge and Miller (1991) seize upon 
two specific determinants proposed by Eisenhardt—the number of alternatives considered and the use 
of experienced counselors—and examine their effects on decision speed. In a study of 36 organizations 
in three different industries, they find that considering more alternatives quickened decision speed, 
regardless of environmental context, but that the use of experienced counselors had different effects on 
speed in different contexts. Wally and Baum (1994) ask 151 CEOs to respond to a hypothetical 
acquisition scenario and find that these executives’ cognitive ability, use of intuition, tolerance for risk, 
and propensity to act were all positively related to decision speed, as were organizational centralization 
and formalization. Forbes (2005), using survey data from 98 Internet startups and their founder/ 
managers, finds that firms make faster decisions when they are managed by older entrepreneurs and by 





Gianiodis, Phan, & Balkin, 2005; Müller, 2010),26 internationalization (Autio, Sapienza, & 
Almeida, 2000; Casillas & Moreno-Menéndez, 2014; Gao & Pan, 2010), 27  and product 
development (Clark & Fujimoto, 1989; Datar, et al. 1997; Dyer, 1996; Hult, Ketchen, & 
Nichols, 2002).28 
The continuing lack of distinguishing speed vis-à-vis speed capability arises from two 
gaps in the literature: the lack of a theoretical understanding of the boundary condition when 
speed and speed capability can diverge, and the absence of empirical research examining the 
                                                        
26 In the entrepreneurship literature, Chang (2004) maintains that better resources, such as the reputation 
of venture capital firms available to them, the amount of money raised from venture capital firms, and 
the reputation of alliances partners, lead a startup to have shorter time-to-IPO. Beckman and Burton 
(2008) argues that firms with more complete functional structures go public faster and firms with 
broadly experienced team members obtain venture capital more quickly. Müller (2010) finds that the 
time lag between the founder’s leaving of academia and the establishment of her firm is shorter when 
the necessity of assembling complementary skills is lower, when there has been high-level technology 
transfer, when the founders have access to university infrastructure, or when they receive informal 
support by former colleagues. Honjo and Nagaoka (2018) maintain that biotechnology start-ups initially 
backed by venture capital firms and those originating from universities are more likely to go public 
within a shorter period. Markman, Gianiodis, Phan, and Balkin (2005) finds that university technology 
transfer offices’ (UTTOs) resources decrease commercialization time more than cooperation from 
faculty, that faculty-inventors play a stronger role in reducing commercialization time than companies 
during advanced commercialization stages, and that UTTO competency in matching technologies to 
clients decreases commercialization time during advanced commercialization stages. 
27 In the internationalization literature, Autio, Sapienza, and Almeida (2000) maintain that firms with 
earlier initiation of internationalization and greater knowledge intensity grows faster internationally. 
Casillas and Moreno-Menéndez (2014) argue that the depth of international activities has an inverted 
U-shaped impact on the speed of the internationalization process, while diversity of international 
activities has a U-shaped influence on the speed of internationalization. Gao and Pan (2010) maintain 
that cumulative entry experience speeds up the pace of sequential entries of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in a foreign market; equity joint venture and wholly owned subsidiary experience have stronger 
effects on speeding up the pace of sequential entries of MNEs than contractual arrangement experience; 
switching from low to high resource commitment modes slows the pace of sequential entries of MNEs 
in a foreign market; and the deterring effect of mode switch on the pace of sequential entries can be 
reduced as MNEs acquire more cumulative entry experience. 
28 In the product development literature, Clark and Fujimoto (1989) argue that organizational capability 
(measured by integrated execution) has shorter engineering lead-time, but little influence on planning 
lead-time. Datar, Jordan, Kekre, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (1997) maintain that a concentrated new product 
development structure, in contrast to a distributed structure, affords rapid prototyping, whereas volume 
production is reached faster in the distributed structure. Dyer (1996) submits that the greater the inter-
firm human asset co-specialization, the faster the new model cycle time in the auto industry. Hult, 
Ketchen, and Nichols (2002) argue that cultural competitiveness (e.g., entrepreneurship, innovativeness, 
and learning) decreases order fulfillment cycle time (i.e., the duration of time between an internal 






divergence of speed and speed capability in tandem. There is little theoretical or empirical 
research examining both the constructs of speed and speed capability simultaneously. Gompers 
(1996) could be an exception in finding that young venture capital firms take startups public 
earlier than older venture capital firms do because young venture capital firms have greater 
marginal return of shorter time-to-IPO on establishing a reputation and raising capital for new 
funds. Gompers (1996) did not explicitly focus on the resource/capability side effect in 
explaining time-to-IPO (i.e., this article did not explain that younger venture capitals can have 
less resource/capability, which can lead to slower time-to-IPO). Nevertheless, to the best of my 
knowledge, it is unique in suggesting that firms with inferior resource/capability can have faster 
speed. 
 In this chapter, I seek to fill these research gaps in the literature. Focusing on the 
specific constructs of a firm’s time-to-build its plant (i.e., the time lag between the firm’s plant 
construction initiation and its completion for market entry) and its speed capability (i.e., the 
time-to-build its plant at the same cost), I explain under what conditions firms’ speed and speed 
capability can diverge. That is, a firm has faster speed despite inferior speed capability or 
slower speed despite superior speed capability in building its plant. Based on my developed 
decision-theoretic model, I maintain that firms with inferior speed capability can have faster 
speed when product-market demand increases substantially (and, conversely, firms with 
superior speed capability in building their plants can have slower speed when product-market 
demand decreases substantially). 
As shown in Figure 3.3, the model captures the tradeoff concerning a firm’s time-to-
build its plant by considering the its increased costs, resulting from its decision to decrease the 
time-to-build its plant, as compared with a firm’s revenue deferment, resulting from deciding 
to allow for a longer time-to-build its plant. The model focuses on a firm’s choice of time-to-





to explain what happens to a firm’s time-to-build, cost-to-build, and marginal cost-to-build its 
plant when a firm’s speed capability and/or product-market demand change. In particular, the 
model considers whether and in what direction a firm’s speed capability and/or product-market 
demand change. It is beyond the purview of this model to answer why a firm’s speed capability 
and/or product-market demand change,29 or whether product-market demand changes and a 
firm’s speed capability interact with each other. 
In terms of product-market demand, when firms enter the higher demand market, a 
revenue curve shifts upwards and its slope gets steeper, as shown in Figure 3.4. In this case, 
firms have a greater incentive to decrease their time-to-build their plants because a higher 
revenue flow is expected to occur sooner, and this flow can more than compensate for any 
additional costs incurred by decreasing their time-to-build. Therefore, for higher demand 
market entrants, decreasing the time-to-build their plant is a profit-maximizing decision. In this 
case, a greater cost-to-build their plants results from a shorter optimal time-to-build due to the 
time-cost tradeoff (i.e., non-linear increases in costs occur as the time-to-build decreases for 
higher demand market entrants). However, when firms enter the lower demand market, a 
revenue curve shifts downwards with its slope getting less steep as shown in Figure 3.5. In this 
case, the lower demand market entrants have a greater incentive to increase their time-to-build 
their plants. Thus, a lower cost-to-build a plant results from a shorter optimal time-to-build a 
plant. 
In terms of speed capability, when firms have superior speed capability, the cost curve 
shifts towards the origin, as shown in Figure 3.6. In this case, firms have a greater incentive to 
decrease their time-to-build their plants because firms can advance revenue flow sooner while 
incurring no more cost than when speed capability does not change. Therefore, for entrants 
with superior speed capability, decreasing the time-to-build their plants is a profit-maximizing 
                                                        





decision. In this case, the cost-to-build their plants also decreases despite a shorter optimal 
time-to-build a plant because superior capability offsets the increased cost from the time-cost 
tradeoff. However, when firms have inferior speed capability, the cost curve shifts farther away 
from the origin, as shown in Figure 3.7. In this case, firms have a greater incentive to increase 
their time-to-build their plants. Accordingly, the cost-to-build their plant also increases despite 
a longer optimal time-to-build a plant because inferior capability offsets the decreased cost 
from the time-cost tradeoff. 
Based on these basic dynamics of the product-market demand and a firm’s speed 
capability changes, my developed decision-theoretic model provides distinctive comparative 
statics of time-to-build, cost-to-build, and marginal cost-to-build its plants. Inputting the 
exhaustive scenarios when product-market demand and/or speed capability change produces 
these statics. They enable us to discern whether and in what direction the product-market 
demand effect and/or a firm’s capability effect are substantially at play. From the developed 
model, I find that a firm can have shorter time-to-build its plant despite inferior speed capability 
if product-market demand increases substantially (or, longer time-to-build its plant despite 
superior speed capability if product-market demand decreases substantially). In particular, my 
model shows that product-market demand is one of the boundary conditions that leads speed 
and speed capability to diverge. This finding contributes to the research literature by showing 
that neither a firm with faster speed has superior speed capability, nor a firm with superior 
speed capability has faster speed necessarily holds. 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I provide the model 
setting. In Section 3, I explain what results the model can predict. In Section 4, I conclude by 








3.2.1 Model setting 
I model two groups of firms competing in a homogenous output market. I denote the 
reference group of firms by C and the comparison group of firms by T. There are two time-
periods, which I designated with I and II. Figure 3.1 depicts the two time-periods within the 
developed model. 
In time-period I, both group of firms make investments. I label the time-to-build a plant 
of the reference group of firms by 𝑇  and that of the comparison group of firms by 𝑇 .30 
Consistent with the extant research literature, this model captures the real-world feature that 
managers typically consider a firm’s time-to-build its plant as a strategic choice in the context 
of its entry decision. In time-period I, the firms in the reference group make investments by 
strategically choosing their time-to-build their plants (𝑇∗) in a way that maximizes their net 
present value (NPV). In this model, I posit that firms start receiving return (𝑟 ) at t = 𝑇∗ when 
plant investment completes and commercial operation starts. Note that once the firms in the 
reference group calculate their 𝑇∗, they have determined their calendar time for investment 
completion (and for starting operations). The firms in the comparison group enter the market 
with a strategic choice of time to build (𝑇∗) that also maximizes their net present value (NPV). 
Firms in the comparison group start receiving return (𝑟 ) at t = 𝑇∗, when investment completes 
and commercial operation starts. Once the firms in the comparison group calculate their 𝑇∗, 
the calendar time for investment completion (and for starting operations) of the firms in the 
comparison group is also fully determined. 
                                                        
30 A firm’s time-to-build its plant has exogenous and endogenous aspects, which can be incorporated in 
the model by defining 𝑇 , = 𝑇 + 𝑇  and 𝑇 , = 𝑇 + 𝑇  for each industry, i, where 𝑇  captures an 
exogenous aspect and 𝑇  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇  capture an endogenous aspect. However, this study treats a firm’s 
time-to-build its plant as endogenous (i.e., as a strategic choice) because adding 𝑇  in the model does 
not change the general results. Moreover, 𝑇  will be cancelled out in the empirical context, as chapters 





The model is in continuous time denoted by t > 0. I posit that, for firms in both groups, 
the investments are completely irreversible. Each group of firms incurs costs, receives revenues, 
and seeks to maximize their discounted cash flows (i.e., their respective NPVs) for a common 
discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1), which reflects the cost of capital for the firms.  
I adopt a decision-theoretic approach, not a game-theoretic approach, for two reasons. 
First, the objective of the model is to explain what happens to time-to-build, cost-to-build, and 
marginal cost-to-build its plants for comparison-group firms relative to those in the reference 
group, when firms’ speed capability and/or product-market demand change. It is not the 
objective of this model to explain why a firm’s capability and/or product-market demand 
change (e.g., entry timing, competition, and so on), or whether product-market demand changes 
and a firm’s speed capability interact with each other. Second, in Chapters 3 and 4, I test my 
developed theory in the empirical context of the LNG industry, where I can treat all firms as 
price takers (Kellogg, 2014). This treatment almost certainly holds institutionally. The market 
for Liquefied Natural Gas is global and product market price is the first-order consideration for 
firms in their investment decisions, as shown in Figure 3.2. With respect to monopoly power 
in the market, the largest firm in the dataset is responsible for only 5.2 percent of all constructed 
plants’ capacities during the sample period, a quantity that seems insufficient for exertion of 
substantial market power. 
3.2.2 Expected revenue and cost for the reference group of firms 
Firms that have better market demand expectations and anticipate that their NPV would 
be positive become members of reference group C by entering the market in period I. The 
expected flows of revenue of group C are denoted by r . The present value of the expected 
revenue flows that the reference group of firms faces at the time of market entry is then 





A firm’s total construction cost for its plant is a function of the time-to-build the plant 
under a time-cost tradeoff. In the current study, a 1% decrease in a firm’s time-to-build its plant 
typically requires more than a 1% increase in the firm’s total construction cost for its plant 
(Boehm, 1981; Graves, 1989; Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1967, 1984). I refer to this as the time-
cost tradeoff, consistent with extant literature (Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2007). I denote 
the reference group of firms’ cost function of time-to-build its plants by 𝐶 (T): 
𝐶 (𝑇 ) = c(𝑇 − α) + 𝛽 
where α > 0 and 𝛽 > 0 
In the model, a sufficient condition for a time-cost tradeoff is 𝑐(𝑇) > 0, 𝑐 (𝑇) < 0, 
lim
→
𝑐 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝑐 (𝑇) = 0, and 𝑐 ′(𝑇) > 0 where 𝑇 > 0. In the cost function, α is a 
firm’s minimum feasible time-to-build its plant (i.e., time which is independent of cost) and 𝛽 
is a firm’s minimum feasible cost-to-build its plant (i.e., cost which is independent of time). In 
other words, α captures the time that cannot be bought by cost (e.g., intangible resources that 
a firm’s specialized human resources or routines have accumulated through direct/indirect 
experiences), and 𝛽  captures the cost that needs to be paid even if the construction is not 
initiated (e.g., costs for requisite activities before construction such as planning and studying). 
The reference group of firms thus seeks to maximize the NPV of its cash flows, as given 
by: 
∏ =  𝑅 (𝑇 ) −  𝐶 (𝑇 ) 
3.2.3 Expected revenue and cost for the comparison group of firms 
Firms that have better market demand expectations and anticipate that their NPV will 
be positive become members of the comparison group T by entering the market in period I. 
The expected flow of revenues of the group T is denoted by r . The present value of the 





𝑅 (𝑇 ) =  r 𝑒 𝑑𝑡 
For the comparison group of firms, a firm’s total construction cost for its plants is still 
a function of its time-to-build its plant under a time-cost tradeoff, in which the ratio of lower 
time-to-build and increased cost-to-build a plant is exactly the same (by model construction) 
as the reference group of firms. That is, the shape of a cost curve for the comparison group of 
firms is the same as the one for the reference group of firms. However, in terms of absolute 
costs, the comparison group of firms might have a shorter time-to-build their plant for the same 
cost, due to superior speed capability, or a longer time-to-build their plant for the same cost, 
due to inferior speed capability. These differences in speed capability between the reference 
group and comparison group are captured by a cost curve shift. Specifically, superior speed 
capability of the comparison group of firms is captured by a cost curve shift toward the origin 
and inferior speed capability by a cost curve shift farther away from the origin.  Alternatively, 
I can capture the difference in a firm’s speed capability between the reference group and 
comparison group by changing the shape of a cost curve while keeping its minimum feasible 
time-to-build a plant (α) and minimum feasible cost-to-build a plant (β) the same. This move 
is based on Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2007), as shown in Figure 3.3. These results are 
robust in capturing the difference in speed capability; I use a cost curve shift because it does 
not require a specific functional form of costs. 
I denote the comparison group of firms’ cost function of time-to-build its plants by 
𝐶 (𝑇 ). 
𝐶 (𝑇 ) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α + 𝛾 ) + 𝛽 − 𝛾  
When the comparison group of firms has superior speed capability, 𝛽 ≥ 𝛾 ≥ 0 and α ≥
𝛾 ≥ 0. When the comparison group of firms has inferior speed capability, 𝛾 ≤ 0 and 𝛾 ≤ 0. 






∏ =  𝑅 (𝑇 ) − 𝐶 (𝑇 ) 
3.3. RESULTS FROM THE MODEL 
 The model captures the tradeoff between revenue and cost for a firm deciding the time-
to-build its plant, as shown in Figure 3.4.B. Figure 3.4.B illustrates a revenue curve (𝑅 ) and a 
cost curve (𝐶 ) for the reference group of firms. As a firm increases the time-to-build its plant, 
its cost-to-build decreases due to time compression diseconomies and its revenue decreases 
due to delays in commercial operation on the product-market. In the reference group, a firm’s 
optimal time-to-build a plant is 𝑇∗, and the cost-to-build a plant at 𝑇∗ is 𝐶 (𝑇∗). Figure 3.4.A 
illustrates a first derivative of expected revenue flows (𝑅 ) and a first derivative of costs (𝐶 ) 
for the reference group of firms. In the same group, a firm has its optimal time-to-build a plant 
designated as 𝑇∗, where 𝑅  and 𝐶  is equal and marginal cost-to-build a plant at its optimal 
time-to-build is 𝐶  (𝑇
∗). 
In the following sections, I explain how the comparative statics for the comparison 
group of firms change relative to the reference group of firms when their speed capability 
is different from the reference group of firms and when they face different product-
market demand from the reference group of firms. In particular, in Figure A of Figures 3.5 
through 3.8, a shift in a first derivative of revenue curve (i.e., 𝑅  relative to 𝑅 ) and a shift 
in a first derivative of cost curve (i.e., 𝐶  relative to 𝐶 ) of the comparison group relative 
to the curves of the reference group are illustrated. These shifts show a change in optimal 
time-to-build a plant (i.e., 𝑇∗ relative to 𝑇∗), and a change in marginal cost at the optimal 
time-to-build a plant (i.e., 𝐶  (𝑇
∗) relative to 𝐶  (𝑇
∗)), for the comparison group relative 
to the reference group. In Figure B of those same figures, a shift in a revenue curve (i.e., 





group relative to the reference group are illustrated. These shifts show a change in cost 
at the optimal time-to-build a plant (i.e., 𝐶 (𝑇∗) relative to 𝐶 (𝑇∗)) of the comparison 
group relative to the reference group.  
3.3.1. When the comparison group of firms have superior speed capability31 
Figure 3.5 shows the changes in comparative statics resulting from the model when the 
comparison group of firms have superior speed capability relative to the reference group of 
firms and the product-market demand is constant. As shown Figure 3.5.A, a first derivative of 
costs for the comparison group of firms (𝐶 ) shifts leftward. The optimal time-to-build a plant 
of the comparison group of firms is shorter relative to that of the reference group of firms (i.e.,  
𝑇∗  <  𝑇∗). Also, marginal cost at its optimal time-to-build a plant of the comparison group is 
steeper or more negative relative to that of the reference group (i.e., 𝐶  (𝑇
∗) < 𝐶  (𝑇
∗)). As 
shown Figure 3.5.B, the cost-to-build a plant at the optimal time-to-build a plant for the 
comparison group is lower relative to that for the reference group (i.e., 𝐶 (𝑇∗) < 𝐶 (𝑇∗)). 
3.3.2. When the comparison group of firms have inferior speed capability 
Figure 3.6 shows the changes in comparative statics from the model when the 
comparison group of firms have inferior speed capability relative to the reference group of 
firms and the product-market demand is constant. As shown Figure 3.6.A, a first derivative of 
costs for the comparison group of firms (𝐶 ) shifts rightward. The optimal time-to-build a plant 
of the comparison group of firms is longer relative to that of the reference group of firms (that 
is, 𝑇∗ >  𝑇∗). Marginal cost at the optimal time-to-build a plant of the comparison group is less 
steep or less negative relative to that of the reference group (i.e., 𝐶  (𝑇
∗) > 𝐶  (𝑇
∗)). As shown 
Figure 3.6.B, the cost-to-build a plant at the optimal time-to-build a plant for the comparison 
group is higher relative to that for the reference group (i.e., 𝐶 (𝑇∗) > 𝐶 (𝑇∗)). 
                                                        





3.3.3. When the comparison group of firms face higher product-market demand  
Figure 3.7 shows the changes in comparative statics from the model when the 
comparison group of firms face higher product-market demand relative to the reference group 
of firms and their speed capability is constant. As shown Figure 3.7.A, a first derivative of 
revenue for the comparison group of firms (𝑅 ) shifts downward. The optimal time-to-build a 
plant of the comparison group of firms is shorter relative to that of the reference group of firms 
(that is, 𝑇∗ <  𝑇∗). Marginal cost at the optimal time-to-build a plant of the comparison group 
is steeper or more negative relative to that of the reference group (i.e., 𝐶  (𝑇
∗) < 𝐶  (𝑇
∗)). As 
shown Figure 3.7.B, cost-to-build a plant at the optimal time-to-build a plant for the comparison 
group is higher relative to that for the reference group (i.e., 𝐶 (𝑇∗) > 𝐶 (𝑇∗)). 
3.3.4. When the comparison group of firms face lower product-market demand  
Figure 3.8 shows the changes in comparative statics from the model when the 
comparison group of firms face lower product-market demand relative to the reference group 
of firms and their speed capability is constant. As shown Figure 3.8.A, a first derivative of 
revenue for the comparison group of firms (𝑅 ) shifts upward. The optimal time-to-build a 
plant of the comparison group of firms is longer relative to that of the reference group of firms 
(that is, 𝑇∗ >  𝑇∗). Marginal cost at the optimal time-to-build a plant of the comparison group 
is less steep or less negative relative to that of the reference group (i.e., 𝐶  (𝑇
∗) > 𝐶  (𝑇
∗)). As 
shown Figure 3.8.B, the cost-to-build a plant at the optimal time-to-build a plant for the 
comparison group is lower relative to that for the reference group (i.e., 𝐶 (𝑇∗) < 𝐶 (𝑇∗)). 
3.3.5. Comparative statics for exhaustive scenarios 
Based on these basic dynamics of product-market demand changes and speed capability 
changes, Table 3.1 provides the exhaustive scenarios of product-market demand and/or speed 
capability changes. Each scenario provides theoretically distinctive predictions for a firm’s 





enable us to discern whether and in what direction the product-market effect and/or speed 
capability effect are substantially at play. 
This developed theoretical framework illuminates two points. First, it is insufficient to 
explain a firm’s speed solely based on its speed capability or to explain a firm’s speed capability 
solely based on its speed. As seen in Column 2 and Row C in Table 3.1, a firm with inferior 
speed capability can have a shorter time-to-build a plant when product-market demand 
increases substantially. Likewise, as seen in Column 3 and Row B, a firm with superior speed 
capability can have a longer time-to-build a plant when product-market demand decreases 
substantially. Thus, the literature should cease to posit that speed capability depends on speed. 
Second, when it comes to speed, theoretical and empirical triangulation can improve the 
reliability of theoretical arguments and empirical findings (Van de Ven, 2007). In the current 
study, triangulation occurs by first theorizing about cost, marginal cost, and speed, and by then 
empirically testing the four different models (a1), (a2), (b1), and (b2) rather than relying on a 
single model (a1), as shown in Table 3.1. Such triangulation allows us to disentangle the speed 
capability and product-market demand effects, and to boost the reliability of the theoretical 
arguments. Inferring superior speed capability from a faster speed in a single model (i.e., model 
(a1) in Table 3.1) can lead to inaccurate causal inferences, as this model shows. Theorizing and 
empirically testing multiple models, by contrast, generate additional information on the event 
of interest (i.e., 𝛼 , 𝛽 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽  in Table 3.1). This information then provides clues to the next 
step of triangulating and disentangling mechanisms of speed capability and product-market 
demand.  
3.4. CONCLUSION 
My theoretical framework, based on my developed analytical model, contributes to the 
extant research literature by challenging the assertion that the firm’s faster speed and superior 





enabling us to incorporate a firm’s time-to-build its plant as a strategic choice based on product-
market demand changes (which impact a revenue curve shift) as well as an outcome of its speed 
capability changes (which impact a cost curve shift). To test the framework, I provide 
exhaustive scenarios in which product-market demand and/or a firm’s speed capability change. 
Each scenario provides distinctive empirical predictions, and they enable us to discern whether 
and to what extent product-market demand and/or a firm’s speed capability effects are 
substantially at play. Based on my analytical model, a firm can have faster speed despite 
inferior speed capability in building its plant or slow speed despite superior speed capability 
depending on product-market demand. Thus, the theoretical framework provides a necessary 
correction to the extant literature. 
Even though this developed theory provides an improved understanding of speed and 
enables us to disentangle the mechanisms of speed capability and product-market demand, 
empirical corroboration or falsification should follow (Van de Ven, 2007).  In many cases, the 
key challenge in empirical research on speed is to collect speed and cost data itself. That is not 
the case here. In the next chapter, I empirically examine firms’ time-to-build, cost-to-build, and 
marginal cost-to-build a plant in the context of the Liquefied Natural Gas industry, using 
demand shock caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. The demand shock provided 
ample data. Therefore, this empirical context serves well to test and, as will be shown, 








Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1. The Timing of the Model 
 
Figure 3.2. Firm as a price taker in LNG industry 
 
(A) Global LNG market 
 
(Source: Nitrogen+Syngas 292 | March- April 2008, The magazine for the nitrogen and syngas industries) 





Figure 3.3. Superior speed capability in the model 
         
 
Figure 3.4. Optimal time-to-build, cost-to-build, and marginal cost-to-build a plant for 
reference group 
    
A. First derivative                                          B. Net present value (NPV) 
 
Figure 3.5. Comparative statics for comparison group when comparison group has 
superior speed capability  
    






Figure 3.6. Comparative statics for comparison group when comparison group has 
inferior speed capability  
    
A. First derivative                                          B. Net present value (NPV) 
Figure 3.7. Comparative statics for comparison group when comparison group face 
higher product-market demand 
   
A. First derivative                                          B. Net present value (NPV) 
Figure 3.8. Comparative statics for comparison group when comparison group face lower 
product-market demand 
   





Table 3.1. Theoretical predictions on comparative statics when a firm’s capability and/or product-market demand change 
 (a) Time =                                    𝜶𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜶𝟑𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 
      T𝐢𝐦𝐞 = 𝜶𝟏𝑰𝑽 × 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕  +  𝜶𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜶𝟑𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 
(b) 𝐂𝒐𝒔𝒕 =                                   𝜷𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜷𝟑Time 
       𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏𝑰𝑽 × T𝐢𝐦𝐞 +   𝜷𝟐𝑰𝑽 + 𝜷𝟑Time 
Product-Market Changes (captured by revenue curve) 
1. No change in demand 
    (i.e., no shift) 
2. Increase in demand 
    (i.e., upward shift) 
3. Decrease in demand 
























 A. No change in capability 
     (i.e., no shift) 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : 0 
𝛼 : 0        /     𝛽 : 0 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : – 
𝛼 : –          /    𝛽 : + 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : + 
𝛼 : +           /   𝛽 : – 
B. Increase in capability 
    (i.e., shift toward the origin) 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : – 
𝛼 : –        /     𝛽 : – 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : – 
𝛼 : –          /   𝛽 : +, 0, – 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : +, 0, – 
𝛼 : +, 0,–    /   𝛽 : – 
C. Decrease in capability 
    (i.e., shift farther from the origin) 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : + 
𝛼 : +        /     𝛽 : + 
𝛼  & 𝛽 :  –, 0 ,+ 
𝛼 : –, 0 ,+ /   𝛽 : + 
𝛼  & 𝛽 : + 









When Can a Firm Have Faster Speed Despite Inferior Speed Capability? 
 (Empirical Test) 
ABSTRACT 
In this chapter, I empirically examine if firms can have faster speed despite inferior speed 
capability when product product-market demand increases substantially in the context of the 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry from 1996 to 2007, using a demand shock caused by 
energy market liberalization in 2000. To account for a potential endogeneity bias from self-
selection, I adopt Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step instrumental variable (IV) approach, using 
monthly price volatility as an instrumental variable. I find that the firms in the post-shock 
period (i.e., when product-market demand rapidly increases) have (1) a shorter time-to-build 
their plants despite their inferior speed capability compared to the firms in the pre-shock period 
(i.e., when product-market demand steadily low). Moreover, I find that (2) firms in the post-
shock period have a higher cost-to-build their plants (per ton capacity) and (3) less marginal 
cost-to-build their plants compared to the firms in the pre-shock period (i.e., the firms facing 
steady low product-market demand). These empirical results are consistent with the prediction 
generated by the developed model when and only when product-market demand increases and 
firms’ speed capability decreases for the comparison group of firms. This finding fills the gap 
in the literature by examining the divergence of the firm’s speed and its speed capability in 







In this chapter, I empirically examine changes in a firm’s time-to-build, cost-to-build, 
and marginal cost-to-build its plant when its speed capability decreases and the product-market 
demand increases. I do so by using demand shock in the LNG industry caused by energy market 
liberalization in 2000. As shown in Chapter 2, firms in the post-shock period (i.e., firms facing 
rapidly increasing product-market demand after 2000) have inferior speed capability, as 
compared to firms in the pre-shock period (i.e., firms facing steadily low product-market 
demand before 2000). To account for a potential endogeneity bias from self-selection, I adopt 
Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step instrumental variable (IV) approach, using monthly price 
volatility as an instrumental variable. I find that the firms in the post-shock period (i.e., when 
product-market demand rapidly increases) have (1) a shorter time-to-build their plants despite 
their inferior speed capability compared to the firms in the pre-shock period (i.e., when product-
market demand steadily low). Moreover, I find that (2) firms in the post-shock period have a 
higher cost-to-build their plants (per ton capacity) and (3) less marginal cost-to-build their 
plants compared to the firms in the pre-shock period (i.e., the firms facing steady low product-
market demand). That is, the negative relationship between firms’ time-to-build and cost-to-
build their plants (per ton capacity) becomes less negative for the firms in the post-shock 
period. These finding are consistent with my developed model when and only when 
product-market demand increases and firms’ speed capability decreases for the 
comparison group of firms. This finding corroborates that firms can have faster speed 
despite their inferior speed capability, and thus to uphold the central assertion of this 
study. 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 2, I provide the empirical 
context and research design. In section 3, I provide the empirical results. In Section 4, I 





4.2. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.2.1 Empirical context 
The current research examines firms’ time-to-build and cost-to-build their plants when 
product-market demand increases and firms’ speed capability decreases in the context of the 
global LNG industry from 1996 to 2007.32 The empirical context has three attractive features. 
First, it allows me to exploit a demand shock in the LNG industry in 2000 because of the 
contemporaneous energy market liberalization. This feature is well presented in the qualitative 
analysis of Hawk, et al. (2013), which I complement with additional quantitative analysis. I 
here empirically corroborate the timing of demand shock based on structural break analysis. 
Second, a firm’s plant-construction investment decision is strategic, and is informed by existing 
knowledge regarding price level, price volatility, and other firm-level characteristics in the 
LNG industry. A firm makes a strategic choice regarding its entry timing and speed, which is 
a key focus of the current study. Third, I can observe a time-cost tradeoff in this empirical 
context that is consistent with the majority of previous research (Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 
1966; Teece, 1977). All of these factors make this context an appropriate one for this study. I 
now examine these features in greater depth to consider their meaning in my analysis. 
First, the empirical context offers the feature that the LNG industry experienced a 
demand shock in 2000, which was caused by energy market liberalization and the electricity 
industry increasing the number of gas power plants. Market liberalization was implemented, or 
considered, globally in all IEA member countries to create more efficient operation of 
electricity energy systems through market competition (International Energy Agency, 2005). 
The liberalization allowed private electricity entities to participate in the previously state-
                                                        
32 I choose the sample period from 1996 to 2007 for ease of comparison to Hawk et al. (2013), which 
uses the same periods to test the intrinsic speed capability effect on a firm’s entry timing in the Atlantic 
Basin Submarket in the global LNG industry. In addition, the natural gas price began to decline after 
2007, which means that post-2007 fits into the shakeout stage, not the growth stage, of the industry life 





regulated market, or the market price system that replaced state-determined price. This 
deregulation created a wholesale electricity market with time-varying prices. Under this market, 
a firm’s operational flexibility to respond better to demand (e.g., easier start-up/shut-down) in 
gas power plants became more advantageous relative to traditional power plants. Moreover, 
the advantages of gas power plant construction (e.g., gas power plant permits are granted more 
easily due to less greenhouse gas emission and gas power plants allow a faster time and lower 
cost to build) became more attractive after market liberalization. Figure 4.1.A (Blumsack, et 
al. 2006) illustrates the effects of this attractiveness by showing that electricity-generating 
capacity addition through natural gas rapidly increased after 1999 relative to all other sources. 
The addition of more gas power plants created a demand shock that led to sharp increases in 
both natural gas prices and LNG plant construction activities in the late 1990s. Figure 4.1.B 
(Hawk, et al. 2013) allows us to look at the impact of the shock on market entry. In the pre-
shock period, entry occurred at a very slow and steady rate; natural gas prices remained low 
and steady historically. In the post-shock period until the end of my sample, however, entry 
into the LNG industry dramatically increased, with the result that natural gas prices rose to 
more than five times the typical price level. Figure 4.1.B makes clear that the empirical data 
correspond with the expected demand shock described here.  
Moreover, I can corroborate the existence and the timing of that empirically observed 
demand shock using a structural break analysis (Chow, 1960; Gregory & Hansen, 1996; Perron, 
2006) based on LNG price. In this analysis, I perform a test of no structural break to identify 
the specific timing for the market partition in the monthly natural gas price data.33 Table 4.1 
presents the empirical results. In the analysis, the null hypothesis of no structural break is 
rejected and the test provides an estimate for a break point as April 2000. This result is 
                                                        





consistent with the empirical patterns shown in Figure 4.1.B, meaning that the observed 
demand shock occurred. 
As a result of my analysis, I was able to partition the LNG market into pre-shock and 
post-shock periods based on the structural break point (i.e., April 2000). This partition is both 
qualitatively validated and statistically determined. The current study does not consider 
technological change as a variable because the LNG industry relies on a standardized 
technology. Moreover, entry into the industry was not constrained by proprietary technology 
or technology innovation in my sample period. Partitioning the market in this context then leads 
to the conclusion that the current study’s empirical context is consistent with the scenario from 
the developed model in which the comparison group of firms (i.e., firms in the post-shock 
period) face higher product-market demand than the reference group of firms (i.e., firms in the 
pre-shock period). This empirical and analytical consistency makes the empirical context 
selected perfect for the purposes of this study. 
Second, the empirical context offers the feature that it corresponds with the principle 
that a firm’s plant-construction investment decision is strategic and informed by existing 
knowledge regarding price level, price volatility, and other firm characteristics. Column I and 
Column II in Table 4.2 give the results from a probit regression, based on the variables of 
market characteristics and firm characteristics, of a firm’s entry into the LNG industry. The 
results show that a firm’s entry is positively associated with price level; negatively associated 
with price volatility and construction raw material price; and associated with a firm’s prior 
experience and possession of complementary assets, such as LNG fleet and oil & gas 
production. In this way, the empirical context provides a desirable necessary condition 
concerning a key premise of my study, in which the firm makes a strategic choice regarding its 





Third, I can observe a time-cost tradeoff in my data set based on the empirical context. 
Columns III and IV in Table 4.2 present the results of an OLS regression of a firm’s cost-to-
build (per ton capacity) on a firm’s time-to-build (per ton capacity) and other variables from 
yearly and monthly panel data. The results show that a decrease in a firm’s time-to-build its 
plant (per ton capacity) is associated with an increase in its cost-to-build its plant (per ton 
capacity). This observed time-cost tradeoff is consistent with the majority of previous research 
(Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1966; Teece, 1977). As discussed in Chapter 2, the industry-wide 
speed frontier shows the time-cost tradeoff. This observed time-cost tradeoff is consistent with 
the model setting in my analytical model in Chapter 3 as well as the majority of previous 
research (Mansfield, 1971; Scherer, 1966; Teece, 1977). These three attractive features 
illustrate validity of the 1996-2007 context in the LNG industry in testing my developed theory. 
4.2.2 Data Sampling 
I now provide my procedure for sampling and analyzing the data given by the 1996-
2007 context. To turn this empirical context into a data set, I first identified the proposed 
contemporary LNG construction projects from the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ), Tusiani and 
Shearer’s (2007) LNG: A Non-technical Guide, company Web sites, Web searches, and other 
sources. Through this data collection, I identified 306 LNG construction projects proposed 
from 1996 to 2007. Of the 306 LNG projects, 136 resulted in the actual construction and 
operation of an LNG plant. Of the 136 LNG plants constructed, 96 started construction between 
1996 and 2007. I then hand-collected samples based on other plant-level data, such as plant 
costs, plant quality, construction start date, commercial operation date, and delay events. These 
plant-level data led to a final sample size of 72 LNG construction plants. All of the ensuing 
analysis comes from these 72 plants. 
To analyze my data, I define ‘entry’ as the ‘construction of a liquefaction or 





commitment among a firm’s decisions when executing this project. That such a commitment 
represents the highest sunk-cost is credible for two reasons. First, a firm’s plant construction 
does not begin until the board of directors makes its final investment decision and entails 
contractual obligations that are costly to reverse. Second, a firm has little ability to change its 
plant construction plans after construction begins, making it “locked in” to its planned course 
of action (Department of Energy, 2016: 95). With ‘entry’ thus defined, this dissertation follows 
Ghemawat (1991) in considering the timing of its commitment (i.e., the timing of the 
irreversible investment) as a key component of what it means for a firm to be “strategic.” 
Analyzing whether a firm is being “strategic” is a key component of the empirical analysis of 
the data set given here. Therefore, the current study focuses on the 72 of the 306 plants in my 
sample that resulted in actual construction from 1996 to 2007 because they represent the 
subcategory of substantial irreversible investment. That subcategory is necessary to make this 
empirical context relevant to the current analysis with its starting point that firms act 
strategically in timing their market entry.  
To hone further this subcategory into a data set, the plant-level data are next matched 
with the firm-year and the firm-month panel data of the parent company using the ownership 
information collected during my data work. As shown in the next section, both yearly and 
monthly panel data yield robust results. Monthly panel data provide the additional benefit of 
allowing exploitation of monthly price volatility as an instrument variable, because the month 
level is related with the market partition based on demand shock and not related with highly 
irreversible time-to-build and cost-to-build (per ton capacity). I will provide detailed 
explanations why monthly price uncertainty can be used as an instrumental variable in the 





firm-level data such as Oil & Gas Productions and Reserves and financial information.34 After 
deleting observations due to missing data for needed variables, my final panel data set 
corresponds to 45 firms over 12 years, from 1996 to 2007, and produces a sample of 500 firm-
year records in the yearly panel data and 6,000 firm-month records in the monthly panel data. 
Figure 4.2 briefly shows the structure of the panel data in the current study. These data comprise 
a fairly comprehensive panel data set covering most of the entrants into LNG industry with 
available and useable data for covariates, and therefore they provide the best empirical context 
for the current analysis.  
My goal is to examine several empirical models of time-to-build and cost-to-build to 
execute an empirical triangulation, consistent with the theoretical triangulation from my 
developed model. Therefore, it was essential to gather the key data of time-to-build and cost-
to-build. My process of gathering these data requires more explanation. 
For time-to-build, I hand-collected data to identify the construction beginning date as 
well as the commercial operation date to help determine the nominal time-to-build per ton 
capacity. When the construction beginning date was not available but the construction duration 
and commercial operation date were identified, I used the latter two to calculate the 
construction start date. When the construction start date and/or duration were not clear, I used 
the Engineering-Procurement-Construction (EPC) contract award date as a proxy for the 
construction beginning date. If the EPC contract award date was not available, I used the board 
of directors’ final investment decision (FID) date as the next best proxy for the construction 
beginning date.35 I then calculated nominal time-to-build. I divided nominal time-to-build by 
ton capacity of a plant to obtain the nominal time-to-build per ton capacity. 
                                                        
34 OGJ100/200 (OGJ’s survey of the 100 leading U.S.-based and international oil and gas companies), 
company annual reports and 10-Ks, and Compustat are used for these data.  
35 I calculate the average months between EPC calendar dates and construction calendar dates when 
both dates are observable in the current study’s data set. Months of difference, on average, were 1.6 





To obtain nominal cost-to-build per ton capacity, I hand-collected the plant construction 
cost estimates in millions of US dollars (USD). The cost estimate is typically available when 
the EPC contract is awarded or when the construction is completed.36  When several cost 
estimates were available over time, I used the most updated publicly available information 
concerning a particular plant. When the currency unit was not USD, I used the yearly-averaged 
exchange rate to convert other currency units into USD. I deflated the cost estimate in USD to 
1996 prices using the yearly-averaged consumer price index (CPI). I divided this deflated cost 
estimate of a plant by ton capacity to obtain the nominal cost-to-build per ton capacity.  
In this way, I was able to provide a compelling sample of data from the selected 
empirical context. The following section provides further details on how I measured pre-shock 
and post-shock firms, time-to-build, cost-to-build, and other control variables. 
4.2.3 Measures 
Having selected my data, my goal was to examine if firms in the post-shock period can 
have faster speed despite inferior speed capability, as compared to firms in the pre-shock period. 
I explain here how I measured the key constructs of product-market demand, a firm’s speed 
capability, its time-to-build and cost-to-build a plant, and control variables in the pre- and post-
shock periods. 
4.2.3.1. Pre-shock and post-shock period in product-market demand: demand shock and 
the interaction term of yearly price and yearly price volatility 
To begin my analysis of the firm panel data, I created two variables to measure product-
market demand. These variables result from nature of the empirical context and the quantitative 
structural break analysis performed above, which showed that the demand for LNG rapidly 
increased after April 2000. For the main variable, I created a dummy variable, demand shock, 
                                                        
when both dates are observable in the current study’s data set. Months of difference, on average, were 
2.5 months. The average of time-to-build is 41.2 months, with a standard deviation of 13.9 months. 
36 58 cost estimates of the 72 cost estimates were available when the EPC contract is awarded. The 





which is equal to ‘1’ for the firms in the post-shock period (since April 2000) and ‘0’ for the 
firms in the pre-shock period (before April 2000). Alternatively, for the second variable, I used 
the interaction term of yearly price and price volatility to measure product-market demand. As 
seen in Figure 4.3, the pre-shock period in my sample corresponds with steady low product-
market demand (i.e., low price and low price volatility), whereas the post-shock period 
corresponds with rapidly increasing product-market demand (i.e., high price and high price 
volatility). Because I compared the group of firms facing low price and low price volatility to 
the group of firms facing high price and high price volatility, I used the interaction term of 
yearly price level and price volatility as an alternative independent variable. In measuring both 
variables, I controlled for yearly price and yearly price volatility. Price is measured by using 
monthly U.S. natural gas wellhead price data from the Energy Information Administration of 
the U.S. Department of Energy. Price volatility is the conditional variance of U.S. natural gas 
price estimated from ARCH process (Episcopos, 1995; Huizinga, 1993). Using these two 
variables, I was able to distinguish firms in the pre-shock and post-shock periods. In the next 
subsection, I explain how I measured the post-entry speed capability. 
4.2.3.2. Post-entry speed capability  
In this subsection, I show how to generate a measurement of post-entry speed capability. 
First, I make clear that speed capability from here is all post-entry measure because I used the 
actual time-to-build and cost-to-build data for the projects, of which construction and 
commercial operation were physically initiated and completed. Speed capability is defined as 
faster speed at the same cost. To measure speed capability empirically, I adopt frontier methods. 
As Chen, Delmas, and Lieberman point out, “Frontier methods can be used by strategy 
researchers to test theories of various factors that lead to competitive advantage. They are also 
particularly suited to conceptualize and measure firm-specific capabilities” (2015: 20).  I 





distance from the origin and the slope of observation, based on the coordinates of cost-to-build 
and time-to-build. Once I got measures of a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build as described 
in the next subsections, I was able to measure relative speed capability on average. For a better 
explanation, I use Figure 4.4, which illustrates speed capability as points in the coordinates of 
a plane with time-to-build as the X-axis and cost-to-build as the Y-axis. In these coordinates, 
if two points reside on a line with the same slope, the point with shorter distance from the origin 
has superior speed capability relative to the point with longer distance from the origin. For 
example, point  and point  are the two points on the line with the same slope and with 
different distances from the origin. In this case, point  has superior speed capability to point 
 because point  has shorter time-to-build and lower cost-to-build than point. Likewise, 
point  has superior speed capability to point  and point  has superior speed capability to 
point. Therefore, speed capability can be measured based on the point’s slope and its distance 
from the origin, where slope is calculated as  and the distance from the origin is calculated 
as √time + cost . With these measures of slope and distance from the origin, I can identify 
whether the firms in the post-shock have superior or inferior speed capability by testing 
whether they negatively or positively moderate distance between the origin and the points on 
the line with the same slope. Specifically, in a regression of distance on the interaction term of 
slope and demand shock after controlling for slope and demand shock respectively, a positive 
coefficient for the interaction term means that firms in the post-shock period have inferior 
speed capability as compared to firms in the pre-shock period. I have now shown how to 
generate a measurement of speed capability for the purposes of testing speed capability 
variance in my empirical context.  
4.2.3.3. Time-to-build per ton capacity and cost-to-build per ton capacity 
Having provided my approach to calculating speed capability and other measures, I 





and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) are two essential components in operationalizing firm 
speed capability. This study defines the construct of time-to-build (per ton capacity) as the time 
lag between the beginning of construction and the commencement of commercial operation 
(per ton capacity). Further, this study defines the construct of “cost-to-build” (per ton capacity) 
as construction cost (per ton capacity). Because the conceptual definition of speed capability 
relies on ceteris paribus assumptions, a firm’s time-to-build its plant and its cost are directly 
comparable between the reference group of firms and the comparison group of firms. This 
renders unnecessary any further analytical constructs. 
However, strategic management, especially based on the resource-based view, posits 
that firms are heterogeneous (Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rumelt, 1984). Indeed, 
in my empirical setting, I anticipate that firms have heterogeneous capabilities in their time-to-
build their plant (per ton capacity). Thus, the empirical testing parsed out how heterogeneous 
plants, firms, and markets influence a firm’s strategic choice of its time-to-build its plant.  
To obtain comparable time-to-build per ton capacity and cost-to-build per ton capacity, 
and thus both use my mathematical model and determine the heterogeneous capabilities of 
firms, I took the five steps detailed in the next paragraph. These are based on the approach of 
Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015), but there are several important 
differences. The first difference results from the purpose of the measure. Hawk et al. (2013) 
and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (215) aimed to measure a firm’s pre-entry speed capability. 
However, I aimed to measure a firm’s post-entry speed capability. Due to this difference in 
goals, I measure a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build a plant of which construction was 
initiated and completed so that I could create a measure for post-entry speed capability. I 
operationalized the focal year’s measure based on when the construction project was initiated, 
whereas their focal year’s measure was based when the project was completed. For reference, 





industry such as refining, petrochemical, gas processing, pipeline, and sulfur facility 
construction projects up to the focal year, considering all stages of the non-LNG projects. The 
second difference is whether to discount the time-to-build measure by the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC). Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015) discounted 
time-to-build measure by the weighted average cost of capital to create pre-entry speed 
capability measure directly out of its time-to-build measure. However, I do not discount time-
to-build by WACC because I had two separate measures of a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-
build (per ton capacity). Because of these two separate measures, I could measure speed 
capability using the frontier approach, instead of discounting time-to-build by WACC. The 
third difference is the time-period of moving averaging. Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-
Almeida et al. (2015) used a three-year moving average of their pre-entry speed capability. 
However, I averaged time-to-build and cost-to-build for the current year in the yearly panel 
data when a firm entered the market more than once in the same year in the yearly panel data 
(and I averaged time-to-build and cost-to-build for the current month in the monthly panel data 
when a firm entered the market more than once in the same month in the monthly panel data). 
The fourth difference arises from whether time-to-build and cost-to-build measures were 
shifted and transformed, or not. I shifted a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build measures by 
their minimum values and then added one, so that all the values of the time-to-build and cost-
to-build were positive, whereas Hawk et al.(2013) and Pacheco-de-Almeida et al. (2015) kept 
the negative values after adjustment. This shift enabled me to measure speed capability using 
the frontier approach on the coordinates of the time-to-build and cost-to-build measures. The 
four differences I state between my measures and those of Hawk et al. (2013) and Pacheco-de-
Almeida et al. (2015) resulted from our different goals. While these extant studies aimed to 
capture a firm’s pre-entry speed capability up to the moment when the firm enters the market, 





Having in mind the differences between my measures of time-to-build and cost-to-build 
and those of the previous research, I now provide a detailed explanation on the five steps to 
create time-to-build and cost-to-build measures. I begin with time-to-build per ton capacity. In 
the first step, I adjusted the nominal time-to-build for plant-level variables and for market-level 
variables. Because in most cases, more than one firm engaged in each construction project in 
the sample, I did not control for firm-level variables in this step, but rather waited until the final 
regression of market entry in the firm panel data. In the second step, I standardized residuals 
from the first step within each region subgroup for each year. In the third step, I averaged the 
standardized residuals from the second step for the projects that each firm began in the year in 
question from the yearly panel. In the fourth step, I mapped the yearly average to a yearly panel 
of firm observations. I carried forward this measure to any future years when no new 
information was available for a given firm. For years in my panel before any time-to-build 
information was available for a given firm, I assumed neutral time-to-build (i.e., I replaced the 
missing time-to-build per ton capacity observations by zeroes for the years before any time-to-
build per ton capacity information was available for a firm in my panel).37 Finally, in the fifth 
step, I shifted a firm’s time-to-build in the firm panel data by its minimum value and then added 
one, so that all the values of the time-to-build per ton capacity were positive. This shift enabled 
me to create a firm’s post-entry speed capability measure based on the time-to-build and cost-
to-build measures. I discuss the first to fifth steps in further depth below so that I can explain 
how I also used them to generate comparable time-to-build per ton capacity data for my data 
panel.  
                                                        
37 In the robustness check, I do not replace the missing time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity 
observations by zeroes for years before any time-to-build per ton capacity information is available for 
a firm in my panel. Results are robust with respect to the assumption of neutral time-to-build. Empirical 





I now turn this detailed discussion of the application of the five steps into one of time-
to-build per ton capacity. I start with the first step, as suggested above. In that first step, I 
adjusted nominal time-to-build per ton capacity for plant-level variables (e.g., plant size, usage, 
quality, and type) and market-level variables (e.g., demand growth, geography, and year). In 
this approach, I decomposed the time-to-build per ton capacity of each plant into a systematic 
component (i.e., average time-to-build in the sample) and a plant-specific component 
(corresponding to the degree to which a firm has a shorter or a longer time-to-build per ton 
capacity than the average time-to-build in the sample). Specifically, I pulled plant-level data 
from all firms for all facilities (indexed by f), all geographic regions (indexed by l), and all 
years (indexed by t) in my sample by running the following regression: 
ln𝑇 , , =  β ln𝐸 , , + β ln𝐸 , , + β 𝑃 , , + β 𝑄 , , + β 𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀 , , + β ln∆ , +  β LDUM
+  β YDUM + θ      (1) 
where 𝑇 is the nominal time-to-build per ton capacity, E is the ton capacity of a plant, P is plant 
usage dummy, Q is the plant quality dummy, NDUM is the plant type dummies, ∆ is the proxy 
for the local demand growth, and LDUM and YDUM are geographic region dummies and year 
dummies, respectively. First, I included a ton capacity of a plant variable and a squared term 
of it because the ton capacity of a plant could affect time-to-build per ton capacity due to 
economies of scale and diseconomies of scale. The ton capacity of a plant is measured as 
capacity figures in million ton per year. Second, I included a plant usage variable because the 
different usage specificity can also influence the time-to-build. Plant usage is measured as 1 if 
a plant is a liquefaction plant and as 0 if a plant is a regasification plant. Third, I included a 
plant quality variable because quality can also influence the time-to-build per ton capacity. 
Specifically, firms can decrease time-to-build at the expense of the plant quality. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that bad plant management leads to poor quality and a longer time-to-build a plant, 





is measured as 1 if a plant is shut down for maintenance within a year of commercial operation. 
Fourth, I included plant type dummies because plant type such as new, expansion, or revamp 
can influence time-to-build per ton capacity. Fifth, local demand growth (∆ , ) is proxied by the 
yearly growth rate in real GDP in the country of the plant from the World Bank Development 
Indicators database. Finally, I also included geographic region dummy variables38 and year 
dummy variables to capture year-specific and geography-specific effects (i.e., bureaucratic 
delays). Using all these different variables, I was able to apply the first step to adjust nominal 
time-to-build per ton capacity for plant-level variables and market-level variables.  
As a result, the estimated residual 𝜃 , ,  associated with a plant for a given firm (denoted 
𝜃𝑓,𝑙,𝑡 for firm j) from my estimation of Equation 1 represents the plant-specific component of 
the time-to-build that is uncorrelated with the systematic determinants of time-to-build 
associated with plant ton capacity, quality, usage, types, demand condition, time fixed effects, 
and geography fixed effects. A positive residual indicates that the plant was finished slower 
than average, whereas a negative residual implies the plant was finished faster than average. 
In the second step, I standardized the measure within each regional subgroup for each 
year for the purposes of comparability. I calculated the mean and standard deviation of 𝜃 , ,  
within each region subgroup for each year, where the mean is calculated as ?̅? , =  
∑ ∑ , ,
,
  




. I then standardized each 




                                                        
38 I use the following geographic regions: Asia and the Pacific; Eastern Europe; Former USSR; Japan; 
Latin American and the Caribbean; North Africa and the Middle East; North America; Sub-Saharan 
Africa; and Western Europe. 
 






In the third step, I built my measure of time-to-build per ton capacity for firm j by 
summing up the standardized plant time-to-build per ton capacity 𝜃 , ,  for all of the plants that 
firm j begin in year (and month) t, and then taking the average.  
In the fourth step, I mapped my averaged, standardized, time-to-build per ton capacity 
measure from the fourth step into a panel of firm-year (and firm-month) observations. My goal 
was to have a firm time-to-build per ton capacity measure when a firm initiated the construction. 
Thus, I took the following approach: I carried forward my time-to-build per ton capacity 
measure to future years (and months) when no new information was available. For years (and 
months) in my panel before any time-to-build information is available for a firm, I assumed 
neutral time-to-build (i.e., I replaced the missing time-to-build per ton capacity observations 
by zeroes for years (and months) before any time-to-build per ton capacity information was 
available for a firm in my panel). In the robustness check, I did not replace the missing time-
to-build per ton capacity observations by zeroes for years (and months) before any time-to-
build per ton capacity information was available for a firm in my panel. This means the results 
are robust to the assumption of neutral time-to-build. 
In the fifth and final step, I shifted a firm’s time-to-build in the firm panel data by its 
minimum value and then added one, so that all the values of the time-to-build per ton capacity 
were positive. This enabled me to capture the real world characteristic that time-to-build and 
cost-to-build are both positive, without affecting the coefficients of each regression. 
Additionally, it provided the opportunity to create a measure for a firm’s post-entry speed 
capability. This detailed analysis of steps one through five for time-to-build per ton capacity 
show how my data panel could generate comparable time-to-build data. 






For cost-to-build per ton capacity measure, I replaced time-to-build per ton capacity by 
cost-to-build per ton capacity in equation 1 of the first step and then repeated the rest of the 
steps. This is enough to show how steps one through five for cost-to-build per ton capacity 
panel can generate comparable time-to-build data for my data panel. Figure 4.5 illustrates the 
yearly average of time-to-build and the cost-to-build per ton capacity in the yearly panel data, 
and follows the procedures described here. In this way, I was able to obtain the comparable 
time-to-build per ton capacity and cost-to-build per ton capacity necessary to my analysis. 
4.2.3.4. Control variables 
As discussed in the section 3.3.1, the effect of demand shock is measured by demand 
shock and the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility. To capture the effect 
of demand shock more accurately, I controlled for yearly price level and price volatility as 
market characteristics. In monthly panel, I include control for monthly price level and price 
volatility in addition to yearly price level and price volatility. As mentioned above, price is 
measured by using monthly U.S. natural gas wellhead price data from the Energy Information 
Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy. Price volatility is the conditional variance 
of U.S. natural gas price estimated from ARCH process (Episcopos, 1995; Huizinga, 1993). A 
demand shock in the product market may influence input prices in the factor market, which 
might influence firms’ post-entry speed capability. For example, the focal firm in my context 
is a buyer in the factor markets, where Engineering-Procurement-Construction (EPC) 
contractors are specialized suppliers. In this case, increasing demand (i.e., greater number of 
projects of the focal firms in the post-shock period) could raise input prices (i.e., EPC cost) for 
the same time-to-build a plant, which might lead to post-shock firms’ inferior speed capability. 
To rule out the factor market explanation, I include two measures: EPC cost and construction 
raw material price. EPC cost is measured by averaging EPC contract amounts in the current 





EPC cost data (i.e., 1997, 1998, and 2001) are not available, I extended the value from the 
previous year. Construction raw material price is measured by using monthly Producer Price 
Index by Commodity for Special Indexes: Construction Materials data from the Federal 
Reserve Bank database. 
I next set my control variables for the differences between firms. Numerous firm 
characteristics (Fuentelsaz et al. 2002; Mitchell, 1989, 1991) may affect a firm’s post-entry 
speed capability. In this case, I considered firm size, age, prior experiences, and the possession 
of complementary assets, all of which I will now define. Firm size is the natural log of the sales 
of the firm for the current year, deflated to 1996 prices using the CPI. When sales data were 
not available for a period, I used a regression imputation procedure (Little & Rubin, 1987) to 
impute missing values and complete the data. Alternatively, I also measured firm size as the 
natural log of the average sales of the firm from 1996 to 2007. Again, sales for each year were 
deflated to 1996 prices using the CPI. Results are robust with respect to the primary 
measurement of firm size.40 Age is the difference between the year of incorporation for the firm 
and the plant construction year. I included  age2 to account for possible non-linear effects. To 
reduce potential multicollinearity between the age and age-squared terms. I standardize the age 
measures. Results are robust with respect to the exclusion of age2. Experience is a count 
variable measuring the number of prior LNG plant construction projects in which a firm had 
participated over the course of the LNG industry in the current panel data set. To account for 
the possession of complementary assets, I included several measures. I create LNG fleet as the 
number of LNG fleet owned by focal firms in the current year. I measured oil and gas 
production and oil and gas reserves as the natural log of the oil and gas production and reserves 
of the firm for the current year, respectively, measured in millions of barrels of oil equivalent 
(MMboe). When oil and gas production and reserves data were not available for a period, I 
                                                        





used a regression imputation procedure (Little & Rubin, 1987) to impute missing values and 
complete the data. Alternatively, I also created additional measures of oil and gas production 
and oil and gas reserves as the natural log of the average oil and gas production and reserves 
of the firm from 1996 to 2007, respectively, measured in millions of barrels of oil equivalent 
(MMboe). Results are robust with respect to the primary measurement of oil and gas production 
and reserves.41 In these various ways, I accounted for firm size, age, prior experiences, and the 
possession of complementary assets to control for firm differences. 
There were a few other necessary control variables, in addition to the numerous firm 
characteristics discussed in the last paragraph. To account for any systematic differences in 
entry incentives across parent industry categorizations (i.e., parent companies’ related 
diversifications), I included a set of related industry dummies that might represent how parent 
companies are diversified, including Oil and Gas Extraction (SIC code 13), Petroleum and Coal 
Products (SIC code 29), Electric and Gas Services (SIC code 49), and Other. To better capture 
the true nature of time compression diseconomies, I controlled for a delay event during plant 
construction. I create two dummy variables, delay by extreme weather and delay by extreme 
hurricane, when a project experienced a delay event in its schedule. These additional controls 
allowed me to account for differences between firms, and thereby to generate empirical results 
that resemble real life as closely as possible. 
4.2.4. Statistical method: Wooldridge’s three-step instrumental variable (IV) approach 
In addition to stating control variables, I account for potential endogeneity problem by 
adopting Wooldridge’s three-step instrumental variable (IV) approach (2010: 939-945) in 
monthly panel data.42 Prior to using the IV approach, I first test the selection model for a firm’s 
                                                        
41 Appendix B includes additional analysis results. 






probability of its being classified as firms in the post-shock period, with the controls of market 
characteristics and firm characteristics in monthly panel data. The same variables are included 
to control market characteristics (i.e., yearly price level and price volatility, monthly price level 
and price volatility, construction raw material price) and firm characteristics (i.e., firm size, 
age, prior experiences, LNG fleet, Oil and Gas production and reserves, industry dummies).43 
To account for any endogeneity bias from self-selection, I first adopt Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach, which uses monthly price volatility as an instrumental 
variable.44 A theoretical reason for monthly price volatility as an instrumental variable is that 
the plant construction time and costs incurred are substantially irreversible in this context 
because of the low redeployability of the plant. Thus, the monthly price volatility becomes less 
of a concern for time-to-build and cost-to-build a plant once plant construction begins, whereas 
monthly price volatility is still under consideration until the firm makes its plant construction 
decision. It is difficult to imagine a firm adjusting its time-to-build and cost-to-build a plant 
monthly basis based on price volatility. An unofficial interview with a construction project 
manager was also consistent with this argument. Technically, when appropriate instrumental 
variables are adopted, it is clear that the under-identification test and weak identification test 
should be rejected and that the over-identification test should not be rejected. For all analyses 
                                                        
43 Delay dummies were also included in this model, but were omitted due to multicollinearity. This 
omission led to loss of 500 observations (out of 6,000) in the sample, but made it possible to confirm 
the strong effect monthly price volatility on being classified as firms in the post-shock period. 
44 Step 1 is a probit regression of the endogenous dummy variable (i.e., demand shock) on the exogenous 
variables and the exclusion restrictions (i.e., monthly price volatility). Step 2 is a least-squares 
regression of the endogenous treatment variable on the exogenous variables and the predicted 
probabilities from Step 1 (i.e., probit_hat). Step 3 is a least-squares regression of the outcome variable 
(i.e., time-to-build and cost-to-build respectively) on the exogenous variables and the predicted values 
from Step 2 (i.e., OLS_hat). The second step uses the first-step predicted probabilities as its exclusion 
restrictions. It also allows the researcher to employ a non-linear probability for the assignment of the 
treatment but does not impose a specific distributional assumption for the probability model (Basinger 
& Ensley, 2010). Monthly price volatility and predicted probabilities from the probit selection model 
(probit_hat) are the excluded instrumental variables for the endogenous variable demand shock when I 
use stata commands, ivreg2 and xtivreg2. These instrumental variables help address potential self-





using monthly price volatility and the predicted value from the first stage as instrumental 
variables, the null hypothesis of under-identification was rejected by the Kleibergen and Paap 
(2006) Chi-square test; the null hypothesis of weak identification was rejected by the Angrist-
Pischke test (Angrist & Pischke, 2009: 217-18); and the over-identification test was not 
rejected by the Sargan-Hansen test (Hansen 1982).  
One final concern to address when considering my statistical model looks to the choice 
of the estimator. The question is whether to use a within-effect estimator (e.g., fixed-effects 
model), a between-effect estimator, or an average estimator of within-effects and between-
effect (e.g., random-effects model) (Certo, Withers, & Semadeni, 2017). I use a firm fixed-
effect model for my main estimator, but I present the results using the firm random-effect model, 
too. The results using a firm fixed-effect model and a firm random-effect model are consistent 
in the current study, which shows the reliability of my empirical analysis. 
4.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical context, measures, and models in this chapter are consistent with those 
given by my developed analytic model. I present a series of empirical results in this section, 
and then discuss the additional robustness checks I performed on my results. 
First, I give summary statistics and a correlation matrix for the yearly panel data set in 
Table 4.3, and for the monthly panel data in Table 4.4. I find that demand shock is positively 
correlated with time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity in Table 4.3, and demand shock 
is negatively correlated with time-to-build per ton capacity and positively correlated with cost-
to-build per ton capacity in Table 4.4. This analysis omits any control variables to partial out 
other influences that may affect the correlation coefficients. I also observe that the time-to-
build per ton capacity and cost-to-build per ton capacity variables demonstrate substantial 






I examined potential collinearity in the yearly panel data using variance inflation factors 
(VIFs). I found that mean VIF is 5.04 in yearly panel data and 7.35 in monthly panel data. VIFs 
for most variables in yearly panel data are less than 10 except for Yearly Price Level, Yearly 
Price Volatility, and Construction Raw Material Cost (i.e., VIF of 33.79, 24.02, and 10.73 
respectively). VIFs for most variables in monthly panel data are less than 10 except for Yearly 
Price Level, Yearly Price Volatility, Monthly Price Level, Monthly Price Volatility, and 
Construction Raw Material Cost (VIF of 53.71, 35.43, 11.52, 11.30, and 10.70 respectively). 
High VIF for price level and price volatility is due to the empirical context that the pre-shock 
period is characterized by low price level coupled with low price volatility, whereas the post-
shock period by high price level coupled with high price volatility. My regression analysis 
produces statistically significant results. Multicollinearity is not, therefore, a concern.  
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present results regarding speed capability of firms. Columns I and II 
of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide the results from a firm fixed-effect model and a firm random-
effect model in the yearly panel data, and Columns III and IV of the same Tables provide the 
results from a firm fixed-effect model and a firm random-effect model in the monthly panel 
data. Table 4.5 provides results regarding speed capability of firms in the post-shock period 
(i.e., when the product-market demand rapidly increases) relative to that of firms in the pre-
shock period (i.e., when the product-market demand is steadily low). The coefficients for the 
interaction term of demand shock and slope are positive and statistically significant in all 
Columns. Thus, these empirical findings corroborate that firms in the post-shock period have 
inferior speed capability compared to those in the pre-shock period. 
Table 4.6 also provides results regarding speed capability of firms facing rapidly 
increasing product-market demand relative to those facing steadily low product-market 
demand. It uses the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility, instead of demand 





and slope are positive and statistically significant in all columns. These findings corroborate 
that firms in the post-shock period have inferior speed capability compared to those in the pre-
shock period. Based on this finding, I expect firms’ time-to-build, cost-to-build, and marginal 
cost-to-build in the post-shock period to be consistent with the prediction from my developed 
analytic model when product-market demand increases and firms’ speed capability decreases 
for the rest of analysis. 
Table 4.7 provides results regarding the demand shock effect on time-to-build (per ton 
capacity) and its moderating effect on the relationship between time-to-build and cost-build 
(per ton capacity). Column I and Column II provide the results for time-to-build (per ton 
capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the yearly panel 
data. Columns V and VI provide the results for time-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm 
random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients 
for demand shock are negative and statistically significant in Columns II and V. Therefore, 
these findings corroborate that the firms in the post-shock period have a shorter time-to-build 
(per ton capacity) than those in the pre-shock period. Moreover, Columns III and IV provide 
the results of the moderating effect on the relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-
build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the 
yearly panel data. Columns VII and VIII provide the results of the moderating effect on the 
relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-
effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients for the 
interaction term of demand shock and cost-to-build per ton capacity are positive and 
statistically significant in Columns III, IV, VII, and VIII. Therefore, these findings corroborate 
that the firms in the post-shock period positively moderate the relationship between time-to-





Table 4.8 provides results regarding the demand shock effect on cost-to-build (per ton 
capacity) and its moderating effect on the relationship between time-to-build and cost-build 
(per ton capacity). Column I and Column II provide the results for cost-to-build (per ton 
capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the yearly panel 
data. Columns V and VI provide the results for cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm 
random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients 
for demand shock are positive and statistically significant in Columns II, V, and VI. Therefore, 
these findings corroborate that the firms in the post-shock period have a higher cost-to-build 
(per ton capacity) than those in the pre-shock period. Columns III and IV provide the results 
for the moderating effect on the relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-build (per 
ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the yearly panel 
data. Columns VII and VIII provide the results for the moderating effect on the relationship 
between time-to-build per and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model 
and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients for the interaction 
term of demand shock and time-to-build per ton capacity are positive and statistically 
significant in Columns III, IV, VII, and VIII. Therefore, these findings corroborate that the 
firms in the post-shock period positively moderate the relationship between time-to-build and 
cost-to-build (per ton capacity) relative to those in the pre-shock period. 
In sum, the results from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show that firms in the post-shock period 
have a shorter time-to-build, a higher cost-to-build, and a higher marginal cost-to-build (per 
ton capacity) than those in the pre-shock period. These results are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction from my developed model when and only when product-market demand increases 
and firms’ speed capability decreases for the comparison group of firms. 
Table 4.9 provides results regarding the rapidly increasing product-market demand 





time-to-build and cost-build (per ton capacity). Column I and Column II provide the results for 
the time-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect 
model in the yearly panel data. Columns V and VI provide the results for the time-to-build (per 
ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly 
panel data. The coefficients for the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility are 
not statistically significant in Columns I, II, V, and VI. Therefore, these findings do not 
corroborate that the firms in the post-shock period have either a shorter or a longer time-to-
build (per ton capacity) than those in the pre-shock period. Columns III and IV provide the 
results for the moderating effect on the relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-build 
(per ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the yearly 
panel data. Columns VII and VIII provide the results for the moderating effect on the 
relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-
effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients for the 
three-way interaction term of yearly price level, yearly price volatility, and cost-to-build per 
ton capacity are positive and statistically significant in Columns VII and VIII. Therefore, these 
findings corroborate that the firms in the post-shock period positively moderate the relationship 
between time-to-build and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) relative to those in the pre-shock 
period. 
Table 4.10 provides results for the rapidly increasing product-market demand effect on 
cost-to-build (per ton capacity) and its moderating effect on the relationship between time-to-
build and cost-build (per ton capacity). Columns I and II provide results for cost-to-build (per 
ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the yearly panel 
data. Columns V and VI provide results for cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-
effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients for the 





in Columns I, II, V, and VI. Thus, these findings corroborate that the firms in the post-shock 
period have a higher cost-to-build (per ton capacity) than those in the pre-shock period. 
Columns III and IV provide results of the moderating effect on the relationship between time-
to-build per and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm 
fixed-effect model in the yearly panel data. Columns VII and VIII provide results of the 
moderating effect on the relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-build (per ton 
capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel 
data. Coefficients for the three-way interaction term of yearly price level, yearly price volatility, 
and time-to-build per ton capacity are positive and statistically significant in Columns III, VII, 
and VIII. Thus, these findings corroborate that the firms in the post-shock period positively 
moderate the relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) relative to 
those in the pre-shock period. 
Taken together, the results from Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show that firms in the post-shock 
period have an indifferent time-to-build, a higher cost-to-build, and a higher marginal cost-to-
build (per ton capacity) relative to those in the pre-shock period. These results are consistent 
with the theoretical prediction from my developed model when and only when product-market 
demand increases and firms’ speed capability decreases for the comparison group of firms. 
Table 4.11 provides results regarding the selection model for a firm’s probability of its 
being classified as the firms in the post-shock period. Table 4.11 shows that market-level 
characteristics (i.e., yearly price level and price volatility, monthly price level and price 
volatility, construction raw material price, and EPC cost) and firm-level characteristics (i.e., 
time-to-build per ton capacity, firm size, prior experience, and Oil and Gas reserves) influence 
the probability of a firm’s being classified as the firms in the post-shock period. Especially, 





the firms in the post-shock period, which increases the reliability of using it as an instrumental 
variable in the Wooldridge’s three-step IV estimation. 
Table 4.12 presents results from Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV estimation 
regarding the effect of demand shock on time-to-build (per ton capacity) and its moderating 
effect on the relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build (per ton capacity). When 
appropriate instrumental variables are adopted, it is clear that the under-identification test and 
weak identification test are rejected and that the over-identification test is not rejected.45 For 
all columns, the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the Kleibergen & Paap 
(2006) Chi-sq test; the null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by the Angrist-Pischke 
test (Angrist & Pischke, 2009: 217-18); and the over-identification test is not rejected by the 
Sargan-Hansen test (Hansen 1982).46 With that established, Columns I and II provide the 
results for the time-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm 
fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients for the demand shock are 
negative and statistically significant in Columns I and II. Therefore, these findings corroborate 
that the firms in the post-shock period have a shorter time-to-build (per ton capacity) than those 
                                                        
45 The null hypothesis for the under-identification test is that the equation is under-identified. The null 
hypothesis for the weak identification is that excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous regressors. The joint null hypothesis for the over-identification test is that the instruments 
are valid instruments (i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments 
are correctly excluded from the estimated equation). 
46 For Column I, the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the Kleibergen-Paap test at a 
P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by the Angrist-Pischke test at 
a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of over-identification is not rejected by the Sargen-Hansen test 
at a P-value of 0.4866. For Column II, the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the 
Kleibergen-Paap test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by 
the Angrist-Pischke test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of over-identification is not rejected 
by the Sargen-Hansen test at a P-value of 0.5235. For Column III, the null hypothesis of under-
identification is rejected by the Kleibergen-Paap test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of 
weak identification is rejected by the Angrist-Pischke test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis 
of over-identification is not rejected by the Sargen-Hansen test at a P-value of 0.5675. For Column IV, 
the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the Kleibergen-Paap test at a P-value of 0.0000. 
The null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by the Angrist-Pischke test at a P-value of 0.0000. 






in the pre-shock period. Columns III and IV provide the results for the moderating effect on 
the relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm 
random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients 
for the interaction term of demand shock and cost-to-build per ton capacity are positive and 
statistically significant in Columns III and IV. Therefore, these findings corroborate that the 
firms in the post-shock period positively moderate the relationship between time-to-build and 
cost-to-build (per ton capacity) relative to those in the pre-shock period. 
Table 4.13 presents results from Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV estimation 
regarding the effect of demand shock on cost-to-build (per ton capacity) and its moderating 
effect on the relationship between time-to-build and cost-to-build (per ton capacity). For all 
columns, the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the Kleibergen & Paap Chi-
sq test (Kleibergen & Paap, 2006); the null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by the 
Angrist-Pischke F test (Angrist & Pischke, 2009: 217-18); and the over-identification test is 
not rejected by the Sargan-Hansen test (Hansen, 1982).47 Column I and Column II provide the 
results for the cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm random-effect model and a firm 
fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients for the demand shock are 
positive and statistically significant in Columns I and II. Therefore, these findings corroborate 
that the firms in the post-shock period have a higher cost-to-build (per ton capacity) than those 
                                                        
47 For Column I, the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the Kleibergen-Paap test at a 
P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by the Angrist-Pischke test at 
a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of over-identification is not rejected by the Sargen-Hansen test 
at a P-value of 0.8628. For Column II, the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the 
Kleibergen-Paap test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by 
the Angrist-Pischke test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of over-identification is not rejected 
by the Sargen-Hansen test at a P-value of 0.9651. For Column III, the null hypothesis of under-
identification is rejected by the Kleibergen-Paap test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis of 
weak identification is rejected by the Angrist-Pischke test at a P-value of 0.0000. The null hypothesis 
of over-identification is not rejected by the Sargen-Hansen test at a P-value of 0.8500. For Column IV, 
the null hypothesis of under-identification is rejected by the Kleibergen-Paap test at a P-value of 0.0000. 
The null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected by the Angrist-Pischke test at a P-value of 0.0000. 






in the pre-shock period. Columns III and IV provide the results for the moderating effect on 
the relationship between time-to-build per and cost-to-build (per ton capacity) from a firm 
random-effect model and a firm fixed-effect model in the monthly panel data. The coefficients 
for the interaction term of demand shock and time-to-build per ton capacity are positive and 
statistically significant in Columns III and IV. Therefore, these findings corroborate that the 
firms in the post-shock period positively moderate the relationship between time-to-build and 
cost-to-build (per ton capacity) relative to those in the pre-shock period. 
In sum, the results from Tables 4.12 and 4.13 show that firms in the post-shock period 
have shorter time-to-build, higher cost-to-build, and higher marginal cost-to-build (per ton 
capacity) than those in the pre-shock period. These results are consistent with the theoretical 
prediction from my developed model when and only when product-market demand increases 
and firms’ speed capability decreases for the comparison group of firms. 
Additional Robustness Checks 
I perform additional robustness checks on my results by running the model with 
different regime cut-off dates. I use the April 2000 as the regime division based on qualitative 
and statistical analysis. For robustness checks, I use the years 2000 and 2001 as alternative cut-
off dates between regimes since practitioners’ perceived timing for regime change may be less 
clear-cut. For both cut-off years, I obtain consistent results in all three robustness checks 
described below. 
First, I conduct robustness checks regarding the end date of my sample. To account for 
the possibility that the last years in my sample may be less relevant for entry timing, I rerun 
my results while omitting a later portion of the post-2000 regime data. When omitting years 
progressively (stopping at 2006, then 2005, then 2004, then 2003), I obtain consistent results 





Next, I conduct robustness checks regarding dependent variables. I add price, price 
volatility, and natural disaster into regression of equation 1, which is the first step for the 
operationalization of dependent variables. I obtain consistent empirical results under this 
robustness check. 
Finally, I conduct robustness checks regarding price data using future natural gas price. 
I obtain consistent results under this robustness check. As a result, all three robustness checks 
corroborate my model. 
4.4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I tested the developed theory from my model in Chapter 3 in the context 
of the LNG industry in which product-market demand rapidly increases and firms’ speed 
capability decreases after demand shock. Based on this testing, I find that a firm in the post-
shock period has a shorter time-to-build a plant than that in the pre-shock period, despite its 
inferior speed capability. I also find that a firm in the post-shock period (i.e., a firm facing 
rapidly increasing product-market demand) has a higher cost-to-build a plant and a higher 
marginal cost-to-build a plant than a firm in the pre-shock period (i.e., a firm facing steady low 
product-market demand). These results are predicted from my developed model when and only 
when product-market demand increases and a firm’s speed capability decreases for the 
comparison group of firms. In the firm-level data from the LNG industry, these results were 
corroborated using monthly price volatility as an instrumental variable while controlling for 
firm characteristics and market features. They also withstand extensive robustness checks. 
These empirical findings suggest that, despite its inferior speed capability, a firm can have 
faster speed when product-market demand rapidly increases, which improves our under-
standing on speed and speed capability. 
Indeed, the literature has progressed by conceptually distinguishing the firm’s faster 





literature by empirically showing that a firm with inferior speed capability can have faster 
speed when product-market demand rapidly increases. Therefore, practitioners and academic 
researchers should be more careful to distinguish between speed and speed capability. 
Moreover, further research into the difference between speed and speed capability 
would yield fruitful results. We have little understanding of the different effects of speed and 
speed capability on a firm’s performance. For example, it might be possible that faster speed 
has positive effect on short-term performance, whereas superior speed capability has positive 
influence on long-term performance. Researchers could also examine the different sources of 
speed and speed capability. For example, it might be possible that a firm’s future temporal 
orientation is positively associated with superior speed capability, whereas its present temporal 
orientation is positively associated with faster speed. Finding different antecedents or diverging 
outcomes of speed and speed capability will increase our understanding of speed and speed 
capability. It will also help practitioners make better decisions on speed and speed capability. 
In corroborating the results of my analytic model, the empirical analysis makes clear that these 






Figures and Tables 
Figure 4.1. Demand shock in liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry 
 
(Source: Blumsack et al. 2006) 
A. Generating Capacity Additions in Electric Power Generation, 1991-2003 
 
 
(Source: Hawk et al. 2013) 







Figure 4.2. Brief structure of panel data 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Price level and price volatility in the LNG industry between 1996 to 2007 
       






Figure 4.4. Price level and price volatility in the LNG industry between 1996 to 2007 
       
A. Price level                                                        B. Price volatility 
 
Figure 4.5. Measuring speed capability using time-to-build and cost-to-build  
 








Table 4.1. Test for a structural break: Unknown break date 
 Column I 
Number of observation 156 
Full sample 1995 January to 2007 December 
Trimmed sample 1997 January to 2006 December 




Exogenous variables time_month 
Results reported in Column I are from the test using sbsingle stata command after running the OLS regression 



























Time-to-build   -0.124*** -0.156*** 
  (0.045) (0.013) 
Yearly Price Level 0.430*** 0.279*** -0.012 0.032** 
(0.131) (0.057) (0.048) (0.014) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.771 -1.743* -0.159 -0.200 
(2.128) (1.052) (0.671) (0.191) 
Construction Raw Material  
Price 
-6.569*** -2.745*** 0.129 -0.455*** 
(1.734) (0.745) (0.405) (0.108) 
EPC Cost 
 
0.103 0.006 0.017 0.038*** 
(0.099) (0.050) (0.023) (0.006) 
Firm Size 0.033 0.043** -0.031*** -0.021*** 
(0.029) (0.017) (0.009) (0.003) 
Age 0.017 -0.003 0.117*** 0.088*** 
(0.063) (0.045) (0.037) (0.011) 
Age2 -0.073 -0.050 -0.077*** -0.076*** 
(0.055) (0.030) (0.025) (0.007) 
Experience 0.488*** 0.149*** 0.082*** 0.060*** 
(0.058) (0.021) (0.017) (0.004) 
LNG Fleet -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.018*** 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.261*** 0.202*** -0.002 -0.016 
(0.101) (0.078) (0.028) (0.010) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.080 -0.046 0.097*** 0.086*** 
(0.077) (0.060) (0.036) (0.016) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.230 -0.063 -0.441*** -0.456*** 
(0.198) (0.118) (0.086) (0.026) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.240 -0.238 -0.112 -0.206*** 
(0.790) (0.416) (0.157) (0.050) 
Diversification effect control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 6,000 500 6,000 
R-sq 0.274 0.120 0.326 0.291 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.10 
Results reported in Column I and II are from estimation of a probit model on entry into LNG market, and results 
reported in Column III and IV are from estimation of an OLS model on cost-to-build. Industry dummies for 
diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. 






Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for yearly panel 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Distance from the origin 2.47 0.51 1.00                  
2. Slope 2.06 0.51 -0.28 1.00                 
3. Post Shock 0.57 0.50 -0.17 0.07 1.00                
4. Time-to-build 4.10 1.81 -0.18 0.06 0.78 1.00               
5. Cost-to-build 0.11 0.13 -0.16 0.07 0.69 0.97 1.00              
6. Yearly Price Level 0.89 0.36 -0.72 0.78 0.18 0.19 0.18 1.00             
7. Yearly Price Volatility 3.26 0.44 0.67 0.51 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.00 1.00            
8. Construction Raw 
Material Price 
1.53 0.15 -0.15 0.09 0.62 0.88 0.89 0.18 -0.03 1.00           
9. EPC cost 1.69 1.28 -0.01 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.51 1.00          
10. Firm Size 9.48 2.43 0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.07 0.06 1.00         
11. Age 0.32 0.96 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.29 1.00        
12. Age2 1.03 1.38 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.77 1.00       
13. Experience 1.39 1.74 -0.06 0.22 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.24 0.15 0.49 0.20 0.31 0.14 0.05 1.00      
14. LNG Fleet 2.21 5.31 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.30 0.12 -0.04 0.52 1.00     
15. Oil Gas Production 6.12 0.82 0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.35 0.40 0.33 0.27 0.29 1.00    
16. Oil Gas Reserves 10.54 0.62 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.26 -0.43 0.13 0.12 -0.03 1.00   
17. Delay by Extreme 
Weather 
0.08 0.27 0.39 -0.31 0.17 0.16 0.12 -0.32 0.15 0.10 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 1.00  






Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for monthly panel 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Distance from the origin 3.27 0.44 1.00                    
2. Slope 0.88 0.37 0.01 1.00                   
3. Post Shock 0.64 0.48 -0.04 0.15 1.00                  
4. Time-to-build 2.48 0.51 0.67 -0.72 -0.13 1.00                 
5. Cost-to-build 2.06 0.50 0.50 0.78 0.04 -0.28 1.00                
6. Yearly Price Level 4.10 1.81 -0.06 0.16 0.77 -0.15 0.04 1.00               
7. Yearly Price Volatility 0.11 0.13 -0.06 0.16 0.64 -0.14 0.04 0.97 1.00              
8. Monthly Price Level 4.00 1.96 -0.06 0.15 0.72 -0.13 0.03 0.90 0.86 1.00             
9. Monthly Price Volatility 0.08 0.11 -0.05 0.13 0.50 -0.11 0.02 0.73 0.72 0.87 1.00            
10. Construction Raw Material 
Price 
1.53 0.15 -0.04 0.16 0.55 -0.13 0.05 0.87 0.88 0.83 0.77 1.00           
11. EPC cost 1.69 1.28 0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.23 0.51 1.00          
12. Firm Size 9.48 2.43 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 -0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 1.00         
13. Age 0.32 0.96 0.06 0.06 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.29 1.00        
14. Age2 1.03 1.38 -0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.77 1.00       
15. Experience 1.57 2.41 0.17 0.22 0.36 -0.02 0.18 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.37 0.46 0.20 0.30 0.14 0.05 1.00      
16. LNG Fleet 2.21 5.30 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.29 0.12 -0.04 0.55 1.00     
17. Oil Gas Production 6.70 0.69 0.10 -0.04 0.06 0.11 -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.43 0.32 0.23 0.24 1.00    
18. Oil Gas Reserves 10.40 0.43 0.16 -0.01 -0.00 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.20 -0.00 -0.18 0.25 0.16 0.37 1.00   
19. Delay by Extreme Weather 0.07 0.25 0.13 -0.30 0.21 0.35 -0.31 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.12 -0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 1.00  





Table 4.5. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Yearly Panel Monthly Panel 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.347* 0.280* 0.345* 0.333** 
(0.193) (0.168) (0.172) (0.169) 
Post Shock -0.302 -0.228 -0.337* -0.326* 
(0.226) (0.193) (0.182) (0.179) 
Slope -0.291 -0.239 -0.222 -0.237 
(0.173) (0.163) (0.149) (0.149) 
Yearly Price Level -0.057 -0.066* -0.021 -0.029 
(0.048) (0.036) (0.029) (0.023) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.387 0.480 0.255 0.284 
(0.447) (0.383) (0.367) (0.344) 
Monthly Price Level   -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility   0.063 0.055 
  (0.081) (0.084) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.114 -0.126 -0.421 -0.481* 
(0.277) (0.260) (0.278) (0.260) 
EPC Cost 0.026 0.025 0.041** 0.037** 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.031 0.012 0.039* 0.037* 
(0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
Age 0.005 0.112 -0.284 0.055 
(0.558) (0.097) (0.481) (0.160) 
Age2 -0.082 -0.119 -0.095 -0.091 
(0.248) (0.079) (0.242) (0.158) 
Experience 0.040 0.043 0.031 0.033 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) 
LNG Fleet 0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.001 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.026) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.070* 0.044 0.111*** 0.106*** 
(0.036) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.104*** -0.073*** -0.169*** -0.159*** 
(0.015) (0.025) (0.046) (0.046) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.293 0.327* 0.260 0.255 
(0.198) (0.178) (0.175) (0.173) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.102 -0.005 -0.179 -0.169 
(0.202) (0.195) (0.196) (0.193) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.079 0.164 0.073 0.070 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-





Table 4.6. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Yearly Panel Monthly Panel 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.137** 0.125** 0.130** 0.126** 
(0.067) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.560 0.568 0.032 0.035 
(0.432) (0.474) (0.022) (0.023) 
Slope -0.207 -0.174 -0.193 -0.189 
(0.162) (0.145) (0.136) (0.132) 
Yearly Price Level 0.128 0.115 0.030 0.040 
(0.097) (0.124) (0.028) (0.034) 
Yearly Price Volatility -7.185 -7.038 -1.278* -1.335* 
(4.469) (5.124) (0.702) (0.752) 
Monthly Price Level   -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility   -0.244 -0.266 
  (0.166) (0.178) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 0.181 0.164 -0.438 -0.431* 
(0.304) (0.315) (0.285) (0.260) 
EPC Cost 0.028 0.027 0.036** 0.038*** 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.032 0.013 0.039* 0.036* 
(0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
Age 0.014 0.114 0.230 0.091 
(0.649) (0.097) (0.602) (0.168) 
Age2 -0.090 -0.118 -0.118 -0.106 
(0.254) (0.079) (0.247) (0.162) 
Experience 0.033 0.038 0.027 0.030 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.000 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.025) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.074** 0.046 0.103*** 0.101*** 
(0.034) (0.029) (0.035) (0.032) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.084*** -0.058** -0.162*** -0.152*** 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.048) (0.048) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.254 0.288 0.238 0.240 
(0.201) (0.181) (0.177) (0.172) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.097 -0.004 -0.162 -0.156 
(0.200) (0.192) (0.197) (0.192) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.090 0.171 0.078 0.069 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-





Table 4.7. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Yearly Panel Monthly Panel 
I 
GLS / RE 
II 
OLS / FE 
III 
GLS / RE 
IV 
OLS / FE 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.591*** 0.584***   0.622*** 0.608*** 
  (0.166) (0.177)   (0.155) (0.157) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.074 -0.102* -1.255*** -1.251*** -0.092** -0.072 -1.361*** -1.295*** 
(0.056) (0.053) (0.360) (0.379) (0.045) (0.045) (0.340) (0.334) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.112 -0.068 -0.595*** -0.564*** -0.127 -0.114 -0.676*** -0.654*** 
(0.103) (0.117) (0.143) (0.185) (0.100) (0.104) (0.151) (0.162) 
Yearly Price Level -0.055 -0.074 -0.063 -0.066 -0.015 -0.010 -0.004 0.006 
(0.041) (0.050) (0.042) (0.049) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.487 0.636 0.614 0.627 -0.011 -0.020 -0.111 -0.148 
(0.419) (0.468) (0.441) (0.473) (0.432) (0.435) (0.424) (0.434) 
Monthly Price Level     0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility     -0.012 -0.009 0.012 0.021 
    (0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.075) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.197 -0.201 -0.247 -0.204 -0.256 -0.181 -0.290 -0.184 
(0.290) (0.349) (0.282) (0.333) (0.294) (0.325) (0.284) (0.312) 
EPC Cost 0.023 0.019 0.025 0.023 0.015 0.018 0.014 0.019 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.024 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age 0.124 0.798 0.098 0.455 0.301* 0.100 0.220 -0.228 
(0.085) (0.639) (0.087) (0.578) (0.168) (0.575) (0.140) (0.534) 
Age2 -0.126** -0.424* -0.113* -0.371* -0.285** -0.442** -0.227* -0.371* 
(0.062) (0.224) (0.060) (0.185) (0.139) (0.216) (0.118) (0.190) 
Experience -0.036 -0.039 -0.035 -0.039 -0.020 -0.021 -0.018 -0.019 
(0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.003 -0.015 0.004 -0.006 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.015 






Table 4.7. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity (cont.) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.040 -0.012 0.019 -0.038 0.029 0.007 0.026 0.008 
(0.029) (0.040) (0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.078** -0.087*** -0.093** -0.115*** -0.116 -0.128 -0.131* -0.144** 
(0.039) (0.025) (0.036) (0.018) (0.088) (0.086) (0.069) (0.067) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.738*** 0.704*** 0.744*** 0.704*** 0.660*** 0.668*** 0.724*** 0.732*** 
(0.159) (0.182) (0.171) (0.197) (0.157) (0.163) (0.169) (0.175) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.257 0.164 0.205 0.113 0.160 0.139 0.126 0.108 
(0.160) (0.193) (0.143) (0.175) (0.189) (0.202) (0.165) (0.176) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.293 0.225 0.340 0.279 0.146 0.182 0.223 0.227 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of 
a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 






Table 4.8. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Yearly Panel Monthly Panel 
I 
GLS / RE 
II 
OLS / FE 
III 
GLS / RE 
IV 
OLS / FE 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.600*** 0.488***   0.631*** 0.605*** 
  (0.137) (0.151)   (0.164) (0.171) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.057 0.092* -1.459*** -1.148*** 0.145** 0.174*** -1.459*** -1.391*** 
(0.057) (0.052) (0.350) (0.388) (0.070) (0.055) (0.424) (0.437) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.112 -0.064 -0.609*** -0.476*** -0.114 -0.102 -0.674*** -0.641*** 
(0.101) (0.109) (0.133) (0.157) (0.089) (0.091) (0.150) (0.163) 
Yearly Price Level -0.047 -0.009 -0.052 -0.023 -0.034 -0.023 -0.040 -0.038 
(0.046) (0.054) (0.050) (0.055) (0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.039) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.064 -0.261 0.129 -0.124 0.459 0.400 0.532 0.515 
(0.496) (0.507) (0.545) (0.530) (0.361) (0.388) (0.375) (0.409) 
Monthly Price Level     -0.013** -0.014*** -0.011* -0.011** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility     0.045 0.058 0.026 0.029 
    (0.097) (0.099) (0.095) (0.095) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 0.112 0.128 0.193 0.189 -0.458** -0.412* -0.364* -0.371 
(0.233) (0.233) (0.237) (0.230) (0.211) (0.234) (0.191) (0.226) 
EPC Cost 0.015 0.019 0.012 0.016 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm Size -0.010 0.021 -0.008 0.022 0.028 0.030 0.027 0.030* 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age 0.063 -0.898* 0.074 -0.688 -0.242 -0.718 -0.186 -0.294 
(0.088) (0.509) (0.081) (0.498) (0.159) (0.514) (0.158) (0.523) 
Age2 -0.055 0.341 -0.053 0.309 0.165 0.317 0.133 0.281 
(0.076) (0.215) (0.071) (0.221) (0.158) (0.214) (0.163) (0.227) 
Experience 0.112*** 0.108** 0.096*** 0.092** 0.070** 0.068** 0.059** 0.057** 
(0.036) (0.047) (0.031) (0.040) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet -0.007 0.023 -0.007 0.016 0.001 0.005 -0.007 -0.005 






Table 4.8. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity (cont.) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.023 0.129*** 0.042 0.142*** 0.134*** 0.162*** 0.132*** 0.158*** 
(0.030) (0.038) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.032) (0.037) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.001 -0.033 0.025 -0.003 -0.110** -0.111** -0.089** -0.090** 
(0.025) (0.034) (0.024) (0.029) (0.047) (0.050) (0.042) (0.044) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.460*** -0.460*** -0.457*** -0.448*** -0.508*** -0.508*** -0.546*** -0.546*** 
(0.140) (0.141) (0.139) (0.141) (0.120) (0.116) (0.114) (0.111) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.262 -0.302* -0.233 -0.281* -0.377** -0.370** -0.344* -0.339* 
(0.184) (0.157) (0.178) (0.157) (0.172) (0.165) (0.177) (0.171) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.288 0.238 0.361 0.280 0.104 0.209 0.175 0.250 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of 
a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 






Table 4.9. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Yearly Panel Monthly Panel 
I 
GLS / RE 
II 
OLS / FE 
III 
GLS / RE 
IV 
OLS / FE 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.138 0.140   0.169** 0.168** 
  (0.097) (0.099)   (0.079) (0.078) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
0.010 -0.022 -0.202 -0.264 0.123 0.165 -0.158 -0.144 
(0.430) (0.405) (0.500) (0.462) (0.259) (0.264) (0.287) (0.284) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.114 -0.071 -0.281** -0.243 -0.133 -0.118 -0.331** -0.315** 
(0.104) (0.117) (0.135) (0.159) (0.101) (0.104) (0.130) (0.133) 
Yearly Price Level -0.090 -0.081 -0.062 -0.071 -0.038 0.014 -0.010 0.020 
(0.108) (0.095) (0.109) (0.096) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.682 0.878 -0.175 0.390 -0.780 -1.580 -1.601 -1.946 
(4.624) (4.273) (4.656) (4.242) (2.677) (2.778) (2.788) (2.847) 
Monthly Price Level     -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility     0.040 0.032 0.063 0.054 
    (0.084) (0.082) (0.087) (0.086) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.148 -0.029 -0.128 -0.047 -0.194 -0.063 -0.173 -0.076 
(0.333) (0.369) (0.321) (0.352) (0.295) (0.327) (0.298) (0.332) 
EPC Cost 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.018 0.025* 0.018 0.022* 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.022 
(0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age 0.119 0.077 0.111 0.283 0.271 -0.304 0.262* -0.095 
(0.086) (0.603) (0.087) (0.593) (0.171) (0.539) (0.154) (0.560) 
Age2 -0.124** -0.424* -0.116* -0.419** -0.280** -0.440** -0.263** -0.436** 
(0.062) (0.224) (0.061) (0.205) (0.141) (0.217) (0.126) (0.200) 
Experience -0.040 -0.040 -0.047 -0.053 -0.021 -0.020 -0.029 -0.029 
(0.033) (0.041) (0.035) (0.042) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.004 -0.014 0.004 -0.011 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.009 





Table 4.9. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on time-to-build per ton capacity (cont.) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.040 -0.012 0.033 -0.024 0.029 0.008 0.020 -0.004 
(0.029) (0.038) (0.029) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.074* -0.086*** -0.061 -0.077*** -0.115 -0.127 -0.106 -0.120 
(0.038) (0.025) (0.040) (0.026) (0.088) (0.085) (0.082) (0.079) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.732*** 0.707*** 0.713*** 0.681*** 0.642*** 0.663*** 0.639*** 0.655*** 
(0.159) (0.182) (0.163) (0.187) (0.156) (0.162) (0.164) (0.171) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.262 0.164 0.249* 0.147 0.159 0.133 0.167 0.145 
(0.162) (0.194) (0.146) (0.180) (0.192) (0.202) (0.173) (0.185) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.292 0.222 0.311 0.247 0.148 0.181 0.181 0.216 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of 
a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 






Table 4.10. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Yearly Panel Monthly Panel 
I 
GLS / RE 
II 
OLS / FE 
III 
GLS / RE 
IV 
OLS / FE 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.124** 0.088   0.114** 0.112** 
  (0.055) (0.061)   (0.049) (0.049) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
1.211** 1.250** 0.950 1.066* 0.941*** 0.921*** 0.683* 0.673** 
(0.545) (0.516) (0.578) (0.537) (0.333) (0.306) (0.353) (0.322) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.113 -0.066 -0.251*** -0.165 -0.119 -0.105 -0.255*** -0.237** 
(0.100) (0.108) (0.086) (0.110) (0.089) (0.091) (0.092) (0.098) 
Yearly Price Level 0.277** 0.319*** 0.268** 0.314*** 0.280*** 0.261*** 0.271*** 0.255*** 
(0.126) (0.106) (0.127) (0.103) (0.092) (0.069) (0.091) (0.067) 
Yearly Price Volatility -13.202** -13.899** -13.398** -14.067** -10.488*** -10.160*** -10.528*** -10.269*** 
(5.828) (5.387) (5.888) (5.367) (3.648) (3.234) (3.596) (3.174) 
Monthly Price Level     -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility     0.022 0.026 0.020 0.024 
    (0.098) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 0.542 0.490 0.571* 0.519 -0.244 -0.296 -0.235 -0.283 
(0.346) (0.338) (0.344) (0.334) (0.190) (0.227) (0.191) (0.228) 
EPC Cost 0.019 0.021 0.017 0.020 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Firm Size -0.009 0.023 -0.011 0.022 0.028 0.032* 0.027 0.032* 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age 0.064 -0.546 0.073 -0.562 -0.210 -0.051 -0.195 -0.081 
(0.089) (0.578) (0.086) (0.596) (0.160) (0.594) (0.148) (0.598) 
Age2 -0.056 0.340 -0.056 0.343 0.159 0.316 0.147 0.330 
(0.076) (0.217) (0.072) (0.213) (0.158) (0.215) (0.148) (0.210) 
Experience 0.115*** 0.112** 0.114*** 0.113** 0.074*** 0.070** 0.071** 0.067** 
(0.035) (0.046) (0.034) (0.045) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet -0.008 0.022 -0.009 0.019 -0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.002 





Table 4.10. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on cost-to-build per ton capacity (cont.) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.023 0.129*** 0.025 0.132*** 0.136*** 0.162*** 0.139*** 0.170*** 
(0.029) (0.038) (0.028) (0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.004 -0.029 0.004 -0.029 -0.106** -0.105** -0.096** -0.095* 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.033) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.475*** -0.485*** -0.466*** -0.482*** -0.485*** -0.495*** -0.483*** -0.493*** 
(0.138) (0.137) (0.132) (0.134) (0.120) (0.116) (0.118) (0.114) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.276 -0.315* -0.273 -0.321** -0.389** -0.374** -0.379** -0.364** 
(0.185) (0.158) (0.179) (0.153) (0.170) (0.166) (0.173) (0.167) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.292 0.247 0.322 0.256 0.106 0.210 0.133 0.225 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of 
a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 







Table 4.11. Selection model on a firm’s probability of it being classified within the 







Yearly Price Level 28.242*** 
(0.985) 
Yearly Price Volatility -564.849*** 
(20.901) 
Monthly Price Level 4.499*** 
(0.287) 
Monthly Price Volatility 378.159*** 
(7.300) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 170.605*** 
(8.219) 
EPC Cost 6.721*** 
(0.230) 








LNG Fleet -0.031 
(0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.239 
(0.160) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.224* 
(0.120) 
Diversification Effect Control Y 
N 5,400 
R-square 0.932 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I are from estimation of a probit model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm for all Columns. Industry dummies for diversification effects 
and a constant are included in the regressions, but these results are not reported. Pseudo R-square is 






Table 4.12. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.601*** 0.563*** 
  (0.130) (0.137) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.125* -0.117* -1.341*** -1.223*** 
(0.070) (0.067) (0.283) (0.299) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.168* -0.127 -0.682*** -0.650*** 
(0.093) (0.100) (0.088) (0.145) 
Yearly Price Level 0.005 -0.005 0.018 0.009 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.157 -0.054 -0.233 -0.115 
(0.516) (0.512) (0.529) (0.513) 
Monthly Price Level 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.523 -0.367 -0.600* -0.492 
(0.339) (0.360) (0.309) (0.315) 
EPC Cost 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.017 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.007 0.026 0.010 0.024 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019) 
Age 0.049 0.478 0.029 0.225 
(0.075) (0.638) (0.072) (0.571) 
Age2 -0.066 -0.536** -0.057 -0.441** 
(0.043) (0.218) (0.043) (0.191) 
Experience -0.004 -0.024 -0.008 -0.022 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.024) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.016 
(0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.007 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.065 -0.120 0.092 -0.146** 
(0.081) (0.084) (0.080) (0.064) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.197 0.150 0.249 0.197 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 






Table 4.13. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.893*** 0.617*** 
  (0.144) (0.167) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.177* 0.285*** -2.070*** -1.300*** 
(0.091) (0.082) (0.372) (0.422) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.124 -0.064 -0.940*** -0.633*** 
(0.085) (0.081) (0.109) (0.157) 
Yearly Price Level 
 
-0.067* -0.035 -0.085** -0.056 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.939** 0.723 1.061** 0.876* 
(0.463) (0.455) (0.457) (0.465) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.016** -0.018*** -0.014** -0.016*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
EPC Cost -0.495** -0.416* -0.455** -0.415* 
(0.235) (0.253) (0.212) (0.231) 
Firm Size 0.045*** 0.062*** 0.046*** 0.056*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age -0.021** 0.028 -0.019* 0.031* 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018) 
Firm without pre-shock Market 
Experience 
0.088 -1.276** 0.088 -0.812 
(0.087) (0.559) (0.076) (0.525) 
Total Project Capacity -0.079 0.363 -0.068 0.305 
(0.061) (0.234) (0.054) (0.249) 
Total Project Initiated 0.056** 0.052* 0.058*** 0.044* 
(0.023) (0.031) (0.020) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet -0.017** 0.011 -0.015** 0.003 
(0.008) (0.024) (0.007) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.025 0.153*** -0.002 0.155*** 
(0.033) (0.041) (0.030) (0.037) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.100 -0.090** 0.066 -0.077* 
(0.071) (0.046) (0.066) (0.041) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.219 0.151 0.290 0.197 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










In this dissertation, I examine three main relationships involving constructs related to 
firm speed capability:  (1) the relationship between firms’ pre-entry speed capability and post-
entry speed capability, (2) the relationship between firm-specific speed capability and industry-
wide speed frontier, and (3) the relationship between the firm’s speed and its speed capability 
in building its plant. 
In Chapter 2, I examine post-entry speed capabilities of firms in the post-shock period 
(i.e., firms facing rapidly increasing product-market demand) and firms in the pre-shock period 
(i.e., firms facing steady and low product-market demand). I revisit the empirical context of 
the Liquefied Natural Gas industry from 1996 and 2007, in which previous research found that 
firms with superior pre-entry speed capability are more likely to enter the post-shock market. I 
find that firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities as compared 
to firms in the pre-shock period. In particular, I find that additional new entry of lower speed-
capable firms and the use of more non-scale-free resources into more new projects lead to firms’ 
inferior post-entry speed capabilities in the post-shock period relative to the firms in the pre-
shock period. This finding suggests that firms' pre-entry and post-entry speed capabilities can 
diverge, and particularly that firms with superior pre-entry speed capabilities do not necessarily 
achieve post-entry speed capabilities. Therefore, researchers should examine the antecedents 
and outcomes of post-entry speed capability to see how they differ from those of pre-entry 
speed capability. This result also suggests that a shock in product-market demand can lead to 
firm’s loss of capability, even if the shock is positive in a homogenous product market. Thus, 
when examining the development of firm capabilities and the nature of firm competition, rapid 
change in a homogenous product market should be considered a context as important as a 





In Chapter 2, I also find that the industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., the outer boundary 
of speed) in the post-shock period expands relative to that in the pre-shock period, whereas 
firms in the post-shock period have inferior post-entry speed capabilities as compared to firms 
in the pre-shock period. This empirical finding complements recent research on time 
compression (dis)economies, which found time compression economies, not diseconomies, 
and provided two potential explanations to explain time compression economies: (1) hetero-
geneity in firms’ speed capability or (2) a U-shaped relationship between time-to-build and 
cost-to-build with the majority of firms not realizing their economies of time compression. My 
data show a pattern consistent with heterogeneity in firms’ speed capability. In particular, the 
industry-wide speed frontier does not follow a U-shaped relationship between time-to-build 
and cost-build, but fitted value becomes less negative (and even can be positive) when more 
firms make investments far within the speed frontier. This empirical result suggests that time 
compression diseconomies and their changes can be better understood by focusing on the 
industry-wide speed frontier (i.e., the outer boundary of speed), while firm-specific speed 
capability can be better understood by identifying changes in firms’ distances from the speed 
frontier. 
In Chapter 3 and 4, I consider another key issue in the extant literature: distinguishing 
the firm’s faster speed from its superior speed capability in building its plant. In Chapter 3, I 
highlight the persistent lack of distinction between faster speed and superior speed capability 
despite the conceptual distinction and its significance. This problem is mostly due to the lack 
of theoretical understanding concerning the boundary condition dictating when speed and 
speed capability can diverge, and the absence of empirical research examining the divergence 
of speed and speed capability in tandem. To address the lack of distinction between the firm’s 
faster speed and its superior speed capability, I develop a model and derive a theoretical 





firm’s speed capability and/or product-market demand change. My theoretical framework 
shows that a firm with inferior speed capability can have faster speed if product-market demand 
increases substantially. Additionally, it shows that a firm with superior speed capability can 
have slower speed if product-market demand decreases substantially.  
In Chapter 4, I empirically test my developed theoretical framework and examine firms’ 
time-to-build their plants and their speed capabilities in the LNG industry by using demand 
shock caused by energy market liberalization in 2000. I find that, despite inferior speed 
capability, firms in the post-shock period have a shorter time-to-build their plants (i.e., faster 
speed) relative to firms in the pre-shock period. This finding suggests that practitioners and 
academic researchers should cease to equate superior speed capability with faster speed. The 
divergence of speed and speed capability also suggests that researchers should examine the 
antecedents and outcomes of speed and speed capability in tandem because they may vary for 
speed and speed capability.  
In sum, I examine firms’ speed capability through the following relationships:  (1) firms’ 
pre-entry speed capability and post-entry speed capability, (2) firm-specific speed capability 
and industry-wide speed frontier, and (3) divergence of the firm’s speed and its speed capability 
in building its plant. 
Limitations 
There are a few limitations to this dissertation. For the empirical test in Chapters 2 and 
4, this dissertation is not free from endogeneity concerns. There are endogeneity concerns from 
omitted variables, measurement error, and econometric model identification problems. There 
might be several omitted variables in this study, such as market concentration or other firm-
level characteristics, which I could not measure. However, the concern of omitted variables 
and endogeneity bias is mitigated by using an instrumental variable approach (Wooldridge, 





In my dataset, 58 cost estimates of the 72 cost estimates were available when the EPC contract 
was awarded, and the remaining 14 cost estimates were available after the construction was 
completed. This different timing to identify cost estimates can result in potential biases. 
However, there is no reason to believe that the former 58 cost estimates are over-estimated in 
comparison to the latter 14 cost estimates, or vice versa. Third, endogeneity concerns from the 
model identification exist in Chapter 2 and 4 although those concerns are mitigated by using a 
product-market demand shock. Especially, I try to mitigate these concerns further by the use 
of an instrumental variable, but the concern still exists. As most empirical research using 
archival data does, all the control variables were treated as exogenous in the current study, 
which would hardly be the case in practice. If I expand my criteria for the identification 
conditions beyond the independent variable and into control variables, the empirical model 
might not meet the identification conditions. These concerns pose a problem for my assertions. 
Given these limitations, causality is still not ascertained by my empirical results. To 
increase the reliability, I tried theoretical and empirical triangulation, and have presented my 
results here. Combined with the current study, more research through complementary methods 
for triangulation would help for causal understanding (Jick, 1979; Van de Ven, 2007). Among 
other things (e.g., experiments, simulations, and surveys), it would be fruitful to interview 
practitioners who worked for the firms in my data set. For example, we could ask practitioners 
about what kind of decisions they made and why they made those decisions regarding the 
product-market demand and a firm’s time-to-build and cost-to-build its plant. Triangulation 
can increase rigor and relevance in our evolving science of strategic management. 
In the current study, decision-theoretic factors play a primary role in providing the 
baseline explanation on why, relative to those in the pre-shock period, firms in the post-shock 
period have inferior post-entry speed capability (Chapter 2) and why firms in the post-shock 





(Chapters 3 and 4).48  It will be fruitful to incorporate more game-theoretic factors or firm 
heterogeneity in the future research. For example, this study does not provide explanations on 
why some firms on the speed frontier make an investment with faster speed trading off costs 
while others on the speed frontier make an investment with lower costs trading off speed. In 
my sample, Total S.A. in 2005 conducted Yemen LNG project with the highest cost-to-build 
and the shortest time-to-build its plant. Comparing the Total S.A. in 2005 with cases of firms 
with the lowest cost-to-build and the longest time-to-build its plant (e.g., Mitsubishi in 2003) 
might provide some answers to this question. This case study might also provide some 
explanations on why some firm could conduct its project close to the industry speed frontier 
by realizing time-cost tradeoff (e.g., Total S.A.) whereas other firms did not realize faster speed 
to build its plant while spending the highest costs (i.e., top 15%) in the industry. More game 
theoretic factors or firm heterogeneity consideration might provide explanations to these 
questions. 
This dissertation does not consider how specialized suppliers’ (EPC contractors’) 
learning might influence firms’ post-entry speed capability. Although it is not clear whether 
specialized suppliers’ learning (i.e., experiences) would benefit focal firms in the product 
market and increase focal firms’ post-entry speed capability,49 the focal firm in the product 
market would benefit from specialized suppliers’ learning when it builds relational governance 
with specialized suppliers (Corts & Singh, 2004; Kalnins & Mayer, 2004). For example, LNG 
                                                        
48 Main decision-theoretic factors are product-market demand in Chapter 2 and changes in discounted 
present value of speed caused by natural gas price changes in Chapters 3 and 4. There is a game-
theoretic (i.e., firm heterogeneity), which provides an explanation on why some firms in the post-shock 
period curb decreases in speed capability better than others given this change. However, I view sudden 
changes of market structure as dominant forces in a firm’s environment, which requires all firms to 
adapt to them. 
49 Specialized suppliers’ learning will increase specialized suppliers’ speed capability and lead to value 
creation, but distribution of created values depends on the bargaining power of the focal firm and 






firms’ prior experiences with specialized suppliers in the focal and/or related markets might 
positively moderate the inferior speed capability of the firms in the post-shock period. That is, 
the inferior speed capability of firms in the post-shock period will be buffered for the firms 
with greater prior experiences with specialized suppliers. It will be fruitful to examine the focal 
firm’s relational governance with specialized suppliers in the future research. 
It will be worthwhile to see how much findings of this dissertation are generalizable 
beyond the context of building plants in the LNG industry. For example, venture capital firms’ 
taking a startup to initial public offering (IPO) since its financing could be a new and feasible 
context to test the current study’s findings. Two key constructs, time-to-IPO (i.e., the time lag 
between initial funding and IPO) and cost-to-IPO (i.e., venture capital firms’ fund to startups 
in their portfolios) can be collected with a reasonable amount of effort. By constructing 
comparable measures of time-to-IPO (i.e., the time lag between initial funding and IPO) and 
cost-to-IPO (i.e., fund to startup for each startup within the venture capital portfolio), I can test 
if the industry-wide speed frontier follows time compression diseconomies and improves over 
time as well as how firm-specific speed capability changes when the market demand changes. 
By using the data of IPO price and stock market conditions, I can also test if firms in the market-
growing stage pursue profit growth, trading off its speed capability. Further empirical tests in 
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Appendix A. Chapter 2 empirical analyses for robustness check 
1. No replacing the missing time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity observations 
by zeroes for years before any time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity 
information were available for a firm in my panel. 
 
Table A.1. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: distances 
from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 














Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 




Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 






















































































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 324 324 324 324 
R-square 0.146 0.200 0.161 0.201 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column II and 
IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. 
Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. 






Table A.2. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 







Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 












































































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 324 324 324 324 
R-square 0.275 0.404 0.296 0.408 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






2. Alternative measures for firm size, oil and gas production, oil and gas reserves 
Table A.3. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: distances 
from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 














Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 




Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 










































































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.046 0.218 0.064 0.222 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table A.4. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 







Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 
































































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.149 0.351 0.158 0.355 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






3. Including Age2 Term 
Table A.5. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: distances 
from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 














Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 




Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
































































































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.079 0.211 0.090 0.217 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column II and IV are 
from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies 
for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported 











DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 







Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 






















































































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.181 0.356 0.190 0.361 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






4. Using year 2001 as alternative cut-off dates between regimes 
Table A.7. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: distances 
from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 






































































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 500 500 
R-square 0.079 0.172 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column II and 
IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. 
Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. 






Table A.8. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores)  
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
IV 



























































































Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 500 500 
R-square 0.168 0.328 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results 
reported in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-







5. Ending sample date at 2006 
Table A.9. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: distances 
from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.293 0.235*   
(0.181) (0.140)   
Post Shock -0.244 -0.179   
(0.163) (0.136)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 
  0.133** 0.118** 
  (0.064) (0.053) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
  0.409 0.537 
  (0.385) (0.469) 
Slope -0.240 -0.198 -0.185 -0.170 
(0.213) (0.161) (0.154) (0.126) 
Yearly Price Level -0.092 -0.087** 0.063 0.104 
(0.055) (0.038) (0.073) (0.127) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.836 0.758* -5.166 -6.548 
(0.515) (0.403) (3.850) (5.142) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
-0.174 -0.094 0.060 0.166 
(0.277) (0.250) (0.295) (0.306) 
EPC Cost -0.003 0.004 0.007 0.017 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.029 0.013 0.031 0.014 
(0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) 
Age 0.421 -0.028 0.414 -0.026 
(0.565) (0.058) (0.615) (0.057) 
Firm without pre-shock Market Experience  0.218**  0.214** 
 (0.086)  (0.087) 
Total Project Capacity -0.118 0.395 -0.201 0.358 
(0.773) (0.660) (0.803) (0.664) 
Total Project Initiated -0.008 0.023 -0.016 0.017 
(0.035) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.017 0.004 0.016 0.004 
(0.026) (0.010) (0.026) (0.010) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.079** 0.057* 0.083** 0.059** 
(0.039) (0.030) (0.038) (0.029) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.069*** -0.027 -0.050*** -0.014 
(0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.023) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.312** 0.362** 0.277* 0.326** 
(0.149) (0.146) (0.149) (0.148) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.017 0.032 0.029 0.039 
(0.235) (0.215) (0.231) (0.211) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 460 460 460 460 
R-square 0.074 0.169 0.087 0.177 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column II and 
IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. 
Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. 






Table A.10. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock (H1) 
 
-0.024 -0.021   
(0.015) (0.018)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 
  -0.303** -0.308** 
  (0.137) (0.155) 
Yearly Price Level 
 
0.018 0.029* -0.068** -0.062 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.026) (0.038) 
Yearly Price Volatility 
 
-0.114 -0.195 3.262** 3.265* 
(0.176) (0.169) (1.412) (1.673) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
0.016 -0.013 -0.075 -0.119 
(0.069) (0.066) (0.094) (0.100) 
EPC Cost 
 
0.007 0.008 0.001 0.001 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.008 0.001 -0.009 0.001 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Age 
 
0.027 0.007 -0.036 0.007 
(0.147) (0.013) (0.179) (0.013) 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience 
 
 -0.121***  -0.122*** 
 (0.021)  (0.022) 
Total Project Capacity 
 
0.082 -0.000 0.074 0.004 
(0.263) (0.243) (0.265) (0.245) 
Total Project Initiated 
 
-0.018 -0.030*** -0.019 -0.031*** 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
LNG Fleet 
 
-0.012 0.002 -0.011 0.002 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Oil & Gas Production 
 
-0.028*** -0.013* -0.028*** -0.013* 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 
 
0.006 -0.017*** 0.005 -0.018*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 
 
0.118*** 0.100*** 0.124*** 0.103*** 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) 
Delay by Hurricane 
 
0.049 0.057 0.053 0.061 
(0.075) (0.064) (0.076) (0.064) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 460 460 460 460 
R-square 0.138 0.327 0.144 0.331 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






6. Ending sample date at 2005 
Table A.11. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.230 0.166   
(0.147) (0.105)   
Post Shock -0.200 -0.106   
(0.135) (0.103)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 
  0.117** 0.102*** 
  (0.051) (0.039) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
  0.368 0.577 
  (0.347) (0.454) 
Slope -0.213 -0.168 -0.190 -0.173 
(0.182) (0.125) (0.140) (0.108) 
Yearly Price Level -0.113* -0.090** 0.027 0.115 
(0.057) (0.037) (0.055) (0.123) 
Yearly Price Volatility 1.779** 1.493** -3.636 -6.173 
(0.866) (0.652) (3.259) (4.870) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
-1.228 -1.014 -0.962 -0.707 
(0.829) (0.749) (0.727) (0.689) 
EPC Cost -0.008 0.007 0.002 0.021 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.024 0.007 0.026 0.008 
(0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) 
Age 0.924 -0.001 0.857 0.000 
(0.622) (0.049) (0.620) (0.048) 
Firm without pre-shock Market Experience  0.158**  0.157** 
 (0.072)  (0.073) 
Total Project Capacity 0.064 0.530 -0.024 0.501 
(0.780) (0.651) (0.795) (0.645) 
Total Project Initiated -0.034 0.012 -0.041 0.008 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.029 0.005 0.027 0.005 
(0.031) (0.008) (0.031) (0.008) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.041 0.025 0.045 0.026 
(0.034) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.031** 0.012 -0.015 0.023 
(0.013) (0.031) (0.011) (0.030) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.250 0.311* 0.216 0.277* 
(0.174) (0.161) (0.175) (0.163) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.416*** -0.353*** -0.385*** -0.327*** 
(0.092) (0.088) (0.092) (0.085) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 419 419 419 419 
R-square 0.076 0.180 0.090 0.191 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column II and 
IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. 
Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. 






Table A.12. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock (H1) 
 
-0.021 -0.028   
(0.015) (0.018)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 
  -0.271** -0.309** 
  (0.128) (0.151) 
Yearly Price Level 
 
0.023 0.027* -0.055** -0.068* 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.024) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility 
 
-0.412 -0.436** 2.617** 3.079* 
(0.256) (0.222) (1.270) (1.587) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
0.379** 0.319* 0.282 0.193 
(0.175) (0.164) (0.169) (0.156) 
EPC Cost 
 
0.008 0.006 0.002 -0.001 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.009 0.002 -0.009 0.002 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Age 
 
-0.133 0.005 -0.183 0.005 
(0.157) (0.012) (0.191) (0.012) 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience 
 
 -0.100***  -0.102*** 
 (0.021)  (0.021) 
Total Project Capacity 
 
0.059 -0.014 0.052 -0.010 
(0.240) (0.233) (0.243) (0.235) 
Total Project Initiated 
 
-0.007 -0.022** -0.008 -0.024** 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
LNG Fleet 
 
-0.016* 0.002 -0.015* 0.002 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Oil & Gas Production 
 
-0.022** -0.007 -0.023** -0.007 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 
 
0.003 -0.025*** 0.002 -0.025*** 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 
 
0.133*** 0.114*** 0.138*** 0.117*** 
(0.033) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) 
Delay by Hurricane 
 
0.169*** 0.159*** 0.176*** 0.165*** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 419 419 419 419 
R-square 0.142 0.319 0.148 0.321 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






7. Ending sample date at 2004 
Table A.13. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.133 0.052   
(0.127) (0.094)   
Post Shock -0.092 -0.007   
(0.128) (0.100)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 
  0.006 -0.058 
  (0.135) (0.144) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
  2.321 0.643 
  (2.596) (1.355) 
Slope -0.201 -0.165* -0.107 -0.103 
(0.148) (0.092) (0.117) (0.079) 
Yearly Price Level -0.023 0.012 0.173 0.089 
(0.032) (0.060) (0.218) (0.171) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.315 -1.124 -15.911 -5.420 
(1.182) (1.577) (17.773) (10.092) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
-0.695 -0.476 -1.772 -0.712 
(0.758) (0.670) (1.404) (0.673) 
EPC Cost 0.004 0.017 -0.008 0.018 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.014 0.003 0.014 0.002 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) 
Age 0.562 0.015 0.975 0.018 
(0.461) (0.041) (0.798) (0.040) 
Firm without pre-shock Market Experience  0.131**  0.132** 
 (0.064)  (0.065) 
Total Project Capacity 0.166 0.633 0.144 0.649 
(0.754) (0.560) (0.789) (0.564) 
Total Project Initiated -0.031 0.018 -0.036 0.020 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.042) (0.037) 
LNG Fleet 0.026 0.001 0.024 0.002 
(0.038) (0.006) (0.038) (0.006) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.020 
(0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.016 0.026 -0.008 0.025 
(0.014) (0.033) (0.013) (0.033) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.207 0.258* 0.202 0.261* 
(0.175) (0.154) (0.171) (0.151) 
Delay by Hurricane     
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 378 378 378 378 
R-square 0.083 0.209 0.082 0.210 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in 
Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in 
the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and 






Table A.14. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock (H1) 
 
-0.036** -0.030   
(0.018) (0.019)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 
  -1.192 -0.713 
  (0.835) (0.462) 
Yearly Price Level 
 
-0.039** -0.024 -0.130* -0.111** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.068) (0.053) 
Yearly Price Volatility 
 
0.996** 0.797 8.741 5.911* 
(0.488) (0.505) (5.584) (3.274) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
0.023 0.050 0.695 0.341 
(0.181) (0.174) (0.472) (0.265) 
EPC Cost 
 
-0.002 0.000 0.007 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.000 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Age 
 
0.109 0.006 -0.293 0.005 
(0.127) (0.013) (0.256) (0.013) 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience 
 
 -0.090***  -0.094*** 
 (0.021)  (0.021) 
Total Project Capacity 
 
0.018 -0.060 0.017 -0.063 
(0.222) (0.219) (0.221) (0.220) 
Total Project Initiated 
 
-0.007 -0.018** -0.007 -0.021** 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
LNG Fleet 
 
-0.012* 0.004** -0.012* 0.004** 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Oil & Gas Production 
 
-0.018* -0.009 -0.018* -0.010 
(0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 
 
-0.002 -0.026*** -0.003 -0.024*** 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 
 
0.138*** 0.128*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.032) (0.028) 
Delay by Hurricane 
 
    
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 378 378 378 378 
R-square 0.144 0.323 0.141 0.318 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






8. Ending sample date at 2003 
Table A.15. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.014 -0.005   
(0.106) (0.089)   
Post Shock 0.039 0.022   
(0.114) (0.098)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 
  0.020 -0.007 
  (0.149) (0.138) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
  1.852 1.227 
  (2.299) (1.689) 
Slope -0.036 -0.058 -0.032 -0.057 
(0.117) (0.091) (0.095) (0.074) 
Yearly Price Level -0.053 -0.048 0.104 0.074 
(0.040) (0.048) (0.189) (0.165) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.444 -0.440 -12.765 -8.903 
(1.191) (1.369) (15.907) (12.104) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
2.042 0.840 0.312 0.534 
(1.278) (1.054) (0.911) (0.760) 
EPC Cost -0.012 -0.005 -0.021 -0.008 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) 
Firm Size 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Age -0.382 0.037 0.326 0.038 
(0.294) (0.037) (0.517) (0.037) 
Firm without pre-shock Market Experience  0.111**  0.114** 
 (0.054)  (0.056) 
Total Project Capacity 0.270 0.656 0.269 0.670 
(0.513) (0.461) (0.523) (0.465) 
Total Project Initiated 0.011 0.040 0.011 0.043 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) 
LNG Fleet 0.013 -0.001 0.013 -0.001 
(0.023) (0.011) (0.025) (0.010) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.011 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.001 0.018 0.002 0.018 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.007) (0.019) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.194 0.221 0.192 0.226 
(0.167) (0.150) (0.167) (0.148) 
Delay by Hurricane     
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 337 337 337 337 
R-square 0.065 0.267 0.066 0.268 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in 
Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in 
the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and 






Table A.16. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock (H1) 
 
-0.014 -0.025   
(0.017) (0.016)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 
  -0.726 -0.363 
  (0.705) (0.528) 
Yearly Price Level 
 
-0.049** -0.048** -0.110* -0.098* 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.059) (0.050) 
Yearly Price Volatility 
 
1.021** 1.124** 5.843 3.773 
(0.470) (0.550) (4.699) (3.557) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
1.046** 0.654* 1.581*** 0.806** 
(0.494) (0.379) (0.573) (0.375) 
EPC Cost 
 
-0.006 -0.007* -0.003 -0.008* 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Age 
 
-0.147 0.006 -0.353* 0.006 
(0.130) (0.014) (0.202) (0.014) 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience 
 
 -0.092***  -0.096*** 
 (0.022)  (0.022) 
Total Project Capacity 
 
-0.012 -0.078 -0.009 -0.084 
(0.269) (0.237) (0.265) (0.240) 
Total Project Initiated 
 
-0.022* -0.027*** -0.022* -0.031*** 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) 
LNG Fleet 
 
-0.010 0.006* -0.010 0.006* 
(0.014) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) 
Oil & Gas Production 
 
-0.016* -0.010 -0.016* -0.011 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 
 
-0.003 -0.022*** -0.003 -0.021** 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 
 
0.148*** 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.140*** 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.032) (0.026) 
Delay by Hurricane 
 
    
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N     
R-square     
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






9. Using future natural gas price 
Table A.17. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 DV: distances from the origin 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.363* 0.286*   
(0.195) (0.157)   
Post Shock -0.306* -0.296**   
(0.173) (0.139)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × Slope (H1) 
  0.000 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
  -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Slope -0.325 -0.268 -0.105 -0.118 
(0.232) (0.184) (0.138) (0.118) 
Yearly Price Level -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
-0.308 -0.482** -0.168 -0.407 
(0.246) (0.222) (0.299) (0.288) 
EPC Cost 0.043** 0.042** 0.037** 0.041** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Firm Size 0.030 0.014 0.031 0.015 
(0.023) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) 
Age -0.470 -0.057 -0.421 -0.054 
(0.439) (0.062) (0.516) (0.059) 
Firm without pre-shock Market Experience  0.265***  0.255*** 
 (0.095)  (0.095) 
Total Project Capacity -0.088 0.533 -0.116 0.552 
(0.736) (0.614) (0.775) (0.610) 
Total Project Initiated 0.037 0.056** 0.032 0.046* 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.024) 
LNG Fleet 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.024) (0.010) (0.024) (0.010) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.080* 0.061* 0.087** 0.062** 
(0.042) (0.032) (0.040) (0.030) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.101*** -0.046* -0.086*** -0.032 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.023) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.283 0.355** 0.257 0.318* 
(0.195) (0.176) (0.193) (0.169) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.088 -0.041 -0.079 -0.021 
(0.202) (0.188) (0.201) (0.189) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.075 0.177 0.072 0.178 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in 
Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in 
the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and 






Table A.18. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
efficiency scores) 
 DV: efficiency scores from DEA analysis 
I 
OLS / FE 
II 
GLS / RE 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock (H1) 
 
-0.026 0.005   
(0.022) (0.015)   
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (H1) 
  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Yearly Price Level 
 
-0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Yearly Price Volatility 
 
0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Construction 
Raw Material Cost 
0.053 0.119** -0.007 0.010 
(0.072) (0.055) (0.100) (0.101) 
EPC Cost 
 
-0.010* -0.009* -0.003 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.008 0.001 -0.008 0.001 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Age 
 
0.278 0.013 0.054 0.012 
(0.206) (0.013) (0.162) (0.013) 
Firm without Pre-shock Market Experience 
 
 -0.134***  -0.133*** 
 (0.022)  (0.022) 
Total Project Capacity 
 
0.066 -0.031 0.065 -0.029 
(0.259) (0.241) (0.261) (0.239) 
Total Project Initiated 
 
-0.032** -0.039*** -0.032** -0.038*** 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) 
LNG Fleet 
 
-0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.003 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) 
Oil & Gas Production 
 
-0.029*** -0.015* -0.028*** -0.014* 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 
 
0.013 -0.008 0.013 -0.010* 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 
 
0.113*** 0.091*** 0.114*** 0.092*** 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) 
Delay by Hurricane 
 
0.079 0.076 0.081 0.076 
(0.062) (0.054) (0.062) (0.054) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 500 500 500 500 
R-square 0.165 0.337 0.167 0.324 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported 
in Columns II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included 
in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, 






Appendix B. Chapter 3 proof 
 
1. An increase in speed capability & no change in demand 
0 < 𝑟 = 𝑟                                                                                                                
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α) + 𝛽 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α + 𝛾 ) + 𝛽 − 𝛾   where 𝛾  & 𝛾 > 0 
 















First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (T − α)                                                               equation (1) 
First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (T − α + 𝛾 )                                                       equation (2) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                             equation (3) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                             equation (4) 
 
𝑇∗  solves: 𝐶 = 𝑐 (𝑇 − α + 𝛾 ) = −𝑟 × 𝑒 = 𝑅                                           equation (5) 






First and second derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = 0, 𝐶 (𝑇) > 0                                   condition (1) 
First and second derivative of cost function  𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = 0, 𝐶 (𝑇) > 0                             condition (2) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (3) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (4) 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 𝐶 (𝑇) < 0                                                                                                condition (5) 
proof) 
 (T − α) < (T − α + 𝛾  ) 
𝑐 (T − α) < 𝑐 (T − α + 𝛾 )   because 𝑐 > 0 
0> 𝑅 (𝑇) = 𝑅 (𝑇) from equation (3) and (4)                                                        condition (6) 





∗ ) > 𝑪𝑻(𝑻𝑻
∗ ) when  𝐶 (𝑻𝑻
∗ ) − 𝑪𝑪(𝑻𝑪
∗ ) < 𝛾  




𝑇∗ > 𝑇∗    from P1  
             𝑅 (𝑇∗) > 𝑅 (𝑇∗)  because 𝑟 > 0 








2. A decrease in speed capability & no change in demand 
0 < 𝑟 = 𝑟                                                                                                                
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α) + 𝛽 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α + 𝛾 ) + 𝛽 − 𝛾   where 𝛾  & 𝛾 < 0 
 















First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (T − α)                                                               equation (1) 
First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (T − α + 𝛾 )                                                       equation (2) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                             equation (3) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                             equation (4) 
 
𝑇∗  solves: 𝐶 = 𝑐 (𝑇 − α + 𝛾 ) = −𝑟 × 𝑒 = 𝑅                                           equation (5) 








First and second derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = 0, 𝐶 (𝑇) > 0                                   condition (1) 
First and second derivative of cost function  𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = 0, 𝐶 (𝑇) > 0                             condition (2) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (3) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (4) 
0 > 𝐶 (𝑇) > 𝐶 (𝑇)                                                                                                condition (5) 
proof) 
 (T − α) > (T − α + 𝛾  ) 
𝑐 (T − α) > 𝑐 (T − α + 𝛾 )   because 𝑐 > 0 
0> 𝑅 (𝑇) = 𝑅 (𝑇) from equation (3) and (4)                                                        condition (6) 





∗ ) < 𝑪𝑻(𝑻𝑻
∗ ) when  𝑪𝑪(𝑻𝑪
∗ ) − 𝐶 (𝑻𝑻
∗ ) > −𝛾  




𝑇∗ < 𝑇∗    from P1  
             𝑅 (𝑇∗) < 𝑅 (𝑇∗)  because 𝑟 > 0 







3. No change in speed capability & an increase in demand: 
0 < 𝑟 < 𝑟                                                                                                              
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α) + 𝛽                                                                                            
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α) + 𝛽                                                                                            
 















First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (𝑇 − α)                                                            equation (1) 
First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (𝑇 − α)                                                            equation (2) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                          equation (3) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                         equation (4) 
𝑇∗  solves: 𝐶 = 𝑐 (𝑇 − α) = −𝑟 × 𝑒  = 𝑅                                               equation (5) 
𝑇∗  solves: 𝐶 = (𝑇 − α)     = −𝑟 × 𝑒  = 𝑅                                               equation (6) 
 
First and second derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→






First and second derivative of cost function  𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = 0, 𝐶 (𝑇) > 0                                  condition (2) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (T) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (3) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (4) 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝐶 (𝑇) from equations (1) and (2)                                                             condition (5) 
 𝑅 (𝑇) > 𝑅 (𝑇) from equations (3) and (4)                                                           condition (6) 





∗ ) < 𝑪𝑻(𝑻𝑻
∗ )  
𝑇∗ > 𝑇∗ from P1 
𝑇∗ − α > 𝑇∗ − α 
𝑐(𝑇∗ − α) < 𝑐(𝑇∗ − α) 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑐 < 0 
P3. 𝑪𝑪(𝑻𝑪
∗ ) > 𝑪𝑻(𝑻𝑻
∗ )   
𝑇∗ > 𝑇∗ from P1 
𝑇∗ − α > 𝑇∗ − α 









4. No change in speed capability & a decrease in demand 
0 < 𝑟 < 𝑟                                                                                                              
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α) + 𝛽                                                                                            
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐(𝑇 − α) + 𝛽                                                                                            
 















First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (T − α)                                                               equation (1) 
First derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝑐 (T − α)                                                               equation (2) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of early-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                             equation (3) 
First derivative of discounted revenue function for the group of late-market entrants is: 
𝑅 (𝑇) = −𝑟 × 𝑒                                                             equation (4) 
𝑇∗  solves: 𝐶 = 𝑐 (𝑇 − α) = −𝑟 × 𝑒  = 𝑅                                                  equation (5) 









First and second derivative of cost function 𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = 0, 𝐶 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (1) 
First and second derivative of cost function  𝐶 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝐶 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = −∞, lim
→
𝐶 (𝑇) = 0, 𝐶 (𝑇) > 0                                  condition (2) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (T) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (3) 
First and second derivative of its revenue function 𝑅 (𝑇) satisfy: 
𝑅 (𝑇) < 0, lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = − 𝑟 , lim
→
𝑅 (𝑇) = 0, 𝑅 (𝑇) > 0                                 condition (4) 
𝐶 (𝑇) = 𝐶 (𝑇) from equations (1) and (2)                                                             condition (5) 
 𝑅 (𝑇) < 𝑅 (𝑇) from equations (3) and (4)                                                           condition (6) 





∗ ) > 𝑪𝑻(𝑻𝑻
∗ )  
𝑇∗ < 𝑇∗ from P1 
𝑇∗ − α < 𝑇∗ − α 
𝑐(𝑇∗ − α) > 𝑐(𝑇∗ − α) 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑐 < 0 
P3. 𝑪𝑪(𝑻𝑪
∗ ) < 𝑪𝑻(𝑻𝑻
∗ )   








Appendix C. Chapter 4 empirical analyses for robustness check 
1. No replacing the missing time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity observations 
by zeroes for years before any time-to-build and cost-to-build per ton capacity 
information were available for a firm in my panel. 
 
Table C.1. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: distances 
from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.414*** 0.415*** 
(0.119) (0.123) 
Post Shock -0.491*** -0.489*** 
(0.122) (0.127) 
Slope -0.196* -0.157 
(0.116) (0.127) 
Yearly Price Level -0.103** -0.092** 
(0.047) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility 1.048** 1.013** 
(0.503) (0.464) 
Monthly Price Level 0.002 0.000 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.025 0.053 
(0.089) (0.091) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.664* -0.548* 
(0.362) (0.311) 
EPC Cost 0.046** 0.052*** 
(0.019) (0.018) 
Firm Size 0.129** 0.114** 
(0.052) (0.048) 
Age 0.849 0.211 
(0.806) (0.280) 
Age2 -0.313 -0.245 
(0.313) (0.235) 
Experience 0.022 0.024 
(0.027) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.021 0.017 
(0.019) (0.017) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.018 0.026 
(0.022) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.038* -0.042** 
(0.023) (0.021) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.235 0.233 
(0.256) (0.255) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.084 -0.086 
(0.189) (0.181) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 3,668 3,668 
R-square 0.114 0.117 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.2. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on post-
entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.147** 0.134** 
(0.058) (0.058) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.006 0.023 
(0.027) (0.030) 
Slope -0.308** -0.282* 
(0.148) (0.153) 
Yearly Price Level -0.050 0.035 
(0.043) (0.041) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.728 -1.270 
(0.724) (0.792) 
Monthly Price Level 0.003 0.000 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.064 -0.190 
(0.215) (0.241) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.773* -0.537* 
(0.386) (0.317) 
EPC Cost 0.036** 0.049*** 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Firm Size 0.121** 0.103** 
(0.051) (0.047) 
Age 1.981* 0.404 
(1.100) (0.308) 
Age2 -0.397 -0.327 
(0.311) (0.236) 
Experience 0.014 0.022 
(0.028) (0.028) 
LNG Fleet 0.022 0.017 
(0.019) (0.018) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.008 0.003 
(0.025) (0.026) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.029 -0.038* 
(0.025) (0.022) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.208 0.235 
(0.265) (0.267) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.060 -0.087 
(0.189) (0.186) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 3,668 3,668 
R-square 0.121 0.110 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.3. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.798*** 0.775*** 
  (0.131) (0.133) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.086 -0.090 -1.553*** -1.544*** 
(0.089) (0.079) (0.310) (0.307) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.130 -0.124 -0.844*** -0.829*** 
(0.121) (0.129) (0.147) (0.168) 
Yearly Price Level -0.044 -0.045 -0.012 -0.023 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.042) (0.044) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.540 0.542 0.203 0.254 
(0.574) (0.582) (0.559) (0.572) 
Monthly Price Level 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.050 0.046 0.068 0.044 
(0.080) (0.088) (0.077) (0.087) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.207 -0.196 -0.228 -0.313 
(0.382) (0.422) (0.364) (0.401) 
EPC Cost 0.029** 0.030* 0.028** 0.024 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.046 0.048 0.074* 0.081 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.045) (0.050) 
Age 0.465 0.671 0.195 0.849 
(0.312) (0.997) (0.234) (0.863) 
Age2 -0.444* -0.697* -0.239 -0.407 
(0.243) (0.348) (0.192) (0.317) 
Experience -0.044 -0.046 -0.046 -0.051 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.032) (0.033) 
LNG Fleet 0.015 0.018 0.024 0.029 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.022) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.006 -0.032 -0.003 -0.023 
(0.048) (0.042) (0.043) (0.038) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.024 -0.026 -0.055 -0.054 
(0.064) (0.063) (0.050) (0.049) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.581*** 0.595*** 0.723*** 0.724*** 
(0.193) (0.207) (0.214) (0.223) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.317 0.320 0.246 0.256 
(0.223) (0.241) (0.218) (0.232) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 3,668 3,668 3,668 3,668 
R-square 0.166 0.148 0.285 0.212 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.4. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.538*** 0.516*** 
  (0.166) (0.161) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.343*** 0.248*** -1.116** -1.155** 
(0.126) (0.086) (0.471) (0.452) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.097 -0.092 -0.570*** -0.548*** 
(0.088) (0.092) (0.162) (0.162) 
Yearly Price Level -0.099* -0.126* -0.109** -0.136* 
(0.055) (0.068) (0.054) (0.068) 
Yearly Price Volatility 1.064* 1.149* 1.180** 1.268** 
(0.551) (0.614) (0.560) (0.623) 
Monthly Price Level -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.029 -0.089 -0.034 -0.094 
(0.086) (0.080) (0.087) (0.079) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.524** -0.793** -0.466** -0.735** 
(0.240) (0.324) (0.230) (0.323) 
EPC Cost 0.049*** 0.034** 0.046*** 0.031** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.101*** 0.125*** 0.099*** 0.121*** 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.031) (0.034) 
Age -0.128 1.211 -0.017 1.368 
(0.210) (0.901) (0.196) (0.974) 
Age2 0.082 0.169 0.006 0.055 
(0.165) (0.229) (0.155) (0.215) 
Experience 0.071** 0.067** 0.064** 0.061* 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
LNG Fleet 0.012 0.016 0.006 0.010 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.044* 0.049* 0.036 0.038 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.012 -0.004 0.009 0.016 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.390** -0.399** -0.418** -0.422** 
(0.174) (0.166) (0.189) (0.183) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.320* -0.304 -0.282 -0.268 
(0.177) (0.189) (0.177) (0.188) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 3,668 3,668 3,668 3,668 
R-square 0.158 0.259 0.232 0.290 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.5. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on time-
to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.173** 0.174** 
  (0.083) (0.081) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
-0.285 -0.264 -0.476 -0.552 
(0.358) (0.342) (0.362) (0.347) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.133 -0.124 -0.318** -0.315* 
(0.120) (0.128) (0.149) (0.157) 
Yearly Price Level -0.164 -0.136 -0.083 -0.128 
(0.113) (0.098) (0.115) (0.098) 
Yearly Price Volatility 4.110 3.703 1.971 2.985 
(3.941) (3.734) (4.106) (3.850) 
Monthly Price Level 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.064 0.070 0.091 0.079 
(0.090) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.265 -0.184 -0.192 -0.258 
(0.378) (0.414) (0.382) (0.415) 
EPC Cost 0.030** 0.034** 0.029** 0.025 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.047 0.047 0.043 0.046 
(0.053) (0.056) (0.045) (0.048) 
Age 0.439 0.219 0.420 1.065 
(0.314) (1.011) (0.267) (1.046) 
Age2 -0.438* -0.696* -0.399* -0.666** 
(0.245) (0.347) (0.205) (0.307) 
Experience -0.046 -0.047 -0.060 -0.066* 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) 
LNG Fleet 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.024 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.005 -0.031 0.009 -0.019 
(0.048) (0.042) (0.044) (0.036) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.022 -0.026 -0.029 -0.030 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.567*** 0.591*** 0.599*** 0.605*** 
(0.186) (0.205) (0.205) (0.222) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.327 0.322 0.329 0.345 
(0.225) (0.242) (0.224) (0.243) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 3,668 3,668 3,668 3,668 
R-square 0.167 0.148 0.200 0.193 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.6. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on cost-
to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.065 0.056 
  (0.042) (0.041) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
1.786*** 1.537*** 1.605*** 1.390*** 
(0.525) (0.433) (0.531) (0.440) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.101 -0.091 -0.174* -0.154 
(0.087) (0.091) (0.105) (0.106) 
Yearly Price Level 0.550*** 0.357*** 0.531*** 0.348*** 
(0.157) (0.103) (0.155) (0.100) 
Yearly Price Volatility -20.311*** -16.600*** -19.913*** -16.397*** 
(5.924) (4.622) (5.867) (4.564) 
Monthly Price Level 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.058 -0.116 -0.055 -0.111 
(0.081) (0.083) (0.080) (0.083) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.099 -0.551* -0.113 -0.547* 
(0.210) (0.322) (0.207) (0.321) 
EPC Cost 0.050*** 0.026* 0.049*** 0.027* 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Firm Size 0.094*** 0.128*** 0.093*** 0.126*** 
(0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.038) 
Age -0.038 2.199* -0.044 2.109* 
(0.206) (1.138) (0.198) (1.133) 
Age2 0.054 0.170 0.059 0.174 
(0.152) (0.230) (0.148) (0.223) 
Experience 0.081** 0.070** 0.080** 0.070** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
LNG Fleet 0.009 0.015 0.008 0.014 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.043 0.049* 0.070** 0.074** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.017 -0.001 -0.019 -0.003 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.350* -0.394** -0.357* -0.400** 
(0.185) (0.167) (0.187) (0.171) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.365** -0.319* -0.351* -0.309 
(0.177) (0.189) (0.180) (0.192) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 3,668 3,668 3,668 3,668 
R-square 0.164 0.265 0.176 0.270 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.7. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.587*** 0.762*** 
  (0.156) (0.128) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.277** -0.191* -1.343*** -1.554*** 
(0.131) (0.107) (0.338) (0.297) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.082 -0.134 -0.624*** -0.859*** 
(0.094) (0.125) (0.126) (0.166) 
Yearly Price Level -0.011 -0.027 0.000 -0.015 
(0.058) (0.050) (0.056) (0.048) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.183 0.334 0.115 0.187 
(0.725) (0.674) (0.718) (0.658) 
Monthly Price Level 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.004 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.590 -0.366 -0.777** -0.655 
(0.414) (0.471) (0.352) (0.408) 
EPC Cost 0.021 0.028 0.023 0.026 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) 
Firm Size 0.040 0.049 0.049 0.073 
(0.040) (0.058) (0.039) (0.049) 
Age 0.072 1.297 0.020 1.470* 
(0.090) (0.981) (0.097) (0.837) 
Age2 -0.098* -0.801** -0.076 -0.449 
(0.053) (0.338) (0.055) (0.308) 
Experience -0.012 -0.044 -0.016 -0.054 
(0.034) (0.040) (0.033) (0.034) 
LNG Fleet 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.030 
(0.012) (0.030) (0.012) (0.024) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.096 -0.040 0.083 -0.027 
(0.083) (0.044) (0.082) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.059 -0.028 0.096 -0.046 
(0.104) (0.062) (0.102) (0.046) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 3,168 3,166 3,168 3,166 
R-square 0.297 0.139 0.337 0.202 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










Table C.8. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.700*** 0.519*** 
  (0.201) (0.156) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.461*** 0.506*** -1.409*** -0.951** 
(0.154) (0.130) (0.539) (0.452) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.053 -0.097 -0.703*** -0.566*** 
(0.077) (0.077) (0.170) (0.161) 
Yearly Price Level -0.153** -0.184*** -0.162*** -0.179*** 
(0.060) (0.071) (0.056) (0.065) 
Yearly Price Volatility 1.971*** 1.858*** 2.036*** 1.831*** 
(0.651) (0.690) (0.632) (0.664) 
Monthly Price Level -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.536** -0.668** -0.480** -0.519* 
(0.253) (0.337) (0.241) (0.305) 
EPC Cost 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.053*** 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Firm Size -0.042 0.129*** -0.034 0.113*** 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.032) (0.028) 
Age 0.090 -0.152 0.100 0.069 
(0.124) (0.911) (0.112) (0.949) 
Age2 -0.063 0.145 -0.044 -0.036 
(0.077) (0.241) (0.068) (0.217) 
Experience 0.078*** 0.072** 0.070** 0.064** 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) 
LNG Fleet -0.029*** 0.016 -0.026*** 0.006 
(0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.036 0.055* 0.026 0.035 
(0.072) (0.029) (0.075) (0.028) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.151* -0.000 0.152* 0.011 
(0.089) (0.031) (0.081) (0.026) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 3,168 3,166 3,168 3,166 
R-square     
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










2. Alternative measures for firm size, oil and gas production, oil and gas reserves 
Table C.9. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: distances 
from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.312* 0.312* 
(0.165) (0.163) 
Post Shock -0.292 -0.296* 
(0.179) (0.176) 
Slope -0.199 -0.223 
(0.143) (0.145) 
Yearly Price Level -0.026 -0.033 
(0.031) (0.025) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.307 0.333 
(0.389) (0.363) 
Monthly Price Level -0.006 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.059 0.052 
(0.075) (0.079) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.356 -0.420 
(0.270) (0.264) 
EPC Cost 0.040** 0.036** 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size - -0.042 
 (0.046) 
Age -0.236 0.088 
(0.432) (0.159) 
Age2 -0.100 -0.073 
(0.244) (0.168) 
Experience 0.026 0.028 
(0.024) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.004 0.003 
(0.027) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Production - -0.030 
 (0.072) 
Oil & Gas Reserves - 0.070 
 (0.083) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.259 0.253 
(0.177) (0.173) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.148 -0.139 
(0.193) (0.190) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.042 0.123 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.10. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
-0.182 -0.184 
(0.134) (0.132) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
  
  
Slope 0.027 0.036 
(0.030) (0.031) 
Yearly Price Level -1.253* -1.318* 
(0.707) (0.729) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.007 -0.007 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Level -0.257 -0.276 
(0.181) (0.190) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.369 -0.370 
(0.275) (0.262) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 0.036** 0.037** 
(0.014) (0.015) 
EPC Cost - -0.040 
 (0.046) 
Firm Size 0.241 0.120 
(0.547) (0.164) 
Age -0.115 -0.087 
(0.246) (0.171) 
Age2 0.022 0.025 
(0.024) (0.023) 
Experience 0.003 0.002 
(0.026) (0.022) 
LNG Fleet - -0.037 
 (0.075) 
Oil & Gas Production - 0.074 
 (0.085) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.240 0.240 
(0.178) (0.173) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.131 -0.127 
(0.193) (0.189) 
Delay by Hurricane   
  
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.048 0.116 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.11. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.604*** 0.590*** 
  (0.153) (0.156) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.094** -0.073 -1.329*** -1.260*** 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.336) (0.330) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.117 -0.108 -0.650*** -0.631*** 
(0.101) (0.102) (0.148) (0.156) 
Yearly Price Level -0.015 -0.009 -0.005 0.007 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.005 -0.029 -0.104 -0.155 
(0.439) (0.443) (0.434) (0.442) 
Monthly Price Level 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.008 -0.001 0.016 0.029 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.072) (0.073) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.208 -0.131 -0.239 -0.130 
(0.288) (0.316) (0.279) (0.303) 
EPC Cost 0.014 0.017 0.013 0.019 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.047  0.018  
(0.057)  (0.051)  
Age 0.255 -0.015 0.180 -0.344 
(0.160) (0.547) (0.134) (0.510) 
Age2 -0.257* -0.378* -0.195 -0.303 
(0.144) (0.209) (0.125) (0.184) 
Experience -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 -0.022 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.016 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.004  -0.005  
(0.078)  (0.075)  
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.011  0.015  
(0.091)  (0.084)  
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.675*** 0.690*** 0.740*** 0.755*** 
(0.159) (0.164) (0.169) (0.174) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.173 0.150 0.139 0.120 
(0.186) (0.196) (0.163) (0.171) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.158 0.171 0.238 0.214 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.12. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.629*** 0.617*** 
  (0.172) (0.180) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.146** 0.173*** -1.453*** -1.423*** 
(0.069) (0.056) (0.442) (0.460) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.106 -0.098 -0.666*** -0.649*** 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.162) (0.173) 
Yearly Price Level -0.039 -0.031 -0.046 -0.047 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.039) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.519 0.484 0.596 0.604 
(0.375) (0.399) (0.387) (0.417) 
Monthly Price Level -0.012** -0.012** -0.010* -0.010* 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.035 0.044 0.016 0.014 
(0.094) (0.096) (0.092) (0.091) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.426** -0.380* -0.330* -0.337 
(0.215) (0.219) (0.196) (0.212) 
EPC Cost 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm Size -0.125***  -0.095**  
(0.044)  (0.042)  
Age -0.132 -0.511 -0.079 -0.079 
(0.146) (0.487) (0.143) (0.498) 
Age2 0.152 0.240 0.114 0.199 
(0.162) (0.218) (0.163) (0.229) 
Experience 0.067** 0.065* 0.056** 0.054* 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.028) (0.029) 
LNG Fleet 0.002 0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.017  -0.035  
(0.080)  (0.077)  
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.095  0.092  
(0.072)  (0.070)  
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.535*** -0.542*** -0.573*** -0.582*** 
(0.125) (0.128) (0.118) (0.121) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.354** -0.344** -0.319* -0.311* 
(0.174) (0.170) (0.177) (0.174) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.214 0.181 0.291 0.224 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.13. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.169** 0.166** 
  (0.079) (0.078) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
0.123 0.184 -0.162 -0.122 
(0.259) (0.270) (0.295) (0.300) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.122 -0.112 -0.322** -0.310** 
(0.101) (0.102) (0.129) (0.130) 
Yearly Price Level -0.040 0.020 -0.014 0.027 
(0.062) (0.068) (0.062) (0.069) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.760 -1.787 -1.531 -2.166 
(2.666) (2.855) (2.730) (2.913) 
Monthly Price Level -0.002 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.046 0.041 0.070 0.065 
(0.081) (0.080) (0.085) (0.084) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.142 -0.006 -0.121 -0.016 
(0.293) (0.323) (0.297) (0.329) 
EPC Cost 0.017 0.025* 0.017 0.022* 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.051  0.040  
(0.058)  (0.055)  
Age 0.221 -0.429 0.215 -0.246 
(0.161) (0.505) (0.148) (0.528) 
Age2 -0.251* -0.377* -0.235* -0.363* 
(0.145) (0.209) (0.132) (0.191) 
Experience -0.024 -0.023 -0.032 -0.032 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) 
LNG Fleet 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.010 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.008  -0.005  
(0.077)  (0.079)  
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.015  0.005  
(0.091)  (0.089)  
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.657*** 0.684*** 0.655*** 0.679*** 
(0.157) (0.164) (0.165) (0.172) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.173 0.144 0.181 0.155 
(0.189) (0.196) (0.170) (0.179) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.161 0.170 0.193 0.205 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.14. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.107** 0.104** 
  (0.050) (0.051) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
0.934*** 0.898*** 0.689* 0.660* 
(0.341) (0.315) (0.363) (0.333) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.111 -0.102 -0.239** -0.226** 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.097) (0.101) 
Yearly Price Level 0.274*** 0.246*** 0.265*** 0.239*** 
(0.093) (0.073) (0.092) (0.070) 
Yearly Price Volatility -10.361*** -9.816*** -10.379*** -9.853*** 
(3.742) (3.360) (3.693) (3.304) 
Monthly Price Level -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.008 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.214 -0.267 -0.207 -0.257 
(0.196) (0.213) (0.198) (0.216) 
EPC Cost 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Firm Size -0.130***  -0.119***  
(0.042)  (0.041)  
Age -0.095 0.154 -0.080 0.146 
(0.146) (0.566) (0.135) (0.569) 
Age2 0.145 0.239 0.130 0.241 
(0.162) (0.218) (0.150) (0.216) 
Experience 0.071** 0.067** 0.069** 0.064* 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) 
LNG Fleet 0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.003 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.019  -0.019  
(0.080)  (0.077)  
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.097  0.090  
(0.072)  (0.068)  
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.512*** -0.530*** -0.511*** -0.530*** 
(0.125) (0.128) (0.123) (0.127) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.365** -0.346** -0.355** -0.336* 
(0.173) (0.171) (0.175) (0.172) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.221 0.182 0.252 0.195 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.15. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.625*** 0.546*** 
  (0.130) (0.138) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.131* -0.125* -1.399*** -1.196*** 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.288) (0.302) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.172* -0.118 -0.712*** -0.628*** 
(0.091) (0.099) (0.089) (0.143) 
Yearly Price Level 0.003 -0.002 0.015 0.012 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.137 -0.080 -0.210 -0.141 
(0.519) (0.521) (0.532) (0.521) 
Monthly Price Level 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.524 -0.310 -0.590* -0.422 
(0.337) (0.352) (0.308) (0.317) 
EPC Cost 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.016 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size -0.006  -0.016  
(0.033)  (0.033)  
Age 0.063 0.376 0.036 0.099 
(0.073) (0.608) (0.068) (0.551) 
Age2 -0.068* -0.464** -0.051 -0.353* 
(0.037) (0.214) (0.036) (0.188) 
Experience -0.000 -0.025 -0.004 -0.024 
(0.026) (0.032) (0.025) (0.028) 
LNG Fleet 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.016 
(0.011) (0.028) (0.010) (0.026) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.007  -0.018  
(0.049)  (0.051)  
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.020  0.042  
(0.047)  (0.048)  
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.194 0.137 0.248 0.182 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










Table C.16. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.808*** 0.620*** 
  (0.144) (0.180) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.171* 0.275*** -1.860*** -1.321*** 
(0.090) (0.083) (0.362) (0.455) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.125 -0.062 -0.860*** -0.633*** 
(0.079) (0.080) (0.111) (0.168) 
Yearly Price Level -0.064* -0.043 -0.081** -0.064* 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.848* 0.794* 0.987** 0.947** 
(0.452) (0.464) (0.450) (0.473) 
Monthly Price Level -0.016** -0.017*** -0.014** -0.014*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.580** -0.374 -0.527** -0.354 
(0.229) (0.236) (0.206) (0.220) 
EPC Cost 0.045*** 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size -0.088***  -0.073***  
(0.022)  (0.022)  
Age 0.117 -1.057** 0.112* -0.604 
(0.073) (0.524) (0.065) (0.487) 
Age2 -0.077 0.275 -0.065 0.214 
(0.058) (0.237) (0.051) (0.248) 
Experience 0.072*** 0.051 0.068*** 0.043 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.021) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet -0.018** 0.012 -0.015** 0.003 
(0.008) (0.025) (0.007) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.057  0.039  
(0.050)  (0.050)  
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.003  0.007  
(0.042)  (0.042)  
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.250 0.125 0.307 0.172 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










3. Excluding Age2 Term 
Table C.17. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.357* 0.343** 
(0.181) (0.175) 
Post Shock -0.359* -0.344* 
(0.196) (0.190) 
Slope -0.231 -0.242 
(0.153) (0.151) 
Yearly Price Level -0.021 -0.027 
(0.029) (0.023) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.255 0.283 
(0.367) (0.345) 
Monthly Price Level -0.006 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.066 0.059 
(0.084) (0.086) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.422 -0.472* 
(0.279) (0.253) 
EPC Cost 0.042** 0.038** 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.038* 0.036* 
(0.022) (0.021) 
Age -0.347 -0.046 
(0.435) (0.073) 
Experience 0.030 0.031 
(0.024) (0.022) 
LNG Fleet 0.004 0.002 
(0.026) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.121*** 0.115*** 
(0.043) (0.040) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.164*** -0.152*** 
(0.043) (0.042) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.256 0.252 
(0.172) (0.170) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.174 -0.164 
(0.190) (0.187) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.072 0.051 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.18. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.129** 0.125** 
(0.061) (0.059) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.033 0.035 
(0.022) (0.023) 
Slope -0.205 -0.198 
(0.141) (0.136) 
Yearly Price Level 0.030 0.044 
(0.028) (0.036) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.272* -1.354* 
(0.696) (0.759) 
Monthly Price Level -0.007 -0.007 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.245 -0.269 
(0.167) (0.179) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.440 -0.423* 
(0.286) (0.253) 
EPC Cost 0.037** 0.039*** 
(0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.037* 0.035* 
(0.022) (0.020) 
Age 0.164 -0.026 
(0.549) (0.071) 
Experience 0.025 0.028 
(0.025) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.002 0.001 
(0.025) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.116*** 0.112*** 
(0.042) (0.040) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.156*** -0.144*** 
(0.046) (0.045) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.232 0.237 
(0.172) (0.168) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.155 -0.150 
(0.190) (0.185) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.075 0.049 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-







Table C.19. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.649*** 0.653*** 
  (0.161) (0.165) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.080* -0.067 -1.406*** -1.381*** 
(0.047) (0.045) (0.349) (0.349) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.143 -0.143 -0.710*** -0.718*** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.149) (0.157) 
Yearly Price Level -0.012 -0.010 -0.001 0.008 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.012 -0.011 -0.116 -0.150 
(0.433) (0.436) (0.424) (0.434) 
Monthly Price Level 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.003 0.000 0.020 0.032 
(0.078) (0.079) (0.075) (0.077) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.233 -0.188 -0.272 -0.189 
(0.291) (0.328) (0.283) (0.313) 
EPC Cost 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.021 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.019 0.017 0.021 0.020 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) 
Age -0.015 -0.179 -0.033 -0.483 
(0.059) (0.514) (0.057) (0.481) 
Experience -0.026 -0.027 -0.022 -0.024 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.007 0.006 0.016 0.017 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.058 0.057 0.048 0.049 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.047) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.095 -0.108 -0.113* -0.129* 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.066) (0.066) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.653*** 0.651*** 0.721*** 0.722*** 
(0.153) (0.155) (0.166) (0.169) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.180 0.171 0.140 0.132 
(0.172) (0.172) (0.152) (0.153) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.207 0.156 0.271 0.209 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-









Table C.20. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.639*** 0.626*** 
  (0.165) (0.168) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.138** 0.173*** -1.486*** -1.448*** 
(0.070) (0.055) (0.429) (0.432) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.126 -0.126 -0.692*** -0.681*** 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.150) (0.153) 
Yearly Price Level -0.036 -0.024 -0.042 -0.040 
(0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.463 0.400 0.535 0.519 
(0.357) (0.382) (0.372) (0.402) 
Monthly Price Level -0.013** -0.013** -0.011* -0.011** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.040 0.052 0.021 0.023 
(0.099) (0.100) (0.096) (0.096) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.477** -0.419* -0.379** -0.375 
(0.209) (0.236) (0.189) (0.227) 
EPC Cost 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.030 0.035* 0.030* 0.034* 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age -0.060 -0.531 -0.038 -0.114 
(0.068) (0.525) (0.064) (0.532) 
Experience 0.074*** 0.074** 0.062** 0.061** 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.024) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet -0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.118*** 0.129*** 0.120*** 0.130*** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.124*** -0.130*** -0.100** -0.106** 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.041) (0.042) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.500*** -0.490*** -0.539*** -0.532*** 
(0.127) (0.129) (0.119) (0.121) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.389** -0.396** -0.354* -0.361* 
(0.186) (0.192) (0.189) (0.197) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.169 0.195 0.250 0.239 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-








Table C.21. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.170** 0.169** 
  (0.081) (0.082) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
0.150 0.198 -0.134 -0.114 
(0.265) (0.273) (0.293) (0.295) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.148 -0.147 -0.346*** -0.345** 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.128) (0.131) 
Yearly Price Level -0.021 0.025 0.006 0.031 
(0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.150 -1.938 -1.947 -2.303 
(2.748) (2.875) (2.870) (2.951) 
Monthly Price Level -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.045 0.041 0.067 0.063 
(0.085) (0.085) (0.088) (0.088) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.167 -0.064 -0.147 -0.077 
(0.293) (0.329) (0.297) (0.334) 
EPC Cost 0.020 0.026* 0.020 0.023* 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.018 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) 
Age -0.036 -0.567 -0.027 -0.353 
(0.058) (0.479) (0.055) (0.499) 
Experience -0.027 -0.027 -0.034 -0.036 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) 
LNG Fleet 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.011 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.057 0.058 0.045 0.046 
(0.047) (0.050) (0.044) (0.047) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.094 -0.107 -0.084 -0.100 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.082) (0.081) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.637*** 0.646*** 0.635*** 0.638*** 
(0.151) (0.155) (0.158) (0.163) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.178 0.164 0.186 0.176 
(0.175) (0.173) (0.158) (0.158) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.208 0.156 0.243 0.191 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.22. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.111** 0.107** 
  (0.049) (0.050) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
0.933*** 0.918*** 0.682* 0.680** 
(0.333) (0.304) (0.353) (0.319) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.130 -0.129 -0.262*** -0.257*** 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089) 
Yearly Price Level 0.272*** 0.258*** 0.264*** 0.253*** 
(0.092) (0.070) (0.091) (0.067) 
Yearly Price Volatility -10.361*** -10.122*** -10.414*** -10.224*** 
(3.653) (3.225) (3.608) (3.169) 
Monthly Price Level -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 
(0.098) (0.099) (0.097) (0.097) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.263 -0.302 -0.253 -0.290 
(0.188) (0.229) (0.189) (0.230) 
EPC Cost 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.030* 0.036* 0.030* 0.036* 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
Age -0.036 0.128 -0.033 0.106 
(0.070) (0.598) (0.064) (0.605) 
Experience 0.077*** 0.075** 0.075*** 0.073** 
(0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet -0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.001 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.121*** 0.130*** 0.125*** 0.137*** 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.120*** -0.124** -0.109** -0.115** 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.478*** -0.477*** -0.476*** -0.474*** 
(0.126) (0.129) (0.124) (0.128) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.401** -0.400** -0.390** -0.392* 
(0.184) (0.193) (0.185) (0.195) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.169 0.196 0.200 0.209 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.23. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.623*** 0.612*** 
  (0.129) (0.144) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.126* -0.106 -1.387*** -1.313*** 
(0.072) (0.069) (0.285) (0.309) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.153 -0.155 -0.693*** -0.715*** 
(0.098) (0.096) (0.088) (0.139) 
Yearly Price Level 0.005 -0.001 0.018 0.013 
(0.037) (0.034) (0.039) (0.035) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.154 -0.075 -0.232 -0.145 
(0.527) (0.511) (0.540) (0.512) 
Monthly Price Level 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.000 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.492 -0.358 -0.576* -0.456 
(0.337) (0.363) (0.310) (0.320) 
EPC Cost 0.013 0.016 0.013 0.020 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.006 0.020 0.008 0.018 
(0.012) (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) 
Age -0.027 0.093 -0.034 -0.124 
(0.044) (0.574) (0.038) (0.502) 
Experience -0.008 -0.031 -0.011 -0.027 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.017 
(0.011) (0.027) (0.010) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.007 0.065 -0.003 0.049 
(0.035) (0.051) (0.032) (0.047) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.108* -0.102 0.128** -0.131** 
(0.059) (0.085) (0.059) (0.063) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.186 0.114 0.242 0.171 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 











Table C.24. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.897*** 0.643*** 
  (0.143) (0.165) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.182** 0.281*** -2.074*** -1.375*** 
(0.090) (0.082) (0.378) (0.418) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.111 -0.093 -0.937*** -0.679*** 
(0.092) (0.078) (0.097) (0.149) 
Yearly Price Level -0.068* -0.039 -0.087** -0.059 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.960** 0.757* 1.087** 0.897* 
(0.462) (0.449) (0.456) (0.458) 
Monthly Price Level -0.016** -0.018*** -0.014** -0.015*** 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.453* -0.436* -0.421** -0.421* 
(0.232) (0.251) (0.211) (0.228) 
EPC Cost 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size -0.023** 0.034* -0.020** 0.036* 
(0.010) (0.021) (0.009) (0.019) 
Age -0.004 -1.062* 0.012 -0.616 
(0.054) (0.564) (0.048) (0.521) 
Experience 0.050** 0.058* 0.052** 0.048* 
(0.024) (0.032) (0.021) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet -0.015* 0.010 -0.012* 0.001 
(0.008) (0.025) (0.007) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.038 0.120*** -0.010 0.126*** 
(0.039) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.156** -0.111** 0.106* -0.093** 
(0.075) (0.046) (0.064) (0.041) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.203 0.141 0.276 0.190 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










4. Using year 2001 as alternative cut-off dates between regimes 
Table C.25. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.217 0.214* 
(0.132) (0.129) 
Post Shock -0.197 -0.194 
(0.160) (0.155) 
Slope -0.251* -0.223* 
(0.134) (0.129) 
Yearly Price Level -0.022 0.007 
(0.025) (0.021) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.234 -0.023 
(0.327) (0.302) 
Monthly Price Level -0.006 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.036 0.039 
(0.087) (0.087) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.530* -0.484* 
(0.286) (0.270) 
EPC Cost 0.033** 0.037** 
(0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.038* 0.036* 
(0.023) (0.021) 
Age 0.610 0.098 
(0.516) (0.162) 
Age2 -0.112 -0.105 
(0.245) (0.160) 
Experience 0.031 0.034 
(0.024) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.001 -0.001 
(0.025) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.106*** 0.104*** 
(0.035) (0.032) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.165*** -0.156*** 
(0.047) (0.048) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.255 0.259 
(0.175) (0.172) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.177 -0.170 
(0.196) (0.191) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.072 0.071 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.26. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.130** 0.126** 
(0.062) (0.060) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.032 0.035 
(0.022) (0.023) 
Slope -0.193 -0.189 
(0.136) (0.132) 
Yearly Price Level 0.030 0.040 
(0.028) (0.034) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.278* -1.335* 
(0.702) (0.752) 
Monthly Price Level -0.007 -0.007 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.244 -0.266 
(0.166) (0.178) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.438 -0.431* 
(0.285) (0.260) 
EPC Cost 0.036** 0.038*** 
(0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.039* 0.036* 
(0.023) (0.021) 
Age 0.230 0.091 
(0.602) (0.168) 
Age2 -0.118 -0.106 
(0.247) (0.162) 
Experience 0.027 0.030 
(0.025) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.002 -0.000 
(0.025) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.103*** 0.101*** 
(0.035) (0.032) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.162*** -0.152*** 
(0.048) (0.048) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.238 0.240 
(0.177) (0.172) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.162 -0.156 
(0.197) (0.192) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.078 0.069 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.27. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.504*** 0.496*** 
  (0.147) (0.146) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.085* -0.079 -1.114*** -1.086*** 
(0.050) (0.054) (0.316) (0.312) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.131 -0.117 -0.516*** -0.499*** 
(0.101) (0.104) (0.149) (0.155) 
Yearly Price Level -0.047* -0.048 -0.034 -0.028 
(0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.034) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.417 0.422 0.312 0.258 
(0.351) (0.411) (0.353) (0.417) 
Monthly Price Level -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.014 0.010 0.067 0.062 
(0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.076) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.194 -0.156 -0.213 -0.167 
(0.300) (0.316) (0.295) (0.309) 
EPC Cost 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.018 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.022 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age 0.311* 0.332 0.262* 0.168 
(0.170) (0.539) (0.146) (0.518) 
Age2 -0.286** -0.441** -0.254** -0.408** 
(0.140) (0.217) (0.122) (0.191) 
Experience -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.020 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) 
LNG Fleet 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.011 
(0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.031 0.008 0.019 -0.003 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.114 -0.125 -0.121* -0.133* 
(0.086) (0.084) (0.071) (0.069) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.665*** 0.670*** 0.690*** 0.695*** 
(0.159) (0.163) (0.174) (0.179) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.141 0.124 0.119 0.106 
(0.189) (0.200) (0.164) (0.175) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.148 0.183 0.212 0.237 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.28. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.482*** 0.473*** 
  (0.122) (0.127) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.015 -0.016 -1.188*** -1.196*** 
(0.050) (0.045) (0.312) (0.327) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.118 -0.106 -0.501*** -0.481*** 
(0.090) (0.092) (0.126) (0.134) 
Yearly Price Level 0.047* 0.017 0.027 -0.005 
(0.024) (0.032) (0.027) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.383 -0.125 -0.205 0.073 
(0.287) (0.323) (0.323) (0.374) 
Monthly Price Level -0.005 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.024 -0.024 -0.068 -0.067 
(0.093) (0.094) (0.087) (0.088) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.513** -0.588** -0.403** -0.480** 
(0.229) (0.261) (0.202) (0.235) 
EPC Cost 0.037*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.029** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Firm Size 0.027 0.031 0.029* 0.032* 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age -0.204 0.285 -0.182 0.346 
(0.159) (0.577) (0.157) (0.566) 
Age2 0.158 0.316 0.147 0.309 
(0.158) (0.214) (0.159) (0.222) 
Experience 0.072** 0.069** 0.062** 0.058** 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.000 0.005 -0.005 -0.001 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.135*** 0.161*** 0.145*** 0.172*** 
(0.034) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.112** -0.110** -0.084* -0.083* 
(0.048) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.486*** -0.496*** -0.490*** -0.498*** 
(0.122) (0.117) (0.121) (0.116) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.377** -0.364** -0.357** -0.348** 
(0.172) (0.165) (0.173) (0.167) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.103 0.204 0.157 0.252 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.29. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.169** 0.168** 
  (0.079) (0.078) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
0.123 0.165 -0.158 -0.144 
(0.259) (0.264) (0.287) (0.284) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.133 -0.118 -0.331** -0.315** 
(0.101) (0.104) (0.130) (0.133) 
Yearly Price Level -0.038 0.014 -0.010 0.020 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.780 -1.580 -1.601 -1.946 
(2.677) (2.778) (2.788) (2.847) 
Monthly Price Level -0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.040 0.032 0.063 0.054 
(0.084) (0.082) (0.087) (0.086) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.194 -0.063 -0.173 -0.076 
(0.295) (0.327) (0.298) (0.332) 
EPC Cost 0.018 0.025* 0.018 0.022* 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.022 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age 0.271 -0.304 0.262* -0.095 
(0.171) (0.539) (0.154) (0.560) 
Age2 -0.280** -0.440** -0.263** -0.436** 
(0.141) (0.217) (0.126) (0.200) 
Experience -0.021 -0.020 -0.029 -0.029 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.005 0.003 0.009 0.009 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.029 0.008 0.020 -0.004 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.115 -0.127 -0.106 -0.120 
(0.088) (0.085) (0.082) (0.079) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.642*** 0.663*** 0.639*** 0.655*** 
(0.156) (0.162) (0.164) (0.171) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.159 0.133 0.167 0.145 
(0.192) (0.202) (0.173) (0.185) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.148 0.181 0.181 0.216 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.30. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.114** 0.112** 
  (0.049) (0.049) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
0.941*** 0.921*** 0.683* 0.673** 
(0.333) (0.306) (0.353) (0.322) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.119 -0.105 -0.255*** -0.237** 
(0.089) (0.091) (0.092) (0.098) 
Yearly Price Level 0.280*** 0.261*** 0.271*** 0.255*** 
(0.092) (0.069) (0.091) (0.067) 
Yearly Price Volatility -10.488*** -10.160*** -10.528*** -10.269*** 
(3.648) (3.234) (3.596) (3.174) 
Monthly Price Level -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.022 0.026 0.020 0.024 
(0.098) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.244 -0.296 -0.235 -0.283 
(0.190) (0.227) (0.191) (0.228) 
EPC Cost 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.028 0.032* 0.027 0.032* 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age -0.210 -0.051 -0.195 -0.081 
(0.160) (0.594) (0.148) (0.598) 
Age2 0.159 0.316 0.147 0.330 
(0.158) (0.215) (0.148) (0.210) 
Experience 0.074*** 0.070** 0.071** 0.067** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet -0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.002 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.136*** 0.162*** 0.139*** 0.170*** 
(0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.106** -0.105** -0.096** -0.095* 
(0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.048) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.485*** -0.495*** -0.483*** -0.493*** 
(0.120) (0.116) (0.118) (0.114) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.389** -0.374** -0.379** -0.364** 
(0.170) (0.166) (0.173) (0.167) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.106 0.210 0.133 0.225 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.31. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.593*** 0.537*** 
  (0.134) (0.146) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.210** -0.200* -1.414*** -1.271*** 
(0.087) (0.110) (0.259) (0.296) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.160* -0.117 -0.585*** -0.502*** 
(0.094) (0.099) (0.111) (0.143) 
Yearly Price Level -0.016 -0.079* -0.005 -0.049 
(0.026) (0.041) (0.027) (0.040) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.266 0.795* 0.151 0.518 
(0.347) (0.455) (0.356) (0.448) 
Monthly Price Level -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.208 -0.247 -0.122 -0.187 
(0.313) (0.301) (0.259) (0.268) 
EPC Cost 0.024* 0.014 0.023* 0.015 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Firm Size 0.004 0.025 0.007 0.023 
(0.013) (0.021) (0.012) (0.018) 
Age 0.022 1.330* -0.021 0.970 
(0.071) (0.740) (0.069) (0.709) 
Age2 -0.042 -0.473** -0.022 -0.459** 
(0.043) (0.213) (0.045) (0.184) 
Experience -0.001 -0.023 -0.004 -0.019 
(0.026) (0.036) (0.025) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.006 
(0.010) (0.028) (0.009) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.035 0.006 0.017 -0.018 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.060 -0.122 0.089 -0.140** 
(0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.064) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.752*** 0.665*** 0.736*** 0.663*** 
(0.140) (0.156) (0.148) (0.176) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,912 5,912 5,912 5,912 
R-square 0.276 0.184 0.321 0.235 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 









Table C.32. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.693*** 0.525*** 
  (0.090) (0.127) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.028 0.016 -1.713*** -1.310*** 
(0.068) (0.075) (0.250) (0.340) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.147* -0.110 -0.728*** -0.536*** 
(0.084) (0.082) (0.086) (0.124) 
Yearly Price Level 0.030 0.025 -0.010 -0.004 
(0.024) (0.032) (0.025) (0.035) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.141 -0.177 0.187 0.085 
(0.327) (0.318) (0.352) (0.367) 
Monthly Price Level -0.005 -0.007 0.001 -0.002 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.479** -0.611** -0.292 -0.425** 
(0.221) (0.253) (0.187) (0.207) 
EPC Cost 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.028** 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm Size -0.023** 0.032* -0.022** 0.033* 
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) 
Age 0.081 0.081 0.101 0.142 
(0.077) (0.619) (0.067) (0.567) 
Age2 -0.072 0.292 -0.074 0.253 
(0.057) (0.214) (0.049) (0.227) 
Experience 0.058** 0.065** 0.055*** 0.056* 
(0.024) (0.033) (0.021) (0.029) 
LNG Fleet -0.017** 0.006 -0.015** -0.003 
(0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.020 0.160*** 0.005 0.171*** 
(0.032) (0.040) (0.030) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.098 -0.111** 0.076 -0.085* 
(0.073) (0.047) (0.062) (0.045) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.470*** -0.496*** -0.422*** -0.472*** 
(0.100) (0.103) (0.098) (0.098) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,912 5,912 5,912 5,912 
R-square 0.288 0.197 0.349 0.244 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 









5. Ending sample date at 2006 
Table C.33. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.299* 0.288* 
(0.153) (0.149) 
Post Shock -0.293* -0.276* 
(0.164) (0.156) 
Slope -0.240* -0.208 
(0.133) (0.130) 
Yearly Price Level -0.055* -0.045* 
(0.032) (0.025) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.631 0.549 
(0.397) (0.354) 
Monthly Price Level -0.008 -0.009* 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.135* 0.135* 
(0.077) (0.078) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.530* -0.487* 
(0.293) (0.267) 
EPC Cost -0.002 0.007 
(0.009) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.035 0.033* 
(0.021) (0.019) 
Age 0.272 0.009 
(0.450) (0.145) 
Age2 0.026 -0.017 
(0.236) (0.141) 
Experience 0.012 0.016 
(0.024) (0.022) 
LNG Fleet 0.012 0.008 
(0.025) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.115*** 0.106*** 
(0.036) (0.032) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.150*** -0.139*** 
(0.041) (0.042) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.294** 0.294** 
(0.139) (0.138) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.093 -0.097 
(0.208) (0.207) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 5,520 5,520 
R-square 0.072 0.045 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.34. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.114** 0.110** 
(0.053) (0.052) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.041* 0.045** 
(0.022) (0.023) 
Slope -0.171 -0.157 
(0.126) (0.123) 
Yearly Price Level -0.020 0.017 
(0.034) (0.035) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.575 -0.866 
(0.676) (0.712) 
Monthly Price Level -0.011* -0.010 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.233 -0.284 
(0.180) (0.191) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.495 -0.438 
(0.299) (0.268) 
EPC Cost -0.003 0.008 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.035 0.033* 
(0.021) (0.019) 
Age 0.488 0.039 
(0.595) (0.151) 
Age2 0.003 -0.031 
(0.244) (0.145) 
Experience 0.008 0.014 
(0.024) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.010 0.007 
(0.025) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.109*** 0.103*** 
(0.036) (0.031) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.142*** -0.133*** 
(0.045) (0.045) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.270* 0.280** 
(0.139) (0.137) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.078 -0.082 
(0.207) (0.204) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 5,520 5,520 
R-square 0.077 0.047 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.35. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.564*** 0.550*** 
  (0.146) (0.149) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.092** -0.103** -1.244*** -1.200*** 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.320) (0.317) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.163* -0.148 -0.652*** -0.630*** 
(0.091) (0.096) (0.138) (0.150) 
Yearly Price Level -0.029 -0.036 -0.018 -0.013 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.192 0.247 0.078 0.055 
(0.477) (0.478) (0.461) (0.474) 
Monthly Price Level 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.036 0.031 0.056 0.051 
(0.087) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.269 -0.256 -0.303 -0.239 
(0.297) (0.324) (0.288) (0.314) 
EPC Cost -0.006 -0.011 -0.005 -0.001 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.022 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age 0.245 0.441 0.174 0.027 
(0.153) (0.493) (0.128) (0.456) 
Age2 -0.212* -0.361 -0.165 -0.298 
(0.129) (0.218) (0.109) (0.191) 
Experience -0.023 -0.024 -0.019 -0.022 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.012 
(0.024) (0.030) (0.020) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.042 0.022 0.040 0.023 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.040) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.116 -0.129 -0.130** -0.145** 
(0.080) (0.078) (0.062) (0.060) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.654*** 0.659*** 0.715*** 0.719*** 
(0.140) (0.145) (0.155) (0.160) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.126 0.102 0.110 0.091 
(0.183) (0.192) (0.153) (0.162) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,520 5,520 5,520 5,520 
R-square 0.173 0.197 0.254 0.239 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.36. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.614*** 0.583*** 
  (0.157) (0.166) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.136** 0.124*** -1.421*** -1.390*** 
(0.069) (0.044) (0.410) (0.430) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.150* -0.135 -0.689*** -0.649*** 
(0.083) (0.086) (0.143) (0.159) 
Yearly Price Level -0.049 -0.052 -0.053 -0.070 
(0.034) (0.043) (0.034) (0.045) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.716* 0.728* 0.756** 0.869* 
(0.368) (0.430) (0.375) (0.453) 
Monthly Price Level -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014** -0.014** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.126 0.128 0.097 0.100 
(0.099) (0.100) (0.096) (0.096) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.486** -0.528** -0.381* -0.491* 
(0.227) (0.262) (0.203) (0.252) 
EPC Cost 0.012 0.008 0.015 -0.001 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) 
Firm Size 0.026 0.028 0.026 0.028 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Age -0.255 -0.226 -0.205 0.241 
(0.158) (0.545) (0.158) (0.556) 
Age2 0.204 0.432* 0.174 0.386 
(0.155) (0.224) (0.160) (0.239) 
Experience 0.050* 0.043 0.038 0.032 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) 
LNG Fleet 0.015 0.024 0.007 0.013 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.125*** 0.159*** 0.123*** 0.153*** 
(0.033) (0.040) (0.029) (0.037) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.091** -0.089* -0.068 -0.067 
(0.043) (0.047) (0.042) (0.045) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.445*** -0.448*** -0.485*** -0.488*** 
(0.101) (0.095) (0.101) (0.096) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.267 -0.229 -0.249 -0.216 
(0.203) (0.196) (0.213) (0.206) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,520 5,520 5,520 5,520 
R-square 0.067 0.201 0.135 0.245 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.37. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.150** 0.150* 
  (0.076) (0.076) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
0.074 0.122 -0.157 -0.150 
(0.236) (0.226) (0.267) (0.245) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.168* -0.152 -0.335*** -0.319** 
(0.092) (0.096) (0.126) (0.130) 
Yearly Price Level -0.059 -0.012 -0.026 -0.003 
(0.064) (0.051) (0.064) (0.050) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.110 -0.942 -1.075 -1.336 
(2.444) (2.281) (2.526) (2.282) 
Monthly Price Level -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.080 0.059 0.093 0.077 
(0.093) (0.087) (0.096) (0.091) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.213 -0.093 -0.189 -0.102 
(0.288) (0.316) (0.291) (0.323) 
EPC Cost 0.003 0.013 0.006 0.012 
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.022 0.021 0.022 0.022 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) 
Age 0.213 -0.207 0.201 -0.029 
(0.154) (0.472) (0.135) (0.495) 
Age2 -0.206 -0.358 -0.191* -0.367* 
(0.130) (0.218) (0.113) (0.203) 
Experience -0.025 -0.024 -0.031 -0.032 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.005 
(0.024) (0.030) (0.022) (0.028) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.042 0.024 0.035 0.013 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.114 -0.129 -0.105 -0.123* 
(0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.073) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.636*** 0.653*** 0.630*** 0.644*** 
(0.138) (0.144) (0.146) (0.154) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.126 0.098 0.150 0.120 
(0.187) (0.193) (0.159) (0.167) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,520 5,520 5,520 5,520 
R-square 0.175 0.195 0.216 0.227 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.38. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.111** 0.108** 
  (0.048)  (0.049) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
0.807** 0.705** 0.554 0.466 
(0.316) (0.266) (0.345) (0.286) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.155* -0.137 -0.282*** -0.260*** 
(0.083) (0.086) (0.090) (0.097) 
Yearly Price Level 0.230*** 0.160*** 0.221** 0.157*** 
(0.088) (0.056) (0.088) (0.053) 
Yearly Price Volatility -8.784** -7.303*** -8.820*** -7.437*** 
(3.451) (2.711) (3.420) (2.658) 
Monthly Price Level -0.007 -0.009* -0.006 -0.009 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.085 0.105 0.082 0.102 
(0.098) (0.096) (0.097) (0.094) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.302 -0.433* -0.290 -0.416 
(0.205) (0.255) (0.205) (0.255) 
EPC Cost 0.018 0.003 0.017 0.004 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Firm Size 0.026 0.029 0.025 0.029 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Age -0.228 0.245 -0.214 0.209 
(0.158) (0.631) (0.147) (0.633) 
Age2 0.199 0.432* 0.187 0.447** 
(0.154) (0.224) (0.143) (0.217) 
Experience 0.053** 0.045 0.051* 0.042 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
LNG Fleet 0.015 0.024 0.012 0.022 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.127*** 0.160*** 0.129*** 0.166*** 
(0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.088** -0.084* -0.078* -0.075* 
(0.042) (0.046) (0.040) (0.044) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.422*** -0.439*** -0.419*** -0.434*** 
(0.100) (0.095) (0.098) (0.094) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.275 -0.232 -0.268 -0.223 
(0.201) (0.197) (0.203) (0.198) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,520 5,520 5,520 5,520 
R-square 0.068 0.202 0.092 0.218 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.39. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.598*** 0.522*** 
  (0.125) (0.132) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.138* -0.192*** -1.351*** -1.194*** 
(0.071) (0.065) (0.277) (0.292) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.205** -0.146 -0.693*** -0.611*** 
(0.086) (0.093) (0.080) (0.133) 
Yearly Price Level -0.000 -0.026 0.014 -0.004 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.051 0.148 -0.177 -0.005 
(0.516) (0.516) (0.527) (0.517) 
Monthly Price Level 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.003 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.552 -0.488 -0.616** -0.538* 
(0.344) (0.355) (0.312) (0.310) 
EPC Cost -0.009 -0.028* -0.004 -0.010 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.005 0.023 0.008 0.023 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.018) 
Age 0.053 1.054* 0.032 0.538 
(0.068) (0.554) (0.065) (0.479) 
Age2 -0.052 -0.410* -0.046 -0.336* 
(0.041) (0.216) (0.040) (0.190) 
Experience -0.005 -0.030 -0.005 -0.023 
(0.023) (0.033) (0.022) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.011 0.003 0.009 0.011 
(0.009) (0.030) (0.008) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.020 0.025 0.011 0.022 
(0.038) (0.039) (0.034) (0.040) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.053 -0.134* 0.080 -0.144** 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.056) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,119 5,119 5,119 5,119 
R-square 0.213 0.154 0.267 0.200 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










Table C.40. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.904*** 0.602*** 
  (0.141) (0.166) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.126 0.194*** -2.125*** -1.352*** 
(0.087) (0.066) (0.372) (0.425) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.146* -0.073 -0.945*** -0.616*** 
(0.082) (0.079) (0.102) (0.155) 
Yearly Price Level -0.052 -0.029 -0.073** -0.053 
(0.036) (0.041) (0.034) (0.038) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.983** 0.737 1.128** 0.933** 
(0.460) (0.460) (0.445) (0.462) 
Monthly Price Level -0.018** -0.020*** -0.017** -0.018*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.483* -0.452* -0.494** -0.499** 
(0.254) (0.274) (0.224) (0.246) 
EPC Cost 0.015 0.032** 0.019 0.020** 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) 
Firm Size -0.019* 0.025 -0.017* 0.027 
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017) 
Age 0.077 -0.808 0.073 -0.299 
(0.081) (0.560) (0.070) (0.491) 
Age2 -0.058 0.521** -0.043 0.461* 
(0.058) (0.238) (0.049) (0.254) 
Experience 0.033 0.014 0.039** 0.009 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.019) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet -0.014* 0.038 -0.011 0.027 
(0.007) (0.024) (0.007) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.040 0.153*** -0.014 0.152*** 
(0.031) (0.041) (0.027) (0.037) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.151** -0.054 0.108 -0.042 
(0.076) (0.042) (0.073) (0.042) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,119 5,119 5,119 5,119 
R-square 0.202 0.139 0.285 0.191 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










6. Ending sample date at 2005 
Table C.41. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.224* 0.218* 
(0.132) (0.128) 
Post Shock -0.254* -0.239* 
(0.137) (0.127) 
Slope -0.185 -0.136 
(0.117) (0.114) 
Yearly Price Level -0.071** -0.050* 
(0.034) (0.026) 
Yearly Price Volatility 1.424** 1.264*** 
(0.551) (0.489) 
Monthly Price Level -0.002 -0.002 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.135 -0.173 
(0.131) (0.137) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.379** -1.278** 
(0.544) (0.503) 
EPC Cost -0.007 0.010 
(0.009) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.030* 0.029* 
(0.018) (0.016) 
Age 0.556 0.021 
(0.459) (0.121) 
Age2 0.040 -0.015 
(0.225) (0.107) 
Experience 0.007 0.013 
(0.026) (0.024) 
LNG Fleet 0.007 0.003 
(0.027) (0.018) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.080** 0.071*** 
(0.031) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.112* -0.095 
(0.060) (0.061) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.224 0.230 
(0.162) (0.160) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.402*** -0.403*** 
(0.082) (0.082) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 5,028 5,028 
R-square 0.075 0.055 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.42. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.093** 0.089** 
(0.041) (0.040) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.233** 0.212** 
(0.110) (0.104) 
Slope -0.167 -0.147 
(0.112) (0.108) 
Yearly Price Level -0.022 0.031 
(0.035) (0.035) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.133 -0.295 
(0.645) (0.624) 
Monthly Price Level -0.018*** -0.014* 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility -1.233** -1.214** 
(0.561) (0.545) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.387** -1.278** 
(0.565) (0.515) 
EPC Cost -0.006 0.011 
(0.011) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.031* 0.029* 
(0.018) (0.016) 
Age 0.747 0.048 
(0.589) (0.124) 
Age2 0.019 -0.027 
(0.234) (0.110) 
Experience 0.004 0.012 
(0.026) (0.025) 
LNG Fleet 0.003 0.000 
(0.027) (0.018) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.076** 0.070*** 
(0.031) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.105 -0.089 
(0.064) (0.065) 
Delay by Extreme Weather  0.204 0.224 
(0.161) (0.157) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.384*** -0.375*** 
(0.079) (0.079) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 5,028 5,028 
R-square 0.081 0.059 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.43. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.504*** 0.477*** 
  (0.128) (0.131) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.080** -0.104*** -1.113*** -1.056*** 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.279) (0.281) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.174* -0.154 -0.602*** -0.566*** 
(0.090) (0.097) (0.125) (0.143) 
Yearly Price Level -0.031 -0.043 -0.020 -0.021 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.668 0.763 0.532 0.551 
(0.542) (0.550) (0.523) (0.536) 
Monthly Price Level 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.007 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.370** -0.352* -0.339* -0.336* 
(0.181) (0.181) (0.179) (0.182) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.740* -0.749 -0.758* -0.710 
(0.442) (0.469) (0.436) (0.459) 
EPC Cost -0.003 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.018 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age 0.212 0.594 0.151 0.193 
(0.130) (0.492) (0.113) (0.444) 
Age2 -0.168 -0.357* -0.129 -0.294 
(0.103) (0.202) (0.091) (0.183) 
Experience -0.024 -0.024 -0.019 -0.020 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.025) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet -0.007 -0.015 -0.000 -0.003 
(0.023) (0.033) (0.018) (0.028) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.023 -0.003 0.024 0.003 
(0.032) (0.039) (0.029) (0.036) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.082 -0.102 -0.098 -0.120* 
(0.091) (0.088) (0.068) (0.066) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.605*** 0.605*** 0.665*** 0.664*** 
(0.152) (0.157) (0.166) (0.171) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.138 -0.178* -0.087 -0.126 
(0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.091) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028 
R-square 0.189 0.203 0.280 0.240 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.44. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.575*** 0.535*** 
  (0.150) (0.157) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.140** 0.116*** -1.317*** -1.270*** 
(0.068) (0.043) (0.390) (0.404) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.162** -0.140 -0.660*** -0.607*** 
(0.081) (0.085) (0.127) (0.144) 
Yearly Price Level -0.055 -0.063 -0.059* -0.080* 
(0.034) (0.045) (0.034) (0.046) 
Yearly Price Volatility 1.373** 1.401** 1.356** 1.496** 
(0.545) (0.615) (0.529) (0.621) 
Monthly Price Level -0.012** -0.012** -0.010* -0.010* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.087 -0.056 -0.084 -0.037 
(0.162) (0.154) (0.165) (0.157) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.265*** -1.320** -1.082*** -1.225** 
(0.453) (0.492) (0.405) (0.464) 
EPC Cost 0.012 0.004 0.016 -0.004 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) 
Firm Size 0.025 0.028 0.024 0.027 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Age -0.197 -0.051 -0.150 0.406 
(0.138) (0.545) (0.136) (0.551) 
Age2 0.158 0.443* 0.128 0.389 
(0.136) (0.228) (0.140) (0.250) 
Experience 0.047* 0.036 0.034 0.025 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.017 0.034 0.009 0.022 
(0.019) (0.025) (0.017) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.094*** 0.135*** 0.089*** 0.125*** 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.030) (0.038) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.070* -0.070 -0.045 -0.047 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.045) (0.047) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.477*** -0.480*** -0.516*** -0.517*** 
(0.113) (0.105) (0.109) (0.104) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.560*** -0.493*** -0.566*** -0.509*** 
(0.077) (0.084) (0.076) (0.084) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028 
R-square 0.080 0.217 0.173 0.259 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.45. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.142** 0.141** 
  (0.067) (0.066) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
0.116 0.125 -0.120 -0.144 
(0.243) (0.227) (0.268) (0.248) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.180** -0.158 -0.322** -0.299** 
(0.091) (0.097) (0.125) (0.132) 
Yearly Price Level -0.043 -0.017 -0.015 -0.010 
(0.062) (0.049) (0.062) (0.047) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.165 -0.461 -0.908 -0.747 
(2.397) (2.152) (2.485) (2.152) 
Monthly Price Level 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.004 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.312* -0.341* -0.345* -0.362* 
(0.182) (0.182) (0.187) (0.185) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.678 -0.571 -0.637 -0.556 
(0.421) (0.437) (0.423) (0.446) 
EPC Cost 0.005 0.011 0.008 0.011 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.018 0.017 0.020 0.018 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) 
Age 0.187 -0.062 0.174 0.081 
(0.131) (0.438) (0.117) (0.457) 
Age2 -0.162 -0.355* -0.151 -0.367* 
(0.104) (0.202) (0.093) (0.191) 
Experience -0.027 -0.024 -0.031 -0.029 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) 
LNG Fleet -0.007 -0.015 -0.005 -0.013 
(0.023) (0.033) (0.020) (0.030) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.022 -0.002 0.021 -0.007 
(0.031) (0.039) (0.030) (0.038) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.080 -0.101 -0.075 -0.101 
(0.091) (0.088) (0.085) (0.081) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.586*** 0.599*** 0.586*** 0.593*** 
(0.151) (0.157) (0.155) (0.163) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.152 -0.188* -0.018 -0.062 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.087) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028 
R-square 0.191 0.201 0.237 0.233 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.46. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.106** 0.104** 
  (0.044) (0.045) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
0.841*** 0.717** 0.597* 0.484* 
(0.319) (0.267) (0.336) (0.276) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.168** -0.144* -0.279*** -0.251** 
(0.081) (0.085) (0.095) (0.101) 
Yearly Price Level 0.233*** 0.150** 0.224*** 0.146*** 
(0.086) (0.056) (0.086) (0.053) 
Yearly Price Volatility -8.502** -6.729** -8.507*** -6.824** 
(3.313) (2.596) (3.289) (2.550) 
Monthly Price Level -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.106 -0.029 -0.105 -0.029 
(0.170) (0.153) (0.166) (0.147) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.102*** -1.245** -1.088*** -1.223** 
(0.420) (0.483) (0.418) (0.480) 
EPC Cost 0.019* 0.001 0.018 0.002 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
Firm Size 0.025 0.029 0.023 0.027 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Age -0.174 0.372 -0.162 0.334 
(0.136) (0.620) (0.127) (0.620) 
Age2 0.153 0.443* 0.144 0.462** 
(0.135) (0.228) (0.124) (0.220) 
Experience 0.052** 0.038 0.049* 0.034 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet 0.016 0.033 0.015 0.034 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.097*** 0.136*** 0.097*** 0.140*** 
(0.031) (0.040) (0.032) (0.042) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.067* -0.065 -0.060* -0.058 
(0.037) (0.042) (0.036) (0.040) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.453*** -0.471*** -0.444*** -0.461*** 
(0.111) (0.106) (0.110) (0.105) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.570*** -0.507*** -0.560*** -0.491*** 
(0.077) (0.085) (0.077) (0.084) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,028 5,028 5,028 5,028 
R-square 0.081 0.219 0.110 0.236 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.47. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.580*** 0.499*** 
  (0.123) (0.119) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.097 -0.155** -1.280*** -1.125*** 
(0.068) (0.066) (0.276) (0.268) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.271*** -0.182* -0.691*** -0.580*** 
(0.083) (0.095) (0.076) (0.122) 
Yearly Price Level -0.039 -0.053 -0.025 -0.034 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Yearly Price Volatility 0.905 0.952 0.705 0.737 
(0.603) (0.604) (0.593) (0.588) 
Monthly Price Level -0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.848* -0.793 -0.805* -0.739 
(0.503) (0.512) (0.482) (0.508) 
EPC Cost -0.020 -0.035** -0.012 -0.020* 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) 
Firm Size 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.010 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) 
Age 0.010 0.920 0.004 0.434 
(0.062) (0.574) (0.057) (0.497) 
Age2 -0.001 -0.385* -0.012 -0.277 
(0.038) (0.201) (0.037) (0.179) 
Experience -0.008 -0.041 -0.002 -0.017 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.019) (0.024) 
LNG Fleet 0.005 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 
(0.007) (0.032) (0.006) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.005 -0.018 0.002 -0.008 
(0.033) (0.038) (0.030) (0.035) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.116* -0.083 0.121* -0.122* 
(0.064) (0.086) (0.062) (0.063) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,705 4,705 4,705 4,705 
R-square 0.226 0.152 0.291 0.196 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










Table C.48. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.863*** 0.528*** 
  (0.138) (0.157) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.202** 0.278*** -1.967*** -1.114*** 
(0.093) (0.082) (0.368) (0.404) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.267*** -0.145* -0.972*** -0.602*** 
(0.083) (0.085) (0.092) (0.139) 
Yearly Price Level -0.105** -0.082* -0.118*** -0.102** 
(0.045) (0.048) (0.044) (0.048) 
Yearly Price Volatility 1.992*** 1.747*** 2.033*** 1.863*** 
(0.680) (0.673) (0.640) (0.670) 
Monthly Price Level -0.015** -0.019*** -0.012* -0.016** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.225*** -1.229** -1.097*** -1.200*** 
(0.472) (0.487) (0.388) (0.440) 
EPC Cost 0.015 0.034** 0.020 0.020** 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) 
Firm Size -0.018** 0.027 -0.016* 0.026 
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.017) 
Age 0.045 -0.960* 0.046 -0.316 
(0.078) (0.525) (0.066) (0.434) 
Age2 -0.043 0.435* -0.031 0.398 
(0.054) (0.243) (0.045) (0.258) 
Experience 0.034 0.040 0.033* 0.028 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) 
LNG Fleet -0.012* 0.032 -0.010 0.021 
(0.007) (0.024) (0.006) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.043 0.132*** -0.027 0.125*** 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.032) (0.037) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.175** -0.071* 0.136 -0.049 
(0.086) (0.039) (0.083) (0.044) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,705 4,705 4,705 4,705 
R-square 0.227 0.158 0.309 0.203 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










7. Ending sample date at 2004 
Table C.49. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.121 0.109 
(0.118) (0.116) 
Post Shock -0.181* -0.157 
(0.106) (0.100) 
Slope -0.132 -0.073 
(0.108) (0.106) 
Yearly Price Level 0.024 0.057*** 
(0.024) (0.022) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.575 -0.945* 
(0.526) (0.512) 
Monthly Price Level -0.004 -0.004 
(0.006) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.160 -0.215 
(0.131) (0.142) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.074** -0.932** 
(0.515) (0.464) 
EPC Cost 0.000 0.021 
(0.007) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.018 0.019 
(0.013) (0.012) 
Age 0.661 0.023 
(0.441) (0.099) 
Age2 0.096 0.001 
(0.170) (0.073) 
Experience -0.006 0.004 
(0.028) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet 0.014 0.007 
(0.021) (0.012) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.057** 0.049** 
(0.027) (0.024) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.124** -0.098* 
(0.051) (0.052) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.205 0.217 
(0.156) (0.154) 
Delay by Hurricane - - 
  
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 4,536 4,536 
R-square 0.091 0.078 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.50. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.023 0.013 
(0.113) (0.110) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.051 -0.026 
(0.104) (0.128) 
Slope -0.092 -0.070 
(0.093) (0.086) 
Yearly Price Level 0.010 0.073 
(0.025) (0.047) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.411 -1.280 
(0.983) (1.264) 
Monthly Price Level -0.008 -0.002 
(0.006) (0.010) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.392 -0.103 
(0.566) (0.613) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.082** -0.905** 
(0.516) (0.435) 
EPC Cost 0.004 0.021 
(0.008) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.018 0.018 
(0.013) (0.011) 
Age 0.569 0.031 
(0.497) (0.099) 
Age2 0.087 -0.002 
(0.179) (0.074) 
Experience -0.007 0.003 
(0.029) (0.028) 
LNG Fleet 0.012 0.006 
(0.021) (0.012) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.056** 0.049** 
(0.027) (0.024) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.121** -0.095* 
(0.054) (0.054) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.192 0.212 
(0.152) (0.149) 
Delay by Hurricane - - 
  
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 4,536 4,536 
R-square 0.088 0.079 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.51. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.399*** 0.386*** 
  (0.117) (0.117) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.103*** -0.123*** -0.926*** -0.897*** 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.252) (0.253) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.227** -0.214* -0.549*** -0.534*** 
(0.107) (0.114) (0.117) (0.133) 
Yearly Price Level 0.061* 0.034 0.069** 0.055* 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.031) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.286** -0.913 -1.394** -1.147* 
(0.623) (0.604) (0.591) (0.592) 
Monthly Price Level 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.007 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.332* -0.304* -0.295* -0.282 
(0.170) (0.172) (0.166) (0.171) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.518 -0.571 -0.537 -0.534 
(0.415) (0.450) (0.424) (0.452) 
EPC Cost 0.006 -0.005 0.004 0.002 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) 
Firm Size 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.006 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age 0.142 0.545 0.102 0.183 
(0.105) (0.480) (0.101) (0.443) 
Age2 -0.084 -0.232 -0.061 -0.173 
(0.079) (0.170) (0.077) (0.172) 
Experience -0.030 -0.033 -0.022 -0.028 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) 
LNG Fleet 0.012 0.010 0.017 0.022 
(0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.018 -0.004 0.019 0.003 
(0.025) (0.032) (0.024) (0.031) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.115* -0.141** -0.127** -0.154*** 
(0.067) (0.066) (0.051) (0.050) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.572*** 0.565*** 0.628*** 0.621*** 
(0.149) (0.153) (0.162) (0.166) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,536 
R-square 0.300 0.225 0.351 0.256 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.52. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.546*** 0.508*** 
  (0.149) (0.156) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.109* 0.080* -1.264*** -1.231*** 
(0.063) (0.041) (0.379) (0.395) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.222** -0.205** -0.679*** -0.635*** 
(0.097) (0.101) (0.120) (0.134) 
Yearly Price Level 0.038 0.030 0.024 -0.001 
(0.033) (0.040) (0.025) (0.034) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.520 -0.497 -0.282 -0.105 
(0.794) (0.844) (0.662) (0.705) 
Monthly Price Level -0.014** -0.014** -0.012* -0.012* 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.182 -0.144 -0.188 -0.131 
(0.159) (0.146) (0.163) (0.148) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.015** -1.080** -0.845** -1.005** 
(0.439) (0.482) (0.381) (0.443) 
EPC Cost 0.021* 0.011 0.024** 0.003 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) 
Firm Size 0.023* 0.025 0.023* 0.025 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
Age -0.122 0.077 -0.083 0.549 
(0.115) (0.513) (0.112) (0.530) 
Age2 0.097 0.389* 0.070 0.322 
(0.106) (0.202) (0.111) (0.235) 
Experience 0.044 0.032 0.029 0.019 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet 0.007 0.028 -0.001 0.011 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.069** 0.105** 0.065** 0.095** 
(0.031) (0.040) (0.029) (0.038) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.060 -0.066 -0.032 -0.040 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.048) (0.051) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.441*** -0.440*** -0.486*** -0.486*** 
(0.124) (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,536 
R-square 0.131 0.220 0.267 0.268 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.53. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.399** 0.399** 
  (0.167) (0.166) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
-2.375*** -2.337*** -2.926*** -2.893*** 
(0.654) (0.685) (0.713) (0.748) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.230** -0.214* -0.380*** -0.365** 
(0.108) (0.114) (0.133) (0.142) 
Yearly Price Level -0.282*** -0.255*** -0.252*** -0.220*** 
(0.084) (0.071) (0.084) (0.066) 
Yearly Price Volatility 17.514*** 16.993*** 15.405*** 14.872*** 
(4.875) (4.906) (4.748) (4.711) 
Monthly Price Level -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.390** -0.419** -0.338** -0.369** 
(0.182) (0.188) (0.171) (0.178) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.068 0.029 0.002 0.109 
(0.392) (0.432) (0.387) (0.430) 
EPC Cost 0.012 0.018 0.009 0.016 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.005 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age 0.120 -0.131 0.115 -0.165 
(0.106) (0.423) (0.103) (0.438) 
Age2 -0.078 -0.230 -0.081 -0.244 
(0.080) (0.170) (0.080) (0.175) 
Experience -0.034 -0.034 -0.025 -0.026 
(0.029) (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) 
LNG Fleet 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.014 
(0.016) (0.030) (0.013) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.017 -0.002 0.016 -0.004 
(0.024) (0.032) (0.024) (0.032) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.113* -0.140** -0.120** -0.150*** 
(0.068) (0.065) (0.054) (0.051) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.560*** 0.566*** 0.578*** 0.585*** 
(0.149) (0.153) (0.155) (0.160) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,536 
R-square 0.298 0.225 0.329 0.252 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.54. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.417*** 0.394*** 
  (0.131) (0.133) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
1.713* 1.755* 0.498 0.615 
(0.941) (1.005) (0.942) (1.007) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.226** -0.205** -0.403*** -0.374*** 
(0.097) (0.101) (0.122) (0.128) 
Yearly Price Level 0.317** 0.242** 0.279** 0.208** 
(0.134) (0.098) (0.133) (0.096) 
Yearly Price Volatility -14.599** -13.847* -13.023* -12.432* 
(7.252) (7.154) (7.221) (7.086) 
Monthly Price Level -0.003 -0.008 -0.000 -0.005 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.165 -0.056 -0.207 -0.101 
(0.166) (0.141) (0.168) (0.144) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.313** -1.524** -1.048** -1.271** 
(0.568) (0.682) (0.481) (0.601) 
EPC Cost 0.016* -0.004 0.015 -0.005 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Firm Size 0.022* 0.025 0.023* 0.025 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Age -0.100 0.516 -0.105 0.492 
(0.113) (0.610) (0.111) (0.599) 
Age2 0.092 0.387* 0.100 0.393* 
(0.105) (0.203) (0.108) (0.211) 
Experience 0.049* 0.032 0.043 0.028 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.006 0.027 0.002 0.018 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.071** 0.104** 0.078** 0.110** 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.033) (0.043) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.062* -0.066 -0.041 -0.046 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.425*** -0.442*** -0.434*** -0.450*** 
(0.122) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,536 4,536 4,536 4,536 
R-square 0.129 0.220 0.180 0.251 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.55. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
   0.418*** 
   (0.112) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.107**   -0.949*** 
(0.052)   (0.241) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.342***   -0.547*** 
(0.091)   (0.121) 
Yearly Price Level 0.064*   0.039 
(0.038)   (0.031) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.687**   -1.152* 
(0.827)   (0.661) 
Monthly Price Level -0.001   0.001 
(0.007)   (0.006) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.402   -0.376 
(0.479)   (0.489) 
EPC Cost -0.010   -0.010 
(0.015)   (0.008) 
Firm Size -0.002   0.004 
(0.010)   (0.010) 
Age 0.015   0.320 
(0.056)   (0.445) 
Age2 0.012   -0.225 
(0.036)   (0.168) 
Experience 0.005   -0.024 
(0.023)   (0.026) 
LNG Fleet 0.002   0.025 
(0.006)   (0.023) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.014   -0.005 
(0.030)   (0.031) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.080   -0.156*** 
(0.051)   (0.047) 
Diversification Effect Control Y   Y 
N 4,283   4,283 
R-square 0.301   0.205 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










Table C.56. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
   0.497*** 
   (0.152) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.070   -1.197*** 
(0.066)   (0.387) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.381***   -0.629*** 
(0.089)   (0.131) 
Yearly Price Level 0.033   0.006 
(0.040)   (0.033) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.393   -0.194 
(0.916)   (0.744) 
Monthly Price Level -0.011   -0.012* 
(0.007)   (0.007) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.755*   -0.928** 
(0.451)   (0.434) 
EPC Cost 0.017   0.003 
(0.012)   (0.007) 
Firm Size -0.014   0.023 
(0.009)   (0.015) 
Age 0.017   0.394 
(0.072)   (0.458) 
Age2 -0.024   0.329 
(0.050)   (0.243) 
Experience 0.016   0.022 
(0.024)   (0.025) 
LNG Fleet -0.013*   0.008 
(0.008)   (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.032   0.094*** 
(0.033)   (0.036) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.181**   -0.045 
(0.082)   (0.048) 
Diversification Effect Control Y   Y 
N 4,283   4,283 
R-square 0.261   0.210 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










8. Ending sample date at 2003 
Table C.57. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.056 0.034 
(0.103) (0.118) 
Post Shock -0.128 -0.100 
(0.093) (0.102) 
Slope -0.079 -0.061 
(0.099) (0.103) 
Yearly Price Level 0.011 0.021 
(0.032) (0.033) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.596 -0.784 
(0.732) (0.769) 
Monthly Price Level 0.000 0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.226 -0.236 
(0.137) (0.144) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.228 -0.187 
(0.612) (0.526) 
EPC Cost -0.007 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Firm Size 0.010 0.013 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Age -0.031 0.006 
(0.379) (0.115) 
Age2 0.142 0.022 
(0.177) (0.078) 
Experience 0.065* 0.067* 
(0.038) (0.037) 
LNG Fleet 0.001 -0.001 
(0.034) (0.020) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.063** 0.055*** 
(0.024) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.180*** -0.146*** 
(0.046) (0.046) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.137 0.142 
(0.156) (0.155) 
Delay by Hurricane - - 
  
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 4,044 4,044 
R-square 0.109 0.084 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.58. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
0.105 0.086 
(0.108) (0.108) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
0.212** 0.228** 
(0.104) (0.115) 
Slope -0.111 -0.097 
(0.095) (0.090) 
Yearly Price Level 0.009 0.008 
(0.031) (0.046) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.965 -0.892 
(1.125) (1.442) 
Monthly Price Level -0.010 -0.012 
(0.007) (0.009) 
Monthly Price Volatility -1.208* -1.285** 
(0.600) (0.639) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.151 -0.183 
(0.621) (0.519) 
EPC Cost -0.006 -0.006 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Firm Size 0.011 0.013 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Age -0.139 0.002 
(0.426) (0.117) 
Age2 0.138 0.023 
(0.181) (0.079) 
Experience 0.065* 0.066* 
(0.038) (0.039) 
LNG Fleet 0.000 -0.001 
(0.036) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.063** 0.055*** 
(0.024) (0.021) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.181*** -0.147*** 
(0.045) (0.046) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.133 0.137 
(0.153) (0.151) 
Delay by Hurricane - - 
  
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 0.110 0.086 
R-square 45 45 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.59. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.256** 0.257** 
  (0.117) (0.112) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.115*** -0.085*** -0.644*** -0.602** 
(0.037) (0.030) (0.247) (0.242) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.362*** -0.361** -0.557*** -0.562*** 
(0.130) (0.137) (0.120) (0.127) 
Yearly Price Level -0.009 -0.016 0.004 0.002 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.036) 
Yearly Price Volatility -0.461 -0.242 -0.638 -0.479 
(0.929) (0.884) (0.869) (0.810) 
Monthly Price Level 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.010 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.385** -0.396** -0.356* -0.375* 
(0.188) (0.192) (0.185) (0.190) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 0.786 0.994* 0.639 0.940 
(0.503) (0.575) (0.501) (0.570) 
EPC Cost -0.021*** -0.016* -0.020*** -0.010 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Firm Size 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.002 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Age 0.089 -0.231 0.064 -0.458 
(0.127) (0.476) (0.122) (0.450) 
Age2 -0.031 -0.078 -0.016 -0.029 
(0.090) (0.201) (0.085) (0.205) 
Experience 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) 
LNG Fleet 0.007 0.003 0.011 0.014 
(0.016) (0.027) (0.014) (0.024) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.034* 0.025 0.034* 0.029 
(0.019) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.173*** -0.211*** -0.177*** -0.216*** 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.049) (0.050) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.434*** 0.426** 0.479*** 0.473*** 
(0.159) (0.161) (0.169) (0.171) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,044 4,044 4,044 4,044 
R-square 0.367 0.290 0.399 0.307 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.60. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.461*** 0.426*** 
  (0.145) (0.143) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.032 0.026 -1.122*** -1.067*** 
(0.044) (0.030) (0.369) (0.364) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.380*** -0.372*** -0.748*** -0.717*** 
(0.122) (0.128) (0.111) (0.117) 
Yearly Price Level 0.085** 0.085** 0.058 0.049 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.036) (0.034) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.628* -1.620* -1.178 -1.093 
(0.861) (0.851) (0.800) (0.771) 
Monthly Price Level -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.253 -0.241 -0.256 -0.231 
(0.165) (0.156) (0.169) (0.157) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.814** -1.867* -1.402* -1.686* 
(0.900) (1.011) (0.798) (0.957) 
EPC Cost 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.004 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Firm Size 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.018 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Age -0.079 -0.181 -0.045 0.244 
(0.127) (0.524) (0.119) (0.525) 
Age2 0.065 0.310 0.040 0.232 
(0.105) (0.224) (0.109) (0.245) 
Experience 0.112*** 0.105** 0.095** 0.091** 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
LNG Fleet -0.003 0.016 -0.010 -0.003 
(0.030) (0.046) (0.024) (0.041) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.073** 0.099** 0.068** 0.088** 
(0.029) (0.037) (0.027) (0.034) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.115** -0.134** -0.084 -0.106* 
(0.050) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.399*** -0.395*** -0.442*** -0.440*** 
(0.144) (0.144) (0.141) (0.143) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,044 4,044 4,044 4,044 
R-square 0.209 0.340 0.339 0.378 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.61. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.106 0.100 
  (0.149) (0.148) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
-2.102 -2.404* -2.298* -2.578* 
(1.355) (1.424) (1.302) (1.388) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.366*** -0.361** -0.391*** -0.385*** 
(0.131) (0.137) (0.127) (0.135) 
Yearly Price Level -0.300*** -0.257** -0.296*** -0.252** 
(0.113) (0.106) (0.114) (0.107) 
Yearly Price Volatility 15.785* 16.863* 15.573* 16.583* 
(8.879) (9.246) (8.995) (9.313) 
Monthly Price Level 0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.006 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.375** -0.455** -0.359** -0.439** 
(0.174) (0.186) (0.161) (0.173) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 0.854* 1.437** 0.858* 1.444** 
(0.503) (0.610) (0.509) (0.615) 
EPC Cost -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.009 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) 
Firm Size 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.001 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Age 0.059 -0.771 0.060 -0.778 
(0.129) (0.471) (0.125) (0.472) 
Age2 -0.025 -0.076 -0.025 -0.075 
(0.090) (0.201) (0.087) (0.203) 
Experience 0.011 0.020 0.012 0.021 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.005 
(0.015) (0.026) (0.015) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.033* 0.026 0.033* 0.026 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.171*** -0.210*** -0.170*** -0.212*** 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.415*** 0.429** 0.422*** 0.434** 
(0.159) (0.161) (0.159) (0.162) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,044 4,044 4,044 4,044 
R-square 0.364 0.290 0.373 0.291 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.62. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  0.148 0.092 
  (0.170) (0.162) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
1.144 1.264 0.765 1.042 
(1.694) (1.872) (1.694) (1.911) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.381*** -0.372*** -0.417*** -0.394*** 
(0.122) (0.128) (0.115) (0.124) 
Yearly Price Level 0.215 0.203 0.210 0.200 
(0.171) (0.160) (0.171) (0.159) 
Yearly Price Volatility -9.980 -10.451 -9.831 -10.425 
(11.798) (12.691) (11.713) (12.648) 
Monthly Price Level -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Monthly Price Volatility -0.244 -0.209 -0.250 -0.212 
(0.162) (0.143) (0.162) (0.142) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -1.873** -2.051* -1.798** -2.014* 
(0.934) (1.135) (0.892) (1.117) 
EPC Cost 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.001 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Age -0.070 0.002 -0.066 0.019 
(0.127) (0.583) (0.125) (0.576) 
Age2 0.063 0.309 0.059 0.304 
(0.105) (0.225) (0.105) (0.224) 
Experience 0.113** 0.104** 0.110** 0.102** 
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) 
LNG Fleet -0.003 0.016 -0.004 0.014 
(0.030) (0.047) (0.029) (0.046) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.073** 0.098** 0.073** 0.097** 
(0.029) (0.037) (0.029) (0.036) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.116** -0.135** -0.110** -0.131** 
(0.050) (0.058) (0.054) (0.061) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.395*** -0.397*** -0.399*** -0.400*** 
(0.142) (0.146) (0.142) (0.146) 
Delay by Hurricane - - - - 
    
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 4,044 4,044 4,044 4,044 
R-square 0.208 0.341 0.222 0.341 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.63. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
   0.237** 
   (0.104) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.113**   -0.573** 
(0.051)   (0.226) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.465***   -0.603*** 
(0.098)   (0.124) 
Yearly Price Level 0.053   0.037 
(0.047)   (0.035) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.864*   -1.143 
(1.119)   (0.816) 
Monthly Price Level 0.003   0.006 
(0.008)   (0.007) 
Construction Raw Material Cost 0.422   0.749 
(0.594)   (0.594) 
EPC Cost -0.017*   -0.009* 
(0.010)   (0.005) 
Firm Size -0.000   0.001 
(0.009)   (0.008) 
Age -0.004   -0.272 
(0.051)   (0.432) 
Age2 0.029   -0.009 
(0.035)   (0.208) 
Experience 0.020   0.000 
(0.028)   (0.027) 
LNG Fleet -0.006   -0.008 
(0.007)   (0.019) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.025   0.025 
(0.031)   (0.025) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.090**   -0.216*** 
(0.046)   (0.047) 
Diversification Effect Control Y   Y 
N 3,851   3,851 
R-square 0.372   0.236 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










Table C.64. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
   0.357** 
   (0.141) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.013   -0.906** 
(0.055)   (0.362) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.546***   -0.709*** 
(0.106)   (0.116) 
Yearly Price Level 0.062   0.066* 
(0.052)   (0.037) 
Yearly Price Volatility -1.073   -1.145 
(1.117)   (0.842) 
Monthly Price Level -0.007   -0.006 
(0.008)   (0.007) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.904   -1.160 
(0.802)   (0.985) 
EPC Cost 0.012   0.008 
(0.011)   (0.005) 
Firm Size -0.010   0.015 
(0.009)   (0.013) 
Age -0.007   -0.361 
(0.067)   (0.454) 
Age2 -0.007   0.297 
(0.045)   (0.250) 
Experience 0.027   0.084** 
(0.032)   (0.041) 
LNG Fleet -0.018**   -0.017 
(0.009)   (0.039) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.016   0.087*** 
(0.034)   (0.033) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.184**   -0.106* 
(0.080)   (0.059) 
Diversification Effect Control Y   Y 
N 3,851   3,851 
R-square 0.337   0.317 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










9. Using future natural gas price 
Table C.65. The effect of positive demand shock on post-entry speed capability (DV: 
distances from the origin) 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Post Shock × Slope (H1) 0.344* 0.331** 
(0.171) (0.169) 
Post Shock -0.337* -0.326* 
(0.182) (0.179) 
Slope -0.226 -0.243* 
(0.146) (0.143) 
Yearly Price Level -0.017 -0.021 
(0.019) (0.017) 
Yearly Price Volatility 18.511 20.014 
(20.166) (19.624) 
Monthly Price Level -0.001 0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.017 -0.242 
(3.409) (3.385) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.426 -0.498* 
(0.279) (0.260) 
EPC Cost 0.043** 0.040** 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Size 0.038 0.036* 
(0.023) (0.022) 
Age -0.268 0.054 
(0.478) (0.161) 
Age2 -0.094 -0.090 
(0.242) (0.158) 
Experience 0.031 0.033 
(0.024) (0.022) 
LNG Fleet 0.003 0.001 
(0.026) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.113*** 0.109*** 
(0.038) (0.035) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.168*** -0.159*** 
(0.041) (0.042) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.256 0.250 
(0.175) (0.173) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.181 -0.171 
(0.195) (0.192) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.074 0.071 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.66. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
post-entry speed capability 
 Monthly Panel 
III 
OLS / FE 
IV 
GLS / RE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility ×Slope 
6.329** 6.005** 
(3.136) (2.946) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility 
-0.400 -0.520 
(0.709) (0.832) 
Slope -0.135 -0.128 
(0.118) (0.113) 
Yearly Price Level -0.016 -0.006 
(0.020) (0.016) 
Yearly Price Volatility -47.227 -51.473 
(34.584) (36.187) 
Monthly Price Level 0.001 0.001 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Monthly Price Volatility 2.941 4.211 
(5.261) (6.714) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.401 -0.369 
(0.296) (0.274) 
EPC Cost 0.032** 0.033** 
(0.014) (0.014) 
Firm Size 0.037 0.035 
(0.023) (0.021) 
Age 0.357 0.103 
(0.610) (0.173) 
Age2 -0.117 -0.108 
(0.250) (0.164) 
Experience 0.027 0.031 
(0.025) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet 0.001 -0.001 
(0.025) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.107*** 0.106*** 
(0.037) (0.034) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.160*** -0.152*** 
(0.044) (0.045) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.237 0.246 
(0.173) (0.168) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.165 -0.160 
(0.197) (0.192) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.075 0.068 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Columns I and III are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model, and results reported in Column 
II and IV are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, 
but results are not reported in the table. Within R-square is reported for a fixed-effects model, and overall R-






Table C.67. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.623*** 0.610*** 
  (0.155) (0.156) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.112** -0.082* -1.382*** -1.304*** 
(0.045) (0.047) (0.337) (0.331) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.127 -0.114 -0.676*** -0.654*** 
(0.100) (0.103) (0.151) (0.162) 
Yearly Price Level 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.015 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
Yearly Price Volatility -10.368 -11.720 -15.179 -17.658 
(24.340) (24.013) (24.421) (24.474) 
Monthly Price Level 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Monthly Price Volatility -2.757 -2.504 -2.673 -2.172 
(2.896) (2.996) (2.759) (2.910) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.290 -0.181 -0.323 -0.172 
(0.290) (0.326) (0.280) (0.312) 
EPC Cost 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.019 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.023 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Age 0.299* 0.004 0.218 -0.317 
(0.168) (0.565) (0.140) (0.513) 
Age2 -0.286** -0.444** -0.228* -0.373* 
(0.139) (0.216) (0.118) (0.189) 
Experience -0.020 -0.021 -0.018 -0.019 
(0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) 
LNG Fleet 0.004 0.003 0.013 0.015 
(0.023) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.028 0.004 0.025 0.004 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.118 -0.126 -0.130** -0.140** 
(0.079) (0.077) (0.063) (0.061) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.660*** 0.671*** 0.726*** 0.736*** 
(0.157) (0.162) (0.169) (0.175) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.160 0.138 0.127 0.108 
(0.188) (0.200) (0.165) (0.175) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.146 0.183 0.223 0.229 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-







Table C.68. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.631*** 0.606*** 
  (0.164) (0.171) 
Demand Shock (𝜷𝟐) 0.147** 0.176*** -1.458*** -1.397*** 
(0.070) (0.054) (0.422) (0.437) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.114 -0.101 -0.674*** -0.641*** 
(0.088) (0.090) (0.150) (0.163) 
Yearly Price Level -0.035 -0.029 -0.037 -0.037 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) 
Yearly Price Volatility 40.808* 38.358* 43.314* 42.792* 
(21.438) (22.683) (22.192) (23.898) 
Monthly Price Level -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Monthly Price Volatility 0.279 0.663 0.360 0.372 
(3.899) (3.960) (3.823) (3.866) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.513** -0.462* -0.413** -0.432* 
(0.223) (0.257) (0.205) (0.250) 
EPC Cost 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Firm Size 0.026 0.029 0.026 0.029 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age -0.243 -0.652 -0.187 -0.233 
(0.160) (0.482) (0.158) (0.508) 
Age2 0.166 0.322 0.135 0.285 
(0.158) (0.215) (0.163) (0.227) 
Experience 0.070** 0.068** 0.059** 0.057** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) 
LNG Fleet 0.000 0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.139*** 0.169*** 0.138*** 0.166*** 
(0.037) (0.042) (0.034) (0.039) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.111** -0.112** -0.091** -0.093** 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.040) (0.041) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.516*** -0.516*** -0.554*** -0.556*** 
(0.119) (0.115) (0.113) (0.109) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.378** -0.370** -0.346* -0.339* 
(0.175) (0.167) (0.180) (0.173) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.104 0.210 0.175 0.251 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.69. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
time-to-build per ton capacity 
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  8.687** 8.612** 
  (4.146) (4.104) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜶𝟐) 
15.879*** 10.948** -3.041 -6.768 
(5.343) (5.305) (10.841) (10.916) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.133 -0.116 -0.273** -0.255** 
(0.101) (0.104) (0.118) (0.121) 
Yearly Price Level -0.018 0.005 -0.013 0.004 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) 
Yearly Price Volatility -156.977*** -121.299** -149.133*** -120.668** 
(53.491) (53.063) (56.664) (55.784) 
Monthly Price Level -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Monthly Price Volatility -1.587 -1.721 -1.290 -1.422 
(3.138) (3.124) (2.870) (2.864) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.004 0.085 -0.013 0.068 
(0.309) (0.318) (0.311) (0.320) 
EPC Cost 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.016 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) 
Age 0.264 -0.337 0.259 -0.187 
(0.175) (0.526) (0.158) (0.541) 
Age2 -0.280** -0.444** -0.266** -0.444** 
(0.142) (0.216) (0.128) (0.204) 
Experience -0.022 -0.020 -0.027 -0.027 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.007 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.027 0.004 0.022 -0.004 
(0.042) (0.044) (0.040) (0.043) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.115 -0.125 -0.110 -0.121 
(0.079) (0.077) (0.076) (0.073) 
Delay by Extreme Weather 0.641*** 0.669*** 0.639*** 0.662*** 
(0.155) (0.162) (0.159) (0.167) 
Delay by Hurricane 0.160 0.134 0.176 0.151 
(0.191) (0.199) (0.179) (0.190) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.148 0.183 0.174 0.209 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.70. The effect of the interaction term of yearly price level and price volatility on 
cost-to-build per ton capacity  
 Monthly Panel 
V 
GLS / RE 
VI 
OLS / FE 
VII 
GLS / RE 
VIII 
OLS / FE 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏)  
  5.582** 5.450** 
  (2.586) (2.606) 
Yearly Price Level × 
Yearly Price Volatility (𝜷𝟐) 
-10.214 -5.830 -22.072** -17.575* 
(6.926) (6.736) (9.280) (9.669) 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.120 -0.104 -0.211** -0.192* 
(0.089) (0.092) (0.092) (0.097) 
Yearly Price Level -0.000 -0.021 -0.003 -0.023 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) 
Yearly Price Volatility 113.458 82.261 99.708 69.929 
(76.268) (73.640) (75.092) (72.333) 
Monthly Price Level 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Monthly Price Volatility -1.571 -1.436 -1.064 -0.933 
(3.912) (3.849) (3.772) (3.706) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.693*** -0.756** -0.674*** -0.737** 
(0.255) (0.281) (0.255) (0.283) 
EPC Cost 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.025 0.029 0.024 0.029 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) 
Age -0.182 0.352 -0.168 0.328 
(0.160) (0.639) (0.148) (0.639) 
Age2 0.156 0.321 0.139 0.330 
(0.157) (0.214) (0.147) (0.211) 
Experience 0.074*** 0.068** 0.072*** 0.066** 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
LNG Fleet 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.004 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.142*** 0.169*** 0.143*** 0.175*** 
(0.036) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) 
Oil & Gas Reserves -0.114** -0.113** -0.109** -0.109** 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) 
Delay by Extreme Weather -0.479*** -0.505*** -0.477*** -0.503*** 
(0.118) (0.115) (0.118) (0.114) 
Delay by Hurricane -0.380** -0.359** -0.369** -0.347** 
(0.172) (0.169) (0.176) (0.172) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 
R-square 0.103 0.205 0.126 0.215 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I, III, VI, and VII are from estimation of a firm random-effects GLS model. Results 
reported in Column II, IV, VI, and VIII are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects OLS model. Standard errors 
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant 
are included in the regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Overall R-square is reported for a random-






Table C.71. The effect of demand shock on time-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟏) 
  0.634*** 0.602*** 
  (0.138) (0.139) 
Demand Shock  (𝜶𝟐) -0.205** -0.208** -1.483*** -1.337*** 
(0.082) (0.089) (0.298) (0.293) 
Cost-to-build (𝜶𝟑) -0.149 -0.097 -0.678*** -0.655*** 
(0.093) (0.100) (0.092) (0.145) 
Yearly Price Level 0.029 0.011 0.038 0.025 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) 
Yearly Price Volatility -44.304 -32.303 -54.161* -37.397 
(30.139) (27.358) (30.402) (27.499) 
Monthly Price Level 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.003 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.415 -0.309 -0.485 -0.361 
(0.327) (0.327) (0.300) (0.307) 
EPC Cost 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.021 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.008 0.029 0.010 0.024 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019) 
Age 0.050 0.805 0.038 0.044 
(0.075) (0.659) (0.072) (0.586) 
Age2 -0.071 -0.551** -0.068 -0.451** 
(0.043) (0.218) (0.043) (0.189) 
Experience -0.008 -0.032 -0.010 -0.023 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.025) (0.031) 
LNG Fleet 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.028 
(0.010) (0.028) (0.009) (0.026) 
Oil & Gas Production 0.027 0.011 0.016 0.005 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.044) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.033 -0.118 0.042 -0.142** 
(0.081) (0.077) (0.078) (0.059) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.193 0.146 0.244 0.197 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-identification 
test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are corrected for 
two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the regressions, but results 










Table C.72. The effect of demand shock on cost-to-build per ton capacity in 3SLS 
 I 
3SLS / RE 
II 
3SLS / FE 
III 
3SLS / RE 
IV 
3SLS / FE 
Demand Shock × 
Time-to-build (𝜷𝟏) 
  0.856*** 0.581*** 
  (0.142) (0.163) 
Demand Shock  (𝜷𝟐) 0.223** 0.413*** -1.959*** -1.134*** 
(0.109) (0.114) (0.377) (0.425) 
Time -to-build (𝜷𝟑) -0.152* -0.101 -0.913*** -0.618*** 
(0.092) (0.088) (0.106) (0.149) 
Yearly Price Level -0.058* -0.027 -0.061** -0.036 
(0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) 
Yearly Price Volatility 77.211** 65.692** 75.459** 66.196** 
(32.219) (28.344) (30.167) (28.208) 
Monthly Price Level -0.007 -0.014*** -0.006 -0.010** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Construction Raw Material Cost -0.599** -0.311 -0.528** -0.328 
(0.258) (0.267) (0.231) (0.242) 
EPC Cost 0.056*** 0.081*** 0.055*** 0.070*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Firm Size -0.020* 0.029 -0.018* 0.030 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.010) (0.019) 
Age 0.080 -2.093*** 0.082 -1.423*** 
(0.088) (0.587) (0.076) (0.537) 
Age2 -0.076 0.304 -0.068 0.257 
(0.062) (0.242) (0.054) (0.251) 
Experience 0.054** 0.045* 0.052*** 0.037 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.020) (0.023) 
LNG Fleet -0.017** 0.015 -0.014** 0.005 
(0.008) (0.022) (0.007) (0.019) 
Oil & Gas Production -0.018 0.162*** -0.001 0.162*** 
(0.038) (0.044) (0.034) (0.040) 
Oil & Gas Reserves 0.094 -0.106** 0.070 -0.090** 
(0.071) (0.045) (0.066) (0.041) 
Diversification Effect Control Y Y Y Y 
N 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 
R-square 0.219 0.146 0.291 0.194 
*** p < 0.01         ** p < 0.05         * p < 0.1 
Results reported in Column I and III are from estimation of a firm random-effects model adopting Wooldridge’s 
(2010) three-step IV approach. Results reported in Column II and IV are from estimation of a firm fixed-effects 
model adopting Wooldridge’s (2010) three-step IV approach. GMM estimator is used because over-
identification test is not rejected. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by firm and are 
corrected for two-step. Industry dummies for diversification effects and a constant are included in the 
regressions, but results are not reported in the table. Centered R-square is reported. 
